Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
8-13-2019 1:00 PM

Improving Civilian Protection during War through Conflict-Specific
Behavioural Regulation of Combatants
Kirsten MD Stefanik, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: Oosterveld, Valerie, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Law
© Kirsten MD Stefanik 2019

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the International Humanitarian Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Military,
War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Stefanik, Kirsten MD, "Improving Civilian Protection during War through Conflict-Specific Behavioural
Regulation of Combatants" (2019). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 6533.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/6533

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

Abstract
This thesis advances the claim that there is a gap between the regulation of behaviour for the
protection of individuals in peace and the regulations needed to protect civilians from combatant
violence during war. Social psychology and criminology theories can help to develop the
necessary conflict-specific behavioural regulations. This is because social psychology and
criminology theories can explain how combatant deviance is adversely affected by psychological
processes that reframe combatants’ conceptions of right and wrong and, in so doing,
fundamentally alter the way in which combatants view the IHL rules intended to protect
civilians. This thesis uses legal doctrinal methodology to establish the current status of IHL
application to armed groups and existing IHL protections for civilians, which are based largely
on peacetime protections for individuals (e.g., prohibitions on assault, murder, rape, etc.). It
demonstrates the need and utility of turning to academic disciplines beyond law, specifically
social psychology and criminology, to understand combatant violence toward civilians. Through
the use of case studies focusing on the Sierra Leone civil war and the numerous ongoing
conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, this thesis identifies two common combatant
behaviours that contribute to the perpetration of IHL violations against civilians, but are
currently unregulated by IHL: (1) combatant use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing
language toward civilians and (2) combatant use of nicknames, particularly violent or heroic
nicknames. The thesis proposes two new IHL regulations to address these behaviours and to
inhibit the ability of these behaviours to contribute to violence toward civilians during armed
conflict. Ultimately, the thesis demonstrates how combatant psychology can be used to develop
the substantive content of IHL for the protection of civilians.

Keywords:
International humanitarian law; non-state armed groups; combatants; civilian protection;
dehumanization; diffusion of responsibility; social psychology; criminology
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Summary for Lay Audience
This thesis argues that there is a need for new laws regulating the behaviour of members of
armed groups in order to improve protection for civilians during war. Current protections for
civilians are largely based on the same protections for individuals in peacetime (e.g., no murder,
no stealing, no rape), but new laws focusing on behaviour which, in the context of war, places
civilians in danger. The behaviour in need of regulation can be identified through an improved
understanding of the psychology causes of acts of direct violence toward civilians by members of
armed groups. This thesis uses social psychology and criminology to understand the psychology
of fighters. It then applies this understanding to case studies examining violence toward civilians
in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The thesis develops two new legal rules
to regulate the use of demeaning, degrading or dehumanizing language by fighters and the use of
nicknames by fighters. The dehumanization of civilians leads to violence towards civilians.
Nicknames allow fighters to feel anonymous and not responsible for their actions toward
civilians. Targeting these behaviours through the law will prevent the patterns of thought that
lead to civilian harm.
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Chapter 1
1 War and Peace
War and peace: What's the difference? … [W]ar is violent and
peace is, well, peaceful; in other words, peace is the antithesis of
war.
-David Keen1

Peace is the absence of war or, as Keen puts it, “peace is the antithesis of war.”2 In peace, there
is a seemingly never-ending amount of law, both domestic and international, that governs most
aspects of day-to-day life. By contrast, war often epitomizes “the breakdown of legal systems”
and the existence of “unleashed violence means the obliteration of standards of behaviour and
legal systems.”3 However, war is not an ungoverned space. War, referred to as ‘armed conflict’
under international law, is governed by an entire body of law: international humanitarian law
(IHL).4
IHL has, for more than a century, sought to protect and minimize harms to, among others,
civilians during conflict.5 IHL has continued to develop in the face of terrible violence directed
1

David Keen, “War and peace: What’s the difference?” (2000) 7:4 International Peacekeeping 1 at 1.
Ibid.
3
Frédéric Maurice, “Humanitarian Ambition” (1992) 289 International Review of the Red Cross 363 at 371.
4
IHL is also referred to as the law of armed conflict (LOAC). These terms (IHL and LOAC) can and are often used
interchangeably; however, the former, IHL, tends to be preferred by those who wish to emphasize the humanitarian
aims of the body of law, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, while the latter, LOAC, is often
preferred by states and their armed forces.
5
See, e.g., “Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field,Geneva, 22
August 1864” in D Schindler & J Toman, eds, (Leiden, NLD: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988) 280; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949 [Geneva
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949 [Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949 [Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention, Relative to the
Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 [Geneva Convention IV]; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
8 June 1977 [Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977 [Additional Protocol II];
Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules (Cambridge, UK:
ICRC and Cambridge University Press, 2009).
2

2
toward civilians in an effort to improve the protection it provides to civilians. For example, in the
wake of World War II, states negotiated the four Geneva Conventions of 19496 and, in the
shadow of the Vietnam War, they negotiated the two 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949
Geneva Conventions.7 More recently, the aim of civilian protection and the prevention of civilian
suffering has been the catalyst behind treaties prohibiting the use of anti-personnel landmines
and cluster munitions.8
Unlike in peace, it is legal and encouraged that combatants injure and kill enemy combatants
during armed conflict.9 The generally absolute prohibition on murder during peace time is
eroded during war. Despite permitting combatants to use lethal force against enemy combatants,
IHL prohibits combatants from directly targeting civilians.10 Apart from this rule requiring
combatants to distinguish between combatants and civilians, to take precautions to avoid
excessive indirect harm to civilians during conflict, and to ensure that any indirect harm to
civilians is proportionate to the military advantage acquired, the specific acts prohibited under
IHL for the protection of civilians are acts equally prohibited during peace such as murder,
assault, torture, and rape.11 The basic rules of IHL, including rules for the protection of civilians,
are widely known among civilians and combatants around the world.12 Even so, in most
contemporary armed conflicts, the majority of casualties are civilians who take no part in the
hostilities.13

6

Geneva Convention I, supra note 5; Geneva Convention II, supra note 5; Geneva Convention III, supra note 5;
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5.
7
Additional Protocol I, supra note 5; Additional Protocol II, supra note 5.
8
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
Their Destruction, United Nations, 18 September 1997 [Landmine Treaty]; Convention on Cluster Munitions, 3
December 2008 [Convention on Cluster Munitions].
9
See, e.g., Marco Sassoli, Legitimate Targets of Attacks under International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 2003); Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A
Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977) at 34, 41.
10
See, e.g., Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 1 (distinction); Additional Protocol I, supra note 5 at
Articles 48, 51(2), 52(2); Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at Article 13(2).
11
See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5 at Common Article 3; Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at
Article 4(2); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rules 87-98.
12
Daniel Muñoz-Rojas & Jean-Jacques Frésard, The Roots of Behaviour in War, Understanding and Preventing IHL
Violations (Geneva: ICRC, 2004) at 5.
13
See, e.g., Valerie Epps, “Civilian Casualties in Modern Warfare: The Death of the Collateral Damage Rule”
(2013) 41 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 307 at 329; Sobhi Tawil, “International
Humanitarian Law and Basic Education” (2000) 82 International Review of the Red Cross 581; Walter C Clemens
& J David Singer, “A Historical Perspective: The Human Cost of War” (2000) 282 Scientific American 56.

3
Since World War II, the nature of conflicts has drastically changed: the preponderance of armed
conflicts today are of a non-international character – sometimes referred to as civil wars – in
which at least one of the parties to the conflict is a non-state armed group (more commonly
referred to as rebels, guerrillas, or insurgents).14 Statistics show that, since 2000, armed groups
have accounted for the majority of the direct violence toward civilians in armed conflicts around
the world.15 Conflicts, such as those in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), have become synonymous with widespread civilian harms committed by members of
armed groups in direct violation of IHL.16 This violence has included assault; murder; torture;
and cruel, inhumane, humiliating and degrading treatment of civilians by combatants.17 News
reports often provide horrifying details of women whose babies are cut from their wombs by
combatants only to be killed,18 or people trapped in their homes by combatants and burned to
death.19 With such appalling details, it is easy to dismiss these combatants as psychopaths,
sadists, or monsters; however, the number of perpetrators of violence toward civilians during
non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) far exceeds societal prevalence rates of sadism and
psychopathy,20 personality disorders that, during peace, are sometimes used to explain how

14

In fact, of the 49 conflicts worldwide in 2017 only one was an inter-state conflict, the conflict between India and
Pakistan over Kashmir: Kendra Dupuy & Rustad, Siri Aras, Trends in Armed Conflict (Oslo: Peace Research
Institute Oslo, 2018).
15
Sebastian von Einsiedel, Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict, United Nations
University Centre for Policy Research Occasional Paper 10 (United Nations University, 2017) at 7.
16
Other conflicts known for widespread violence toward civilians since the end of the Cold War have included the
wars in the Central African Republic (2012-ongoing), Colombia (1964-ongoing), Darfur (2003-ongoing), Guatemala
(1960-1996), Rwanda (1990-1994), Somalia (1991-ongoing), Sri Lanka (1983-2009), South Sudan (2013-ongoing),
Syria (2011-ongoing), Former Yugoslavia (1991-1999).
17
While these acts of violence have been common in many armed conflicts, chapter 7 of this thesis examines these
acts in the specific context of the Sierra Leone Civil War and armed conflicts in the DRC since the mid-1990s.
18
Human Rights Watch, “We’ll Kill You if You Cry” Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict, Vol 15, No 1 (A)
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003) at 35.
19
“Casualties of War - Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms”, (1 February 1999), online: Human
Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/report/1999/02/01/casualties-war/civilians-rule-law-and-democratic-freedoms>;
Mark Tran, “Northern Congo civilians ‘need urgent aid’”, (15 October 2009), online: The Guardian
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/15/northern-congo-civilians-urgent-aid>; UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of a Mission of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
– accounts of Congolese fleeing the crisis in the Kasai region, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Geneva:
United Nations, 2017) at paras 30, 37-38, 40, 43.
20
The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders records the 12-month prevalence
rates of antisocial personality disorder, which includes psychopathy and sociopathy, at between 0.2% and 3.3%:
American Psychiatric Association, “Personality Disorders” in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, 5th ed (Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association, 2013); A 2001 study based on 2053 adults in
Oslo, Norway found prevalence rates of sadism at 0.2% and antisocial personality disorder at 0.7%: S Torgersen, E
Kringlen & V Cramer, “The prevalence of personality disorders in a community sample” (2001) 58:6 Archives of
General Psychology 590.

4
individuals come to commit acts of extreme violence against individuals.21 In reality, more often
than not, combatants who harm civilians are ordinary people who, before they took up arms,
were law-abiding citizens and who, after they lay down their arms, return to ordinary lawabiding lives, although often plagued by the trauma of their war experiences.22
This transition from law-abiding citizen to law-breaking combatant raises questions as to why
laws prohibiting certain behaviours for the security of individuals provide, more often than not,
sufficient protection from extreme violence in peace but these same prohibitions often offer
insufficient protection for civilians during armed conflict. Insight into this transition from lawabiding individual during peacetime to law-breaking individual in wartime can be found in
criminology and social psychology theories.23 These two disciplines have examined the
psychological processes associated with ordinary individuals who come to commit war crimes,
crimes against humanity, acts of genocide, and other violent acts toward civilians during armed
conflict. They demonstrate how, for example, the dehumanization of civilians reframes how
combatants view civilians and how they view rules for the protection of civilians.24
Psychological processes such as dehumanization reframe combatant conceptions of right and

21

See, e.g., David J Cooke, “Psychopathy, Sadism and Serial Killing” in Adrian Raine & José Sanmartin, eds,
Violence and Psychopathy (New York; London, UK: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2001) 123; Rebecca
Taylor LaBrode, “Etiology of the Psychopathic Serial Killer: An Analysis of Antisocial Personality Disorder,
Psychopathy, and Serial Killer Personality and Crime Scene Characteristics” (2007) 7:2 Brief Treatment and Crisis
Intervention 151; Hilda CP Morana, Michael H Stone & Elias Abdalla-Filho, “Personality disorders, psychopathy,
and serial killers” (2006) 28:2 Brazilian Journal of Psychiatry 74.
22
See, e.g., Alette Smeulers, “Perpetrators of International Crimes: Towards a Typology” in Alette Smeulers &
Roelof Haveman, eds, Supranational Criminology: towards a criminology of international crimes (Antwerp, BE:
Intersentia, 2008) 233 at 233–34; James Waller, Becoming Evil How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass
Killing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 55–87; Sara Reardon, “Colombia: after the violence” (2018)
557:7703 Nature: International Journal of Science; RJ Lifton, The Nazi Doctors (New York: Basic Books, 1986);
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: Viking, 1963).
23
For example, the theories of techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to
authority discussed in chapter 7. See, e.g., Albert Bandura, “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of
Inhumanities” (1999) 3:3 Personality and Social Psychology Review 192; Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement:
How People Do Harm and Live with Themselves (New York: Worth Publishers, 2016); Philip Zimbardo, The
Lucifer Effect Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York: Random House, 2007); Herbert C Kelman &
V Lee Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Stanley Milgram, Obedience to authority: An experimental view (New York:
Harper & Row, 1974); Alexander Alvarez, “Adjusting to Genocide: The Techniques of Neutralization and the
Holocaust” (1997) 21:2 139; Emily Bryant et al, “Techniques of Neutralization and Identity Work Among Accused
Genocide Perpetrators” (2017) spx026 Social Issues 1.
24
See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 23 at 167; Bandura, supra note 23 at 84–89; Bandura, supra note 23 at 201–203;
Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 18–19; Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 17, 222–24.

5
wrong such that their conceptions of right and wrong are no longer the same as during peace
time.
The continued excessive suffering of civilians during conflicts demands reflection on the current
content of IHL and how the protection of civilians during NIACs may be improved. IHL
discussions of, and approaches to, improving civilian protection in recent years have focused
predominantly on engagement with armed groups for the promotion of compliance with existing
rules as the best means of improving civilian protection.25 The assumption inherent in this focus
on engagement and enforcement of existing IHL rules is that existing IHL provides sufficient
protection for civilians and, consequently, engagement, education, and training are all that is
needed to improve armed group respect for civilians during armed conflict.26 Advocacy for new

25

See, e.g., Hyeran Jo, Compliant Rebels Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2015); Hyeran Jo, “Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by Non-State
Armed Groups: How Can It Be Improved?” (2016) 19 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 63; Liam
Elphick, “A Model of Amnesty: Inducing Armed Groups to Comply with International Humanitarian Law” (2016) 1
Perth International Law Journal 10; Jann Kleffner & Liesbeth Zegveld, “Establishing an individual complaint
procedure for violations of international humanitarian law” (2000) 3 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law
384; Marco Sassoli, “Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve their Compliance with International
Humanitarian Law” (2010) 1:1 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 5; Olivier Bangerter,
“Disseminating and Implementing International Humanitarian Law within Organized Armed Groups: Measures
armed groups can take to improve respect for IHL” in International Institute of Humanitarian Law, ed, Non-State
Actors and International Humanitarian Law (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2010) 187; Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of
Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Sandesh
Sivakumaran, “Courts of Armed Opposition Groups: Fair Trial or Summary Justice?” (2009) 7 Journal of
International Criminal Justice 489; Heike Krieger, ed, Inducing Complliance with International Humanitarian Law,
Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Cedric
Ryngaert & Anneleen Van de Meulebroucke, “Enhancing and Enforcing Compliance with International
Humanitarian Law by Non-State Armed Groups: an Inquiry into some Mechanisms” (2011) 3:1 Journal of Conflict
and Security Law 443; Michelle Mack, Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Geneva: ICRC, 2008).
26
See, e.g., ICRC, Enhancing Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 2d ed
(Geneva: ICRC, 2012) at 7; Marco Sassoli, “The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current and
Inherent Challenges” (2007) 10 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 45 at 46, 73; Inter-Parliamentary
Union & ICRC, International Humanitarian Law, Handbook for Parliamentarians N° 25 (IPU & ICRC, 2016) at 24;
Gabor Rona, “Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the ‘War on Terror’” (2003)
27:2 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 55 at 69.

6
IHL rules has largely been limited to the use of new technology in armed conflict such as lethal
autonomous weapons (colloquially referred to as ‘killer robots’)27 and cyberwarfare.28
This thesis examines the issue of civilian protection under IHL and whether existing IHL
protection provisions do, in fact, provide adequate protection for civilians during armed conflict
or whether, contrary to dominant opinions, there is a need for further regulation. This thesis
questions the view that IHL currently provides all of the necessary protections for civilians. This
thesis argues that, in understanding the psychological processes that contribute to violence
toward civilians in armed conflict, it is possible to determine that new IHL regulation is needed
and the content required in that new IHL regulation.

1.1 Objectives
This thesis advances the claim that there is a gap between the regulation of behaviour for the
protection of individuals in peace and the regulations needed to protect civilians from combatant
violence during war. Rather than mirror peacetime protections for individuals, the regulation of
combatant behaviour under IHL must include behavioural regulation specific to conflict that
address behaviours which, in conflict, pose a risk to the safety of civilians. Social psychology
and criminology theories can help to develop the necessary conflict-specific behavioural
regulations because they explain how combatant deviance is adversely affected by psychological
processes that reframe combatants’ conceptions of right and wrong and, in so doing,
fundamentally alter the way in which combatants view the IHL rules intended to protect
civilians.
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See, e.g., Denise Garcia, “Killer Robots: Why the US should Lead the Ban” (2015) 6:1 Global Policy 57; Vincent
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University of Oxford, 2014); Armin Krishnan, Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons
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Yale Law Journal 1309 at 1319–25; Peter Asaro, “On banning autonomous weapon systems: human rights,
automation, and the dehumanization of lethal decision-making” (2012) 94:886 International Review of the Red
Cross 687 at 709.
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Regime for Cyber Warfare” in Christian Czosseck & Kenneth Geers, eds, The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on
Cyber Warfare (Amsterdam, NLD: IOS Press, 2009) 106 at 115.
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Although there are a number of academic disciplines which examine and analyze past crimes or
IHL violations against civilians during armed conflict,29 this thesis focusses on theories from the
fields of criminology and social psychology to identify possible psychological factors that
contribute to crimes directed against civilians during armed conflict. These disciplines were
chosen because both address the subject of deviant behaviour. One key topic examined by
criminology is the “exploration of what causes some people to commit crimes”.30 Social
psychology “stud[ies] how people behave in real-world situations” including “why [people]
commit crimes”.31 Together, these disciplines provide a rich body of literature that explores how
and why ordinary people commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.32 The
theories considered for this thesis specifically focus on individual behaviour within that
individual’s “immediate social or physical environment” (social context).33 This thesis focuses
on the social context of war. In my discussion, I address four dominant theories within the social
psychology and criminology literature: techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement,
deindividuation, and obedience to authority. It is necessary to note that the theories used in this
thesis do not suggest that the behaviours they identify are deterministic.34 The presence of one or
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more of these behaviours does not guarantee that an individual will violate IHL; however, they
can have a profound impact on the psyche of a combatant that culminates in violence toward
civilians. For this reason, throughout the thesis, these behaviours are referred to as possibly,
potentially, or capable of contributing to or facilitating violations of IHL. This distinction is
important: these theories are not intended to excuse or justify deviant actions, nor are the
situational and psychological effects identified intended to minimize the degree of personal
accountability an individual bears for committing deviant acts.35
In order to demonstrate the existence of a gap between the current regulation of behaviour for the
protection of individuals during peace and the behavioural regulations necessary to provide
protection for civilians during war, and the need to address this with new IHL regulation, this
thesis develops six key arguments. First, it demonstrates that armed groups and their members
are bound by IHL and, therefore, would likely be subject to new regulations of IHL. Second, it
argues that the humanitarian goals of IHL warrant consideration of possible avenues by which to
improve civilian protection during non-international armed conflicts, including through the
ongoing development of the substantive rules of IHL for the protection of civilians. Third, it
demonstrates that the specific acts prohibited under IHL for the protection of civilians, such as
murder, assault, and rape, are the same protections offered to individuals during peace. Fourth,
through an examination of case study conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC, the thesis argues
that the mere existence of widespread IHL violations in practice provides little to no insight into
why legal protections that are largely sufficient during peace offer insufficient protection for
civilians during war. Fifth, it argues that combatant psychology understood through
criminological and social psychological theories developed and applied to the specific context of
violence toward civilians during conflict can help explain some of the underlying causes of IHL
violations. Sixth, it argues that these theories of criminology and social psychology help to
identify behaviours that are legal during peace (e.g., the use of dehumanizing language and the
use of nicknames) but which pose a sufficient risk to the safety of civilians during armed conflict
that they should be regulated under IHL. The thesis recommends the adoption of two new IHL
regulations - to address the use of dehumanizing language toward civilians and the use of
nicknames by combatants - in order to inhibit psychological processes that contribute to violence
35

See, e.g., Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 230–313.
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toward civilians during armed conflict. This thesis concludes that the flawed application of IHL
to armed groups, as well as the gap between the legal protections offered to individuals during
peace and those needed to protect civilians during war, can be addressed through new regulations
based on problematic behaviours identified through the use of social psychology and
criminology theories.
There is a certain internal tension to the suggestion that the failure to comply with existing legal
protections for civilian protection should be resolved through the development of new laws.
However, there is a critical difference between existing IHL rules for the protection of civilians
and the two new IHL rules recommended in this thesis. The rules recommended in this thesis
target psychological processes that contribute to violations of existing IHL laws. These
psychological processes, for example dehumanization or the displacement of responsibility for
one’s actions, critically alter how combatants view civilians, how combatants view themselves,
and how combatants view existing laws for civilian protection. The adverse effects of the
psychological processes discussed in this thesis and targeted by the new rules developed in the
thesis increase over time. The effects of psychological processes such as dehumanization or
displacement of responsibility intensify, thereby increasing the combatants’ disassociation from
both civilians who will become victims and from their own actions. There is a meaningful and,
in terms of civilian protection, a critical difference between the question of compliance before
psychological processes have been used by combatants to reframe their psyches and way of
thinking and the question of compliance after these psychological processes have been employed
and begun to operate on combatant psyches.36 Through the use of these psychological processes,
combatants create an obstacle or impediment to compliance with existing IHL rules for civilian
36

I have developed an analogy to demonstrate the issue that arises from the use of these psychological processes and
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violence.
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protection. Consequently, the current problem of non-compliance is not a pure enforcement issue
and will be difficult to remedy without addressing the root psychological processes contributing
to acts of direct violence toward civilians.
The new rules proposed in this thesis are designed to address the risk posed to civilians when
combatants begin to employ certain psychological processes but before combatants have altered
their psyches and reframed how they view civilians, their own responsibility and actions, and
existing laws. These new rules represent an upstream intervention, that can decrease the problem
of direct violence toward civilians and non-compliance with existing IHL rules downstream.

1.2 Scope
The primary objective of this thesis is to improve civilian protection during armed conflict by
identifying behavioural regulations needed in the specific context of armed conflict for the
protection of civilians and addressing this problem through the development of new IHL
regulations. In doing so, the thesis focuses on IHL as the body of international law designed for
the regulation of armed conflict and the protection of civilians during armed conflict and on the
further development of the substantive content of IHL. This section will address the scope of the
thesis and why it is important to concentrate on law development within IHL, in addition to
IHL’s current focus on armed group engagement. It will also explain why it is important to focus
on non-state armed groups and NIACs as well as on IHL, rather than other bodies of
international law, namely international criminal law and international human rights law, that
overlap in some ways with the protection of individuals during armed conflict.
As noted, the dominant approach of scholars and practitioners of IHL to improving civilian
protection during armed conflict is through engagement with armed groups for the promotion of
compliance with existing rules.37 A much smaller body of work has focused on the development
of new rules of IHL.38 This thesis takes the approach that attention does need to be paid to ways
of further developing civilian protection through new regulations, which can complement and
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facilitate the work of practitioners on engagement with armed groups for the purpose of
promoting compliance with IHL protections for civilians. The psychological factors that are
discussed in this thesis, in particular the dehumanization of civilians and the displacement of
responsibility by combatants for their actions, reframe combatants’ conceptions of right and
wrong and, in so doing, reframe the way in which combatants view IHL rules intended to protect
civilians. When practitioners seek to promote IHL compliance with protections for civilians who
have been subjected to dehumanization, they first need to re-humanize the civilians in the eyes of
the combatant. This renders the practitioners’ task of securing improved IHL compliance
significantly more difficult. New rules that seek to prevent the dehumanization of civilians will
enhance civilian protection by decreasing IHL violations. Additionally, education on these new
rules could, in the medium- and long-term, make ongoing IHL engagement with armed groups
on compliance more effective. It is for this reason that this thesis focusses on the development of
new rules of IHL rather than the enforcement of existing rules. Theories of criminology and
social psychology demonstrate how combatant psychology makes compliance more unlikely and
promoting compliance more difficult for practitioners, therefore there is great value in focusing
on law development that could ultimately enhance compliance.
The thesis focuses its analysis and discussion on the behaviour of members of non-state armed
groups as opposed to the behaviour of soldiers in national armed forces. Further, a focus on
members of non-state armed groups requires a focus on NIACs because, unless an armed group
is under the overall control of a state,39 an armed conflict against that armed group will be a
NIAC.40 The focus on non-state armed groups and NIACs is important for three reasons. First,
the majority of contemporary armed conflicts are NIACs involving one or more non-state armed
group.41 Further, the majority of direct armed violence against civilians in armed conflicts has
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The ‘overall control’ test was adopted by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic. The ICTY distinguished its
‘overall control’ test from the ICJ’s earlier ‘effective control’ test in Nicaragua: “the ICTY holds that it is important
to distinguish between the control for individual persons (effective control) and the control for militarily organized
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been attributed to non-state armed groups.42 Consequently, efforts to develop ways to reduce and
prevent direct violence toward civilians during armed conflict should logically target these
actors. Second, IHL treaty law is significantly more developed in the context of international
armed conflicts as compared to NIACs: between the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions there are 475 substantive provisions governing
international armed conflicts as compared to 19 provisions between Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II that govern NIACs.43 Although customary IHL has developed the content
of substantive rules governing NIACs,44 NIACs remain subject to fewer IHL rules than
international armed conflicts.45 Third, although the academic literature on NIACs and non-state
armed groups has grown significantly in the past two decades,46 academic literature focusing on
international armed conflicts and state armed forces continues to far exceed the academic
literature addressing the regulation of non-state armed groups.47 For the three aforementioned
reasons, a focus on members of non-state armed groups in this thesis can provide both the
practical attention required to prevent harms against civilians and contribute to an area of IHL
literature that receives comparatively limited attention.
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In addition to focusing on non-state armed groups in NIACs, this thesis limits itself to
consideration of IHL as a distinct body of international law. This is because IHL provides the
most direct regulation of the conduct of war in international law and is aimed at the prevention of
harm to civilians. Other areas of international law have a different focus. For example, IHL is
distinct from international criminal law, the body of international law that provides for individual
criminal accountability for the commission of the most serious international crimes: genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.48 International criminal law, therefore,
emphasizes accountability after harm has occurred rather than prevention. In addition to its
preventative focus, this thesis limits its focus to IHL rather than international criminal law for
three key reasons.
The first reason this thesis puts IHL at the centre of its analysis is because IHL captures more
combatant deviance than international criminal law. While some violations of IHL are
considered war crimes under international criminal law,49 not all IHL violations are crimes under
international criminal law. As Sivakumaran notes, “a war crime amounts to a serious violation of
international humanitarian law.”50 War crimes under international criminal law “are derived
primarily from the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols I and
II of 1977, and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.”51 The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, the most recent codification of war crimes under international
criminal law provides two categories of war crimes committed in non-international armed
conflicts: (1) “serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949” including violence to life and person, outrages upon personal dignity, taking
hostages, and “[t]he passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees”,52 and
(2) “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an
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international character, within the established framework of international law,” such as the use of
child soldiers, attacks intentionally directed at the civilian population, forced displacement of the
civilian population and pillage.53 The Rome Statute does not include other IHL prohibitions
addressing tactics such as the use of human shields or of certain weapons prohibited under IHL
like chemical weapons or anti-personnel landmines. IHL therefore provides a broader scope of
regulations for armed conflict than that found under international criminal law.
A second important reason for limiting the thesis’ scope to IHL is that the scope and application
of rules of international criminal law are “not always coterminous with [those of] international
humanitarian law.”54 For example, on the issue of child soldiers, the prohibition under
international criminal law criminalizes the use of children under fifteen years of age to
“participate actively in hostilities”.55 By contrast, the prohibition in IHL, as articulated in
Additional Protocol II applicable only to NIACs, prohibits such children from “tak[ing] part in
hostilities”56 - a complete ban on their participation not restricted to “active” participation as in
the international criminal law rule. Sivakumaran also notes the difference between the
prohibition on disproportionate attacks under international criminal law and IHL:57 IHL bans
“attack[s] which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”58 The international criminal
law prohibition is comparatively narrower as it bans only attacks that are “clearly excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated”.59 Violations of IHL
captured by international criminal law will often “require[] consideration of additional principles
[as compared to IHL] before personal guilt may be assigned.”60 For example, the threshold of
mens rea for international crimes tends to be quite high due to the severity of the acts being
punished as well the stigma that a conviction for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, or
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war crimes carry.61 By contrast, it has been suggested that the threshold for IHL violations is
lower than that for war crimes under international criminal law.62
Finally, IHL is the focus of the thesis because its enforcement through the internal disciplinary
systems of national armed forces and armed groups can be applied with greater temporal
proximity to the occurrence of a violation than a criminal prosecution through an international
criminal institution. Although there are indications that international criminal law has a deterrent
effect on combatants,63 there is also evidence that the likelihood of punishment affects deterrence
more than the severity of potential punishments.64 The need to address disciplinary issues
quickly and efficiently is one reason for separate military justice systems in some Western
countries.65 The use of internal disciplinary systems can enforce disciplinary and IHL rules at an
individual level in a direct and timely manner as well as in a manner visible to other combatants
that will produce a positive deterrent effect.
While this thesis focuses on the realm of IHL, reference to international criminal law will be
made as case law from international criminal courts and tribunals have contributed significantly
to the development of IHL.66 This is particularly the case with the identification of customary
international law applicable to NIACs.67 Although a separate body of law, international criminal
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law provides an important means of enforcing IHL and the application of international criminal
law has necessitated that international courts and tribunals apply and interpret for the first time
some of the provisions and concepts of the law of NIACs, such as when a NIAC comes into
existence.68 “[W]ar crime[s] [are] based” upon “underlying provision[s] of international
humanitarian law”; therefore, the prosecution of war crimes require the interpretation and
application of these underlying IHL provisions.69 Consequently, international criminal courts and
tribunals have therefore helped to “flesh[] out” the rules applicable in NIAC.70 The judgments of
these courts and tribunals have come to be widely relied upon by IHL scholars as one of, if not
the, most important sources for understanding the substantive content of certain IHL rules for
NIACs.71
Another body of international law with some overlap with IHL is international human rights law.
International human rights law is the body of international law that protects the fundamental
rights and freedoms, such as the right to life or the right to freedom of religion, of individuals
from infringement by states.72 There is overlap between some of the behaviours addressed by
IHL and international human rights law.73 For example, both bodies of law prohibit torture and
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cruel treatment.74 Traditionally, international human rights law has been seen as the peacetime
equivalent of IHL and not as law applicable during times of war.75 While this is no longer a
completely accurate depiction of the temporal application of international human rights law, IHL
remains the primary source for rules governing the protection of civilians during armed conflict.
The first important reason why this thesis limits its scope to IHL rather than international human
rights law is, as noted, the manner in which international human rights law applies during armed
conflict. International human rights law is no longer considered inoperative during armed
conflict.76 International human rights law is now considered to operate during armed conflict.77
During armed conflict, international human rights law can serve as both a tool to aid in the
interpretation of IHL78 and a means of filling legal gaps if an issue arises in which IHL is
silent.79 Where there is direct conflict between a provision of IHL and a provision of
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international human rights law, the IHL rule will generally prevail due to its more specialized
nature in the context of armed conflict.80
The second important reason to limit the thesis’ scope to IHL rather than international human
rights law is that international human rights law traditionally only governs the relationship
between states and individuals, rather than relationships between non-state actors (such as armed
groups) and individuals.81 Some scholars have argued that international human rights law now
creates obligations for armed groups in NIACs;82 however, the extent to which international
human rights law might apply to armed groups remains a debated topic.83 Since this thesis
focuses on armed groups under IHL, limitations on the applicability of international human
rights law to these actors limits the utility of considering international human rights law in this
thesis.
This thesis will, however, make reference to international human rights law where relevant.
International human rights law is discussed in chapter 5, which considers the question of whether
international human rights law creates obligations for armed groups and, if so, the extent of these
obligations during armed conflict. International human rights law is also addressed in chapter 8,
which advances recommendations for two new IHL regulations. In chapter 8, due to the ongoing
application of international human rights law during armed conflict, there is value in considering
whether, where existing IHL is silent on the regulation of, for example, the use of dehumanizing
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language, existing international human rights law can fill the gap in lieu of creating a new IHL
regulation.
The scope of this thesis is largely limited to the legal development of IHL, drawing on the related
fields of international criminal law and international human rights law where these bodies of law
can help clarify the interpretation and application of IHL. The focus of this thesis on IHL and its
further development provides a deep look at how IHL protections for civilians can be
strengthened. This leads to the identification of regulations that can both decrease harm to
civilians and facilitate the work of other scholars and practitioners who focus on engaging armed
groups for the purpose of compliance.

1.3 Contributions to Existing IHL Literature
This thesis draws on theories of social psychology and criminology to develop more conflictspecific behavioural regulation for civilian protection in an effort to better realize the
humanitarian goals of IHL to prevent, in as much as possible, the suffering of people who do not
take direct part in armed conflict. This thesis adds to existing IHL literature in four important
ways: (1) by introducing an in-depth examination of combatant psychology into the IHL
literature; (2) by identifying a gap within current IHL regulation and literature on combatant
behaviour toward civilians; (3) by demonstrating that there are ways that IHL protection for
civilians can and should be substantively developed; and, (4) by developing and recommending
new IHL regulations to address the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language by
combatants during conflict as well as the use of non-diminutive and non-derivative nicknames by
combatants during war. This section will discuss each of these contributions to existing IHL
literature and practice.
The first way in which this thesis contributes to existing IHL literature is by providing an indepth examination of combatant psychology that explains how combatants come to commit acts
of violence against civilians during armed conflict. There is a developing body of literature
applying socio-legal approaches, including social psychology, to international criminal law;84
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however, similar literature using social psychology to develop the substantive content of IHL
does not exist. There is a small body of literature that employs psychology to analyze and reflect
on public perceptions of IHL,85 public support for going to war,86 and how governments
convince people to go to war.87 Other articles have focused on the psychology of war victims88
or public perceptions of humanitarian organizations.89 On the specific question of combatant
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psychology, although a body of literature examining this issue exists within the disciplines of
criminology and social psychology,90 very minimal consideration has been given to combatant
psychology by scholars and practitioners in IHL literature.91 Within this IHL literature that
considers combatant psychology, there has been no consideration of theories of criminology that
explain combatant violence toward civilians and only a limited discussion of social psychology
theories that address combatant deviance.92 This thesis considers both criminology and social
psychology and identifies four theories that are repeatedly referenced in both fields: techniques
of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority. This thesis
further provides a detailed discussion of these four theories that emphasizes how certain
behaviours, such as the dehumanization of civilians, affect combatant psychology and result in
civilian harm. This discussion plays an essential role in this thesis by helping to identify and
address gaps in existing IHL regulation of combatant behaviour; however, it also provides a
useful resource for IHL practitioners to better understand the psyches of combatants with whom
they engage.
The second important contribution made by this thesis to existing IHL literature is through the
identification a need within the current regulation of combatant behaviour for the protection of
civilians during armed conflict for new behavioural regulation addressing conflict-specific
behaviours that pose a risk to civilians. This need is the result of current reliance within IHL on
many of the same protections afforded to individuals during peace as the means to provide
protection to civilians during war. Extensive bodies of literature exist on the protection of
individuals during peace under international law93 as well as under domestic law in different
90
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countries.94 There is also an extensive body of literature examining existing IHL protections for
civilians during armed conflict.95 Scholars have reflected on the similarities between
international human rights protections for individuals and IHL protections for civilians in terms
of their overlap on certain subjects (e.g., prohibition on torture) and on the manner in which
international human rights law applies during armed conflict.96 The fact that protections for
civilians during conflict are largely the same as those for individuals under domestic criminal
law97 is rarely acknowledged or discussed in IHL literature. The 1958 Commentary for the
Geneva Conventions notes that notes that the specific prohibited behaviours in armed conflict,
such as torture and mutilation, apply regardless of whether an armed conflict exists because they
are “essential rules which [a state] in fact observes daily, under its own laws, even when dealing
with common criminals.”98 The work of Clarke et al. has drawn on psychology to argue “that, for
the sake of realism, IHL and [international human rights law] rules on the use of force should be
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applied to scenes in video games that portray realistic battlefields”.99 Clarke et al.’s work focuses
on the regulation of a risk, impunity for IHL violations when playing video games, during peace;
however, the idea that behaviour considered innocuous in peace can lead to IHL violations is
similar to this thesis’ approach to identifying forms of speech and nicknames as risks requiring
regulation within the context of armed conflict. Therefore, this thesis adds to the literature by
identifying that the adoption of peacetime protections for individuals in IHL as protection for
civilians has created a gap in how behaviour jeopardizing civilian safety in war is conceived.
This thesis demonstrates that there are behaviours in peace, such as the use of dehumanizing
language or nicknames, that are legal, but which threaten civilian safety during armed conflict in
a manner which demands regulation.
The third important contribution this thesis makes to existing IHL literature is that it
demonstrates that, contrary to existing IHL literature, there are ways in which the substantive
content of IHL can be further developed to enhance civilian protection. As already discussed,
practitioners and scholars currently seek to address violence toward civilians during armed
conflict through engagement with armed groups to promote compliance and provide IHL
education and training.100 Other literature discussing individual protection in peace under
national law has drawn on psychology with respect to members of the security sector and law
enforcement to advocate for improved education and training.101 This thesis therefore adds to the
literature by demonstrating how combatant psychology, or the psychology of violence toward
civilians, can be used not only to improve current IHL engagement and training, but also to
identify weaknesses in existing IHL and as a tool to guide the substantive development IHL to
address these weaknesses.
99
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The fourth way in which this thesis contributes to IHL literature is through the specific
recommendation of new IHL regulations to address the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language by combatants during armed conflicts and the use of non-diminutive or
non-derivative nicknames by combatants during armed conflict. While the use of dehumanizing
language or nicknames by combatants has been widely recorded in conflicts such as the conflicts
in Sierra Leone and the DRC,102 there has been no discussion in IHL literature of a need to
regulate these behaviours. The one exception is where the use of dehumanizing language
constitutes the international crime of incitement to genocide or persecution as a crime against
humanity.103 This thesis contributes to existing IHL literature by demonstrating that not only do
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nicknames and dehumanizing language pose a threat to civilians during armed conflict, they can
be addressed through the development of new IHL rules.
This thesis challenges the dominant paradigm in existing IHL scholarship and practice, which
suggests that current widespread IHL violations of civilian protection during armed conflict by
armed groups requires only engagement with armed groups and training and education for these
armed groups on existing IHL. Instead, this thesis advances the claim that the current application
of IHL to armed groups is flawed due to a gap between the protection afforded to individuals
during peace and the protections that are required to ensure civilian protection during armed
conflict. The thesis demonstrates how social psychology and criminology theories help to
develop an understanding of combatant psychology that leads to violence toward civilians during
armed conflict and recommends new regulations to inhibit the behaviours currently contributing
to violations of existing IHL protections for civilians. In doing so, this thesis develops and adds
to a very limited body of existing IHL literature that considers combatant psychology and
demonstrates a way forward in the ongoing substantive development of IHL. The contributions
made by this thesis to IHL literature and practice will not only enrich IHL scholarship but will
also facilitate and improve the engagement of IHL practitioners with armed groups. Further, it
will provide states with insight into possible behaviours to be cognizant of among their own
national armed forces and an improved understanding of armed groups that can be used to
develop rules of engagement and guidelines for interactions with armed groups during conflict.

1.4 Organization of Thesis
The preceding sections in this chapter have been used to introduce the reader to the objectives
and key concepts used in this thesis. This section will provide an outline as to how the thesis
proceeds to develop its argument to support the claims that: (1) the application of IHL to armed
groups is flawed due to a gap between protection for individuals in peace and the protections
necessary for civilians during armed conflict, and (2) theories of social psychology and
criminology can be used to develop substantive IHL rules to fill this gap.
In chapter 2, this thesis introduces the methodological approaches employed in the thesis.
International legal doctrinal methodology is the dominant method used in thesis. The chapter
introduces this methodology as well as the core sources of international law relied upon under
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this method. The chapter then explains how the case study countries, Sierra Leone and the DRC,
were selected. It describes the qualitative methodology employed in the fieldwork interviews
conducted for the thesis. It provides demographic data for the interviewees and testimonies
collected in each case study location. Finally, it addresses the method of data analysis and
identifies limitations of the research methods employed in the thesis.
Chapter 3 begins the deeper discussion of IHL. It defines armed groups as a legal concept in IHL
based on the requirement of organization. This identifies the specific actor, non-state armed
groups, whose members are the primary focus of the thesis and the recommendations made in
chapter 8. argues that armed groups, despite being non-state actors who cannot be party to IHL
treaties, are nonetheless bound by IHL through a variety of different legal means. These means
include the state’s ability to bind its citizens by consenting to international law, limited
international legal personality, and, in some cases, the state-like exercise of authority over
territory by an armed group. The chapter argues that, despite arguments from some scholars that
armed groups should only be bound to IHL to which they have consented to be bound, consent is
not a legal requirement and armed groups are bound by IHL regardless of whether they consent
or not. The chapter then addresses the relationship between IHL and international human rights
law touched on in chapter one. It argues that at least some armed groups are also bound by
international human rights law as it applies during armed conflicts. The fact that armed groups
are bound by existing IHL and international human rights law protections for civilians during
armed conflict means that armed groups would be likely to be bound by the new substantive
rules of IHL developed in chapter 8 of this thesis.
Chapter 4 examines the principles and rules of IHL for the protection of civilians in NIACs. It
begins with a discussion of the concept of humanity and humanitarian goals of IHL that,
although balanced with military necessity, have provided and continue to provide the impetus for
the protection of civilians during armed conflict. It argues that the humanitarian objectives of
IHL support a review of existing IHL protections for civilians as well as the possible
development of new rules in an effort to increase their protection. It then examines core IHL
principles of distinction, precaution, proportionality, and humane treatment. Next, the chapter
turns to more specific prohibited acts for civilian protection such as violence to life, torture and
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cruel treatment, humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, and pillage. Knowledge of existing
rules binding on armed groups for the protection of civilians is important because chapter 8
identifies specific gaps in behavioural regulation for the protection of civilians during armed
conflict. The chapter argues that the existing specific protections represent acts that are equally
prohibited or criminalized during peacetime in the national laws of states. It further argues that
this suggests there may be a need to consider whether there are behaviours which, although legal
during peace, pose a risk to civilians during war such that they warrant regulation.
Chapter 5 addresses the protection of civilians during armed conflict in practice using the two
case studies of the Sierra Leone civil war and the series of conflicts in the DRC since the mid1990s. The chapter provides some basic information about these conflicts; however, the focus of
the chapter is on the violations committed during these conflicts by members of armed groups.
Two key points are made in this chapter. First, the widespread violations of IHL protections for
civilians during these conflicts indicate that the current status quo of IHL in practice is not
providing sufficient protection for civilians during armed conflict. It would be easy to assume
that these violations are purely an issue of non-compliance with existing IHL that can be
addressed through engagement, education, and training with armed groups. However, the second
key point of the chapter is that the violations do not in and of itself provide much, if any, insight
into the psychology of combatants committing these IHL violations and that drives the
commission of these IHL violations. This is important because the theories of social psychology
and criminology discussed in chapter 7 explain how combatant deviance is adversely affected by
psychological processes, such as dehumanization and the abdication of responsibility for one’s
actions, that reframe combatants’ conceptions of right and wrong and, in doing so, fundamentally
alter the way in which combatants view the IHL rules intended to protect civilians. This
reinforces the fact that combatant psychology can provide information not otherwise readily
available or apparent from mere awareness of the occurrence of IHL violations.
Chapter 6 examines three legal theories: Law and Economics, Behavioural Law and Economics,
and Socialization and International Law. Legal theory does not traditional examine the
psychology of deviance. Rather, the psychology of deviance is generally left to the disciplines of
social psychology and criminology. However, the three theories discussed in this chapter all
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attempt to develop behavioural or psychological models to explain legal compliance or deviance.
This chapter examines each of the three theories to demonstrate why they do not provide an
adequate tool for understanding combatant violence toward civilians during armed conflict and,
consequently, why a turn to theories of social psychology and criminology can provide the
necessary theoretical framework for addressing the regulation of combatant behaviour for the
protection of civilians. The chapter argues that Law and Economics theory bases its
understanding of legal deviance on significantly flawed assumptions about human behaviour.
While Behavioural Law and Economics attempts to address the flawed assumptions of Law and
Economics, its consideration of human psychology is very limited and ill-suited to application in
the exceptional circumstances of armed conflict. Socialization and International Law draws upon
some theories from the field of sociology, including cognitive dissonance which is foundational
to many of the social psychology and criminology theories employed in chapter 7. However,
Socialization and International Law theory fails to explore how cognitive dissonance operates in
detail. In particular, the theory fails to examine the psychological processes used by people to try
to resolve cognitive dissonance. Consequently, Socialization and International Law, like Law
and Economics and Behavioural Law and Economics, provides an inadequate theory to explore
and understand combatant psychology in armed conflict.
Chapter 7 turns to theories of social psychology and criminology. Although the legal theories
discussed in chapter 6 do not provide adequate models to explain combatant psychology, this
chapter demonstrates how social psychologists and criminologists have spent decades exploring
the question of how law-abiding citizens become law-breaking combatants who commit
violations of IHL protections for civilians during armed conflict. Chapter 7 discusses the theories
of techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to
authority. The chapter argues that these theories, which are referenced broadly in the literature,
provide a deep and nuanced understanding of combatant psychology that can be used to fill the
gap between the protection of individuals during peace and the protections needed for civilians
during conflict. The chapter identifies two key themes across the four theories: dehumanization
and responsibility. These two themes are used to review the research and fieldwork on the
conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC as well as existing IHL in chapter 8.
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Chapter 8, guided by the themes of dehumanization and responsibility established in the
preceding chapter, identifies the manifestation of these themes in two behaviours common in the
conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC: 1) the use of degrading, othering, or dehumanizing
language to refer to or address civilians, and (2) the use of nicknames by combatants as a
possible means of abdicating responsibility for any IHL violations they commit. The chapter
explains how these behaviours are representative of the themes of dehumanization and
responsibility in the theories of techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement,
deindividuation, and obedience to authority. The chapter explores whether the use of demeaning,
degrading, or dehumanizing language or the use of nicknames are already adequately covered by
existing IHL or international human rights law rules applicable during armed conflict. The
chapter argues that neither of these behaviours are adequately captured by existing protections
for civilians and proposes new rules and regulations to fully address these behaviours under IHL
and prevent harms to civilians.
Finally, chapter 9 provides the conclusion to the thesis. It restates the research problem
introduced in chapter 1 and revisits the key findings and contributions of each chapter of the
thesis. It reiterates that international legal theories do not sufficiently consider or address factors
that contribute to legal deviance in IHL and the potential to use theories of criminology and
social psychology to address this weakness. The expertise of these other disciplines that are
experienced in explaining deviant behaviour can be used as a lens to review IHL and such a
review can help identify problematic combatant behaviours, some of which are suitable for
regulation under IHL. The final chapter then addresses some of the limitations of this research
and propose avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2
2 Methodology
The research conducted for this thesis employs multiple methodologies. This thesis uses legal
doctrinal analysis to consider existing IHL protections for civilians during NIACs as applied to
non-state armed groups. Given that this analysis forms the centre of the thesis, the primary
methodology of the thesis is the legal doctrinal method. Legal doctrinal methodology provides
the means of identifying, interpreting, and applying existing rules of IHL relevant to both civilian
protection and the regulation of armed groups during NIACs. In addition to legal doctrinal
methodology, this thesis uses qualitative case study analysis to examine violations of IHL rules
for civilian protection committed by members of armed groups in practice. The two case study
conflicts relied on in the thesis are the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) and the multiple
armed conflicts that have occurred and remain ongoing in the DRC. These case studies are
complemented by field research and data collection conducted by the author in Sierra Leone and
the DRC. The thesis is further complemented by the use of theories and quantitative research
drawn from the disciplines of social psychology and criminology to develop an understanding of
legal deviance by combatants from IHL rules protecting civilians.
The aims of this thesis are three-fold. First, this thesis aims to demonstrate the need for different
behavioural regulations in IHL in order to protect civilians during conflict as compared to
peacetime behavioural regulation for the protection of individuals. The second aim of this thesis
is to elucidate common behaviours during armed conflict that can result in violations of IHL
rules for the protection of civilians, using social psychology and criminology theories. Third, this
research aims to advance recommendations for new substantive rules of IHL to address
behaviours that pose a particular risk to civilians during conflict with the goal of enhancing the
overall protection of civilians during war.
This chapter explains the methodology employed in this thesis to achieve the three abovementioned aims. The first section discusses legal doctrinal methodology, which serves as the
primary methodology and framework for this thesis. Next, the chapter turns to the case studies
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that are the focus of practical IHL application and violations in the thesis. Although the case
studies and qualitative fieldwork interviews are secondary methodologies in this thesis employed
within the larger legal doctrinal methodology framework, this discussion of these secondary
methodologies comprises the majority of this chapter. This is due to the fact that legal doctrinal
methodology is not as technical as qualitative methodology applied to fieldwork. Therefore, the
qualitative methodology requires more extensive description to achieve full transparency. The
discussion of case studies and qualitative methodology begins with consideration of my research
in Sierra Leone, including the reasons for selecting this case study and details on the data
collection and research population explored in the fieldwork. This is followed by a discussion of
the DRC case study, which similarly sets out the reasons for selection of the case study, data
collection and research population. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the data analysis
process employed, with the goal of transparency.

2.1 Legal Doctrinal Methodology
The primary methodology employed in this thesis is legal doctrinal. Legal doctrinal methodology
is the “dominant legal method in the common law world”.104 However, it is common for legal
research to include non-doctrinal methods in addition to doctrinal methods.105 In such instances,
non-doctrinal methods are generally “infus[ed] within … [a] doctrinal research framework.”106
Doctrinal methodology is a “normative and interpretive discipline that looks at legal practices
from a strong internalist point of view.”107 Legal scholars employing doctrinal methodology
“work from conceptions on how the elements of the law fit together in their respective fields, and
this qualifies them for assessing whether current developments can be reconciled with the given
normative structures of law.”108 The purpose of doctrinal methodology is to identify what the law
is in a given context.109 In order to accomplish the identification of the law, legal doctrinal
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methodology conducts an “interpretive, qualitative analysis” of the sources of law.110 Therefore,
within legal doctrinal methodology, “the primary data consist of the sources of the law.”111
The task of an academic employing legal doctrinal methodology is to take the sources of
international law and “organise, analyse and re-present this information in such a way as to
persuade [others] to follow their line of thought.”112 Chynoweth has noted that “the validity of
doctrinal research must inevitably rest upon developing a consensus within the scholastic
community, rather than on an appeal to any external reality.”113 The persuasiveness or strength of
arguments based on legal doctrinal methodology require consideration of the normative
persuasiveness of the argument as well as the concreteness of the argument grounded in the
realities of the legal system.114 Normative persuasiveness can be grounded in foundational
concepts, such as humanity, but is grounded even more strongly by drawing on the “formal
legal” sources (i.e., treaties, custom, and general principles) and “precedents and writings of
publicists” (i.e., case law and scholarly literature).115 Arguments must also take into
consideration the realities of the legal system, in particular the “will and interests of international
actors”; however, one must not adhere too rigidly to the will and interests of states because legal
argumentation must also “must also provide a standpoint from which present power may be
criticized and international transformation may be sought.”116
The authoritative sources of international law are those indicated above: treaties, custom, general
principles, case law, and scholarly literature. The identification of these sources as the
authoritative sources of international law stems from their articulation in Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.117 Treaties are legally binding written agreements
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between states.118 The key treaties relied on in this thesis are the core treaties of IHL: the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949119 and the two 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.120 The second formal source of international law is custom, commonly referred to
as customary international law, which is unwritten law identified based on widespread state
practice accompanied by the belief on the part of states that this practice is legally required
(referred to as opinio juris).121 The case law of international courts and tribunals is often relied
upon for the identification of rules of customary international law.122 In the context of IHL, the
2005 International Committee of the Red Cross’ Customary IHL Study is, in addition to
international case law, an important source relied on to identify customary IHL rules.123 The
third formal source of international law is general principles of international which are “cardinal
principles of the legal system, in the light of which international . . . law is to be interpreted and
applied.”124 General principles of international law may be identified within specific bodies of
international law or treaty regimes.125 Kleffner has suggested that, in the context of IHL, “[t]he
principles of distinction, proportionality and protection as well as the prohibition of using means
and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury and unnecessary
suffering” are general principles of IHL.126 Other key sources of international law are case law
and scholarly literature. This thesis draws extensively on the case law of the International Court
of Justice, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the International
Criminal Court to aid in the identification, interpretation, and application of existing IHL.
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Finally, this thesis makes extensive use of scholarly literature to engage with existing
interpretations of IHL as well as ongoing debates about existing IHL.
The sources of international law provide both the object of doctrinal scholarship as well as the
“conceptual framework” that must be employed to “make sense of the legal practice.”127
Consequently, legal doctrinal methodology is often said to operate “from a strong internalist
point of view.”128 In legal doctrinal methodology, “[m]ore than in the exact sciences, the only
form of ‘objectivity’ one may reach is the intersubjective consensus among legal scholars.”129
Legal doctrinal methodology has been criticized because it differs in method from the social
sciences;130 however, this criticism, as noted by Van Hoecke, “start[s]from false assumptions
(unity and similarity of all scientific disciplines)”.131 Legal doctrinal methodology is more
similar to methodologies employed in disciplines in the humanities with its emphasis on
interpretation, rather than the methodologies employed in social science disciplines.132
Nonetheless, Brouwer has described legal doctrinal methodology as being between the
methodologies employed in the humanities and those employed in social sciences.133
The legal doctrinal methodology employed in this thesis is appropriately situated between the
humanities and the social sciences. It relies heavily on interpretation; however, in so doing it
draws on research from the social sciences as supporting evidence. The thesis also uses
qualitative case study analysis based on conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC to demonstrate
the current status quo of IHL in practice and to find evidence in practice of the behaviours
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identified within the social psychological and criminological theories and studies employed in
the thesis. Though this thesis draws on work from the social sciences and includes the use of case
studies, it remains motivated by the “normative perspective of ‘the law’.”134 The reliance on
disciplines other than law, therefore, is both “heuristic” and “auxiliary”.135 The use of other
disciplines is heuristic where the evidence from other disciplines is used merely to bolster or
support the legal argument and interpretation of legal sources and auxiliary when a turn to social
psychology and criminology is necessary to explain combatant psychology, a task that chapter 6
will demonstrate cannot be accomplished by relying solely on legal theories.
This section has explained the legal doctrinal methodology relied on in this thesis. Through the
use of legal doctrinal methodology, this thesis grounds itself in the sources of IHL to identify the
current IHL protections for civilians and how IHL applies to non-state armed groups. The
reliance on formal sources of IHL, the formation of which is based on state consent to assume
legal obligations, further grounds this thesis in the reality of the international system which is
dominated by states who serve as the makers of international law. Where useful, recourse to
sources from disciplines in the social sciences is made heuristically to bolster specific
interpretations and applications of existing IHL. The thesis turns to the disciplines of social
psychology and criminology for an understanding of combatant psychology and, more
specifically, violence toward civilians in armed conflict. The insights provided by social
psychology and criminology are then used within the normative legal framework of IHL,
informed by the case studies of Sierra Leone and the DRC, to identify behaviours worthy of
substantive legal attention for the further protection of civilians during armed conflict.
The next section will turn to a discussion of fieldwork conducted for this thesis in Sierra Leone
and the DRC. While the case studies of Sierra Leone and the DRC, along with the fieldwork data
collection conducted in these countries, is a secondary methodology drawn on in this thesis, the
intricacies of this method require a much lengthier explanation than has been devoted to
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explaining the comparatively straightforward legal doctrinal methodology that is the primary
methodology of this thesis.

2.2 Case Studies and Qualitative Fieldwork
The aims of this thesis are grounded in the legal doctrinal methodology discussed in the previous
section. As noted, the legal doctrinal method is complemented through the use of case studies
and qualitative fieldwork. This section will introduce the case study and fieldwork
methodologies employed in the thesis.
Complete objectivity in qualitative research is not possible. Qualitative researchers must accept
that their research is open to bias. As Galdas has noted, “[t]hose carrying out qualitative research
are an integral part of the process and final product, and separation from this is neither possible
nor desirable.”136 Instead, transparency “about the processes by which data have been collected,
analyzed, and presented” should be a standard by which researchers are evaluated.137
Consequently, this chapter and thesis aims for maximum transparency, in terms of conveying the
manner in which research was conducted and data was collected, the approach used to analyze
materials, and the presentation of the data collection. As with any research project, there are
limitations to the methods and research choices made. These limitations have been identified and
explained in the description of the methodology.
The use of the case study method allows a researcher to “to investigate and understand complex
issues in real world settings.”138 When using the case study method, “emphasis … is placed on
exploration and description of a phenomenon.”139 The case studies of Sierra Leone and the DRC
in this thesis are illustrative of contemporary NIACs characterized by widespread IHL violations
committed by armed groups against civilians. Illustrative case studies describe and demonstrate
“what a situation is like” and can serve as tools to “help in the interpretation of other data”.140
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Illustrative case studies can “[m]ake the unfamiliar familiar” for readers and help to “avoid
oversimplification of reality”.141
The Sierra Leone and DRC case studies in this thesis are developed through a combination of
primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include fieldwork interviews conducted in
Sierra Leone and the DRC (discussed later in this chapter), statements made by victims,
witnesses, and perpetrators to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and
reports issued by institutions such as the UN Security Council contemporaneous to the events.
Secondary sources are primarily scholarly accounts of these conflicts. Many sources provide a
mixture of primary and secondary evidence. For example, the Final Report of the Sierra Leone
Truth and Reconciliation Commission includes excerpts from first-hand accounts of the Sierra
Leone civil war.142 Other secondary evidence includes Human Rights Watch news releases and
reports written by field operatives during the conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC, as well as
the first-hand accounts of victims, witnesses, and perpetrators quoted in these documents from
the conflict periods.143
One limitation of this method “is in selecting the instances” to be used as case studies as they
“should adequately represent the situation” being examined.144 This can be a challenge because
sometimes, “[w]here considerable diversity exists, it may not be possible to select a ‘typical’
site”.145 In many ways, this was not a significant challenge in this thesis. There are,
unfortunately, many contemporary NIACs in which armed groups have perpetrated extensive
violations of IHL protections for civilians, such as the Taliban in Afghaniztan,146 the FARC in
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Colombia,147 Hezbollah in Israel,148 the NPFL in Liberia,149 the LTTE in Sri Lanka,150 and the
LRA in Uganda.151 What did provide a challenge in the selection of case studies was the desire to
conduct fieldwork in the case study countries, which consequently imposed certain selection
restrictions based primarily on the security of both myself and my potential interviewees.
Therefore, the greatest limitation in case study selection was personal safety considerations.
Personal safety considerations, as well as other considerations discussed below, led to the
selection of Sierra Leone and the DRC as case studies for this thesis. The qualitative fieldwork
interviews conducted in Sierra Leone and the DRC were small-n studies with limited sample
size. Small-n studies are essential in order to build larger studies. As Gerring notes, “[a] single
case study is still a single shot – a single example of a larger phenomenon.”152 Rather than aim to
provide a picture that is generalizable on a large-scale, case studies aim to provide what
Rosemary Nagy has described as a “slice across the spectrum”.153 In the present study, the data
provides a slice across the spectrum of a small sample of data on armed groups in two armed
conflicts. The aim is not to provide outcomes generalizable to all armed groups in all conflicts,
but to elucidate themes, points of interests, and gaps in existing law that may indicate useful
patterns. This study attempts to explain the behaviour of a select number of members of armed
groups in Sierra Leone and DRC by using theories of social psychology and criminology to help
analyse and identify problematic behaviours not currently addressed by IHL.
Beyond the case study method, the research employed a Folk Bayesian approach. This approach
is loosely derived from Bayes Theorem, a mathematical formula that addresses conditional
probabilities; however, a Folk Bayesian approach is “largely intuitive” and is “more a matter of
making research decisions in the spirit of Bayes than of consciously applying Bayesian
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techniques.”154 Folk Bayesianism is a multidirectional approach to analysis where researchers
“move back and forth between theory and data, rather than taking a single pass through the
data.”155 Consequently, theory and data work together to generate the study’s hypotheses. In this
study, I began with by considering a wide array of theories of criminology and social
psychology, which might hold relevance for analysing the data collected through field interviews
and other case study research. As the field data was collected, I went back and forth between the
data and these numerous theories to identify the theories most applicable to the data collected. In
this manner, the theories included in chapter 7 were narrowed to those relevant to the analysis of
the data in subsequent chapters. This back-and-forth movement is critical to the Folk Bayesian
approach, where “moving back and forth between theory formulation and empirical investigation
– are all strategies that take into account the mutual dependence of understanding and
observation.”156 In this vein, “the research task is viewed as akin to extending a web or network,
while being prepared to modify the prior web in order to accommodate new findings.”157 This
multidirectional process allowed for the refinement of theory and data to produce hypotheses that
form the foundation of recommendations for the strengthening of international humanitarian law
and the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Each part of the process – theory and data – was
essential to the identification and generation of hypotheses.

2.3 Sierra Leone
The selection of case study location for the research prioritized safety, feasibility, and the nature
of the conflict. The Sierra Leone civil war began in 1991 and ended in 2002. The country has
been peaceful since that time. With the exception of street crime motivated by poverty, the
capitol, Freetown, is quite safe. This was an important deciding factor in selecting Sierra Leone
as a location for fieldwork. The relatively high levels of safety for both myself and my potential
interviewees could be largely assured by the peaceful climate that existed in the country during
the research period. Second, the feasibility of conducting research in Sierra Leone was an
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important consideration. In particular, the official language spoken in Sierra Leone is English
and all interviews could be conducted in English, therefore eliminating any need for a translator
in interviews. Furthermore, conducting research in Sierra Leone was economically feasible.
While airfare was quite expensive, actual living costs while in country were very low, thus
permitting research to be conducted at a reasonable cost. Finally, the nature of the conflict was a
consideration in case study location selection. My aim in choosing case studies was to select
countries in the same region and with the same nature of conflict, in this case, non-international
armed conflicts. Consequently, the nature of the Sierra Leone civil war as a non-international
armed conflict was a factor in its selection.
2.3.1 Data Collection and Research Population
The first fieldwork research was conducted in Sierra Leone over a period of three weeks in April
2016. The first contact in Freetown, Sierra Leone was made via my Doctoral Supervisor. This
contact was a former employee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and current employee of
the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone. This individual was interviewed at the offices of the
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone and the interview lasted approximately one hour. Using
the snowball method, this interviewee connected me with two further interviewees. The first
interviewee was a victim of violence by armed groups, in particular the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF). This interview took place at the premises of the Residual Special Court and lasted
approximately 45 minutes. The second interviewee was a child soldier158 who was interviewed at
the premises of the YMCA (Young Men’s Christian Organization) in Freetown. This interview
lasted approximately one hour.
All efforts were made to conduct in person interviews in line with the Interview Guidelines
established during the University of Western Ontario ethics review process. Interviews were
conducted in English. This more structured interview style quickly revealed itself to be less than
ideal. The structured questions interrupted the flow of the conversation, and literally interrupted
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the interviewee. Questions would sometimes result in one word or very brief answers. This
required me to adapt interview techniques in the field. A much more unstructured approach was
therefore adopted. I would first introduce myself, the research project, and what was expected of
the participant. In brief, the letter of information was orally delivered in accessible, lay terms so
as to make the interviewee comfortable, while also conveying the necessary information about
the study. After the introduction, the interviewee was given the opportunity to ask me any
questions they might have. Prior to the beginning of the actual interview, I confirmed orally that
the interviewee consented to participating in the interview and to their testimonies being
recorded by hand. No audio recording equipment was used in interviews with victims, former
combatants, or local human rights activists. This was done for the comfort of interviewees and
due to the sensitive nature of the content of interviews. In interviews conducted in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, I introduced the procedure of asking several thematic questions
at the end of the interviewee’s testimony. This procedure was adopted in order to gain potentially
useful information which was not elucidated in the general testimony of the interviewee. It was
an approach formulated after, and in reaction to, preliminary analysis of the in-person former
combatant and victim interviews conducted in Sierra Leone. Consequently, the thematic
questions posed to interviewees in the Democratic Republic of Congo were not posed to the
interviewees in Sierra Leone.
Interview subjects were expanded to include victims and witnesses in addition to former
combatants. This was due in part to difficulties in locating former combatants to interview
through my existing contacts employing the snowball method. My interview with the RUF
victim demonstrated to me that victims could provide a wealth of information about the external
operations of armed groups and, in particular, their interactions with the civilian population.
Unfortunately, a limitation of data from victims and witnesses is that they were unlikely to be
able to provide insight into the internal operations, training, disciplinary measures, or other
internal workings of armed groups. Nonetheless, I made the determination that the data and
information they were able to provide was valuable to the project.
As noted, I struggled to find subsequent interviewees from the initial three in-person interviews.
A visit to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Archives at the Peace Museum in
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Freetown provided an alternative source of data collection, which reqired a special permit to
access the archives for research purposes. This permit took several business days to acquire and
involved paperwork, visits to the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone, and an access fee.
Once the permit was received, I was granted three days of supervised access to the TRC
Archives. There were limitations to the use of TRC testimonies in lieu of in-person interviews. I
was limited to the information contained within the written testimony. I could not ask directed
questions, including thematic questions like those posed to interviewees in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, or seek clarification from the testimony giver. However, there were also
advantages to the use of TRC testimonies. They provided first-hand accounts taken in close
temporal proximity to the conflict. They also eliminated the potential for re-traumatization of the
testimonial giver, which is always a risk in the case of in-person interviews.
The testimonies collected by the Sierra Leone TRC are kept in boxes in a storage room at the
Peace Museum in Freetown. They are arranged by the district where the testimony was collected.
I selected boxes at random and went through the files contained in that box. A particular effort
was made to find testimonies from perpetrators or child soldiers. However, notes were also taken
of testimonies of victims and witnesses. For the most part, testimonies were copied verbatim by
hand. An attempt was still made to protect the identity of testimony givers. This was done by
omitting certain information from the transcription of testimonies. This included the omission of
names of the testimony giver, of family members, of locations of birth or habitation, and so on.
A concerted attempt was made to select boxes from different districts of Sierra Leone. In total,
seven districts are represented amongst the TRC files reviewed.159 The regional breakdown of
the 36 TRC testimonies is as follows: 14 testimonies from Kailahun district; seven testimonies
from Western Area 1 (Urban); four testimonies from Koinadugu district; four testimonies from
Western Area 2 (Rural); three testimonies from Moyamba district; two testimonies from Pujehun
district; and, two testimonies from Tonkolili district. The scope of this distribution is only
minimally useful as it denotes where the individual was located at the time their testimony was
collected for the TRC. It does not automatically correlate to the location of the events described
within the individual’s testimony, nor of their actual habitation. Consequently, efforts to provide
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regional representation through the random selection of boxes of testimonies from different
regions added very little to the geographic robustness of the collection of testimonies.
In total, 39 interviews or testimonies were collected in Sierra Leone. This includes one
organizational interview with the former employee of the SCSL; two in-person interviews – one
victim and one child soldier; and 36 TRC testimonials. Of the 39 testimonies collected, 38 were
given by victims, witnesses, or perpetrators. Of these 38 testimonies, eight were given by
females and 30 by males. In total, 20 testimonies fell under the category of victim, and three in
the category of witness. The remaining 15 testimonies were given by perpetrators or child
soldiers. Eight testimonies were given by child soldiers and seven by adult perpetrators. While
there were 38 testimonies, individuals often reported interactions with more than one armed
group during the conflict. Consequently, 49 interactions with armed groups were reported by the
38 victims, witnesses, and perpetrators. Interaction with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
was most prolific with 24 reports of encounters with this group, or approximately 63% of
respondents having interacted with the RUF. There were seven reports of encounters with the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); seven reports of encounters with the Kamajors;
six reports of encounters with the Sierra Leone Army (SLA); and two reports of encounters with
the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). These were the largest fighting forces in the civil war. In
addition, there were two reports of encounters with the forces of the Economic Community of
West African States Monitoring Group, and one report of an encounter with a Civil Defence
Unit. The age breakdown amongst the 38 testimonies was ten people under the age of 15 years;
12 people between the ages of 15 and 30 years; eight people between the ages of 31 years and 45
years; two people between the ages of 46 years and 60 years; one person over 60 years; and, five
adults of unspecified age.
Among the 15 testimonies collected from child soldiers and perpetrators, one was the result of an
in-person interview and 14 were testimonies pulled from the archives of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. All of the child soldiers and perpetrators were male. Of the seven
adult perpetrators, five reported being forced recruits while two did not indicate whether they
had been forcibly recruited or if they had joined the armed group willingly. Among the eight
child soldiers, seven reported affiliation with the RUF while one reported affiliation with the
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AFRC. Of the seven adult perpetrators, four were affiliated with the RUF, one with the AFRC,
and two with the Kamajors. The age breakdown amongst the child soldiers and perpetrators were
eight people under the age of 15 years; five people between the ages of 15 years and 30 years;
and, two adults of unspecified age.

2.4 Democratic Republic of Congo
As described above, the selection of case study locations for the research prioritized safety,
feasibility, and the nature of the conflict. An early organizational interviewee recommended that
I consider an active conflict as one of my case studies in the project. This was difficult to
accomplish, given the safety restrictions placed on me by my educational institution. The
Democratic Republic of Congo was selected as a case study because of ongoing armed conflict
in the country balanced with the relative safety of parts of the country, as compared to other
active conflicts in Africa such as in the Central African Republic, Somalia, and South Sudan.
Within the DRC, Goma, the Eastern capitol in the province of North Kivu and its immediate
surroundings, is relatively safe and conflict free, while other areas of Eastern Congo still suffer
from active conflict. In the interest of the safety of both myself and my interviewees, I restricted
my research interviews to Goma and its immediate environs – towns that could be accessed as a
day-trip from Goma. The second consideration for the selection of the DRC as a case study was
the feasibility of conducting in situ research. This region consists mainly of French and Swahili
speakers. I am fluent in French, which facilitated communication and ease of living in Goma. It
also limited the occasions on which a translator would be necessary. Goma is also easily
accessible by land from Rwanda, which made it more accessible because I could fly in and out of
Kigali, Rwanda, therefore decreasing travel costs. Finally, the nature of the majority of conflicts
in DRC as non-international armed conflicts was a consideration in selecting the DRC as a
research location.
2.4.1 Data Collection and Research Population
Prior to conducting the first research trip to the Democratic Republic of Congo, I established a
connection with the Human Rights Watch office in Goma, DRC. I relied on this office to help
establish connections with local human rights activists and other local organizations working on
armed group related issues, as well as to keep apprised of the security situation in the region.
However, I did not have any official affiliation with Human Rights Watch during my research. I
made a conscious decision not to affiliate with any organization during my research. This was a
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decision made with the goal of preserving the integrity of the testimonies collected in the
research. Organizations often have reputations amongst the local population. These reputations
may be favourable or unfavourable. They may have a reputation for providing necessary services
or resources to the community. An official affiliation with an organization may colour how the
researcher is perceived and, consequently, colour the information an interviewee is willing to
disclose or how they disclose information with the interviewer. An advantage of this decision
was to minimize potential for bias in responses. A disadvantage of this approach was that it
minimized the potential to access a greater number of interviewees. Ultimately, I chose to
prioritize the quality of the interview responses over the potential for greater numbers of
informants in the study.
In total, two research trips were conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Initially, only
one trip had been planned based on time and financial restrictions to the research project.
However, the first trip in 2016 proved less fruitful than expected and a second trip was necessary
in order to gather combatant interview data. The first research trip took place over three weeks in
May 2016. Unfortunately, my arrival in Goma coincided with the kidnapping of three
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) employees in Eastern DRC. This made
meeting with the ICRC in Goma impossible. Further, it created a situation in which I did not feel
safe traveling outside Goma to conduct interviews. I made the decision early on that a second
research trip would be necessary. As a result, the first research trip was used primarily to
improve my local knowledge about Goma and to familiarise myself with the city and local
dynamics. During this first research trip, three organizational interviews were conducted. The
first interview was conducted with an intelligence officer for the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) well-versed in the
dynamics of armed groups operating in Eastern DRC. This interview lasted approximately one
hour and took place at the MONUSCO base in Goma. The other two interviews were conducted
with local DRC human rights activists. The first interview took place at the Human Rights Watch
office in Goma and lasted approximately 90 minutes. The second interview was much more
extensive and lasted approximately three hours. It took place at a quiet local café at the request of
the interviewee.
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The second research trip took place over three weeks in April 2017. It must be noted that
interview numbers were hampered on this trip by illness (I fell ill early on in this trip) as well as
by the insecurity of roads to travel to certain locations outside of Goma to conduct interviews.
Interviews conducted outside of Goma were restricted to locations where interviews could be
completed as a day excursion from Goma, as per my agreed personal security plan with my
home institution. Again, Human Rights Watch in Goma was used as a primary point of
connection to local advocates. In this case, one advocate (G2312CM) became the focal point for
the snowball method and the connection to all subsequent combatant interviews. He was able to
connect me with a number of former combatants in and around Goma and accompanied me on
interviews, serving, where necessary, as Swahili-French translator.
Combatant interviews were conducted in Goma, Sake, and Kibumba. In total, ten former
combatants were interviewed. All ten interviewees were male. Two interviews with female
combatants had been arranged, however, one fell ill and one had recently returned from a stay in
hospital. I deemed these inappropriate conditions in which to conduct interviews and forewent
the interviews. Of the ten combatants interviewed, two were former child soldiers, five joined an
armed group by choice (though one of these was a child soldier), and five were forced recruits.
Interviewees at the time of joining or being recruited into an armed group ranged in age from 13
years to 42 years.160 Of the ten interviewees, two were under 15 years at the time of joining or
being recruited into the armed group; five were between the age of 15 years and 30 years; one
was between the age of 31 years and 45 years; and, two interviewees were adults but a specific
age was not given. Among the ten interviewees, six different armed groups were represented.
Some interviewees spent time in more than one armed group. The armed groups represented
among the ten interviewees were the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la liberation du
Congo (AFDL),161 Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre (APCLS),162 Forces armées de la
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République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC),163 Mai Mai,164 Mouvement du 23 mars (M23),165
and, Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD).166 The ten interviewees also
represented different roles or ranks within the armed groups. Three interviewees were officers,
six interviewees were foot soldiers or porters, and one interviewee’s rank was unclear.
Building upon the lessons learned from in-person interviews conducted in Sierra Leone, I
employed an unstructured interview model. I introduced myself, the research project, and what
was expected of the participant. In brief, the letter of information was orally delivered in
accessible, lay terms so as to make the interviewee comfortable while also conveying the
necessary information about the study. After the introduction, the interviewee was given the
opportunity to ask me any questions they might have. Prior to the beginning of the actual
interview, I confirmed orally that the interviewee consented to participating in the interview and
to their testimonies being recorded by hand. No audio recording equipment was used in
interviews with victims, former combatants, or local human rights activists. This was done for
the comfort of interviewees and due to the sensitive nature of the content of interviews. I took
notes by hand in English and French.
One-on-one interviews were conducted in French, while other interviews were conducted in
French and Swahili where the local human rights advocate accompanying me served as a Swahili
translator. There are limitations to using a translator for interviews. First, it interrupts the flow of
the interview, as the interviewee must pause while their comments are translated and recorded by
the interviewer. Second, there is the risk of information being lost in translation. However, since
I do not speak Swahili, these were necessary limitations to incur in the research process.
I stressed that the information important to my study was the collection of the interviewee’s own
personal story and experiences – how they came to be in an armed group and their time as a
member of an armed group. I would only ask essential clarification questions while the
163

Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. These are the national armed forces of the DRC.
This is the general term used to refer to local militia groups. Consequently, it can refer to numerous different
groups. Some Mai Mai groups have more specific names to designate their particular affiliation. For example, Mai
Mai Simba, Mai Mai Kifuafua, etc.
165
March 23 Movement.
166
Rally for Congolese Democracy.
164

48
interviewee recounted their story. This approach led to more candid answers as well as
unexpected information. All participants discussed the demobilisation process. This was
originally not considered in the scope of the research and was not considered by the Interview
Guide. Consequently, the decision to move to an unstructured interview style enhanced the
quality and breadth of information gathered. After the interviewees had recounted their entire
story, I asked permission to ask several more targeted questions, reiterating that they were not
obligated to answer questions if they did not feel like answering and that they could end the
interview without further questions if they chose to. This is where some structure was
reintroduced to the interview process with similar thematic questions being posed to all
interviewees if they had not already addressed the material in their personal statement.
The first theme addressed whether or not any training was received by the interviewee from the
armed group(s) in which they had been members. In particular, they were asked whether they
had received any training in IHL. It is interesting to note that the interviewees were more likely
to identify with or understand the term ‘human rights’ rather than ‘international humanitarian
law’. For example, where training of this nature did occur, interviewees spoke of human rights
training, not training in IHL or the laws of war. The second theme addressed whether there were
internal rules within the armed group and, if so, what those rules were and what, if any, were the
consequences if those rules were broken. In particular, interviewees were asked whether there
were rules regarding the treatment of civilians. The third theme asked interviewees how the
armed groups interacted with the civilian population, in particular how they sensitized the
civilian population to their presence. Finally, interviewees were asked if they encountered or had
interaction with organizations such as the DRC Red Cross or International Committee of the Red
Cross during their time in the armed group. These themes were focused upon as potentially
useful to drawing conclusions about the internal operations of armed groups, including internal
rules and discipline, and organizational engagement and influence, from the perspective of
combatants.
Finally, one organizational interview was conducted during this research trip. It was the wish of
the interviewee that the organization not be specifically named. The organization is a non-
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governmental organization (NGO) that works with armed groups. The interview took place at the
offices of the NGO in Goma and lasted approximately one hour.

2.5 Data Analysis
Once all fieldwork was completed, interviews were transcribed. Following this, the data was
analysed. The transcripts were canvassed for common themes or points of particular relevance or
interest in relation to the analytical criminology and social psychology theories explored earlier
in the research process. Once themes were identified, quotes were organized along these themes.
Often a single quote fit into multiple thematic categories. The themes identified were narrowed
down on the basis of alignment with the criminological and social psychological theoretical
frameworks explored and identified earlier in the research.
The first overarching theme emerging from the two countries was that of depersonalization and
disassociation. This theme is related to both theories of social psychology and criminology, in
particular the criminology theory of techniques of neutralization and the social psychology
theories of deindividuation and moral disengagement. The data demonstrated the common
practice of the use of anonymizing nicknames by members of armed groups, in particular
nicknames that often evoke heroic or particularly violent self-images. This is a practice that
disassociates the individual from their non-combatant identity. The use of anonymizing
nicknames is shown to be common both to the conflicts in Sierra Leone and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. A second overarching theme is dehumanization. Once again, this theme can
be associated with both theories of social psychology and criminology. In fact, nearly all of the
theories of criminology and social psychology considered in the research discussed
dehumanization. Here, the information collected in the case study interviews revealed
mistreatment of civilians by combatants and the failure to distinguish, as required by law,
between combatant and civilian. In addition, another common theme was the use of denigrating
and dehumanizing language and imagery to refer to the enemy, including civilians. Theories of
social psychology have demonstrated that such practices facilitate participation in mass
atrocities, in particular against the civilian population.167
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has explained the methodology employed in this thesis. The methodology used is
primarily legal doctrinal methodology, which relies on the sources of international law – treaties,
custom, general principles, case law, and scholarly literature – to identify and interpret the
existing content of IHL protections for civilians as they apply to armed groups in NIACs. The
use of legal doctrinal methodology grounds this thesis in the normative framework of law.
However, the thesis also makes use of non-doctrinal methods in the form of two illustrative case
studies that describe the violation of IHL protections for civilians by members of armed groups
in NIACs in Sierra Leone and the DRC. These two case study locations were selected based on
prioritization of safety, feasibility, and the nature of the conflict. The Sierra Leone and DRC case
studies are developed through a combination of primary and secondary data collection as well as
primary and secondary sources. The primary data collection consists of qualitative fieldwork
interviews and data collection in Sierra Leone and the DRC. Interviews conducted in Sierra
Leone and the DRC were largely unstructured in order to gather the most authentic and complete
account of each interviewee’s experiences. Some minimal structure was introduced in interviews
in the Democratic Republic of Congo by means of thematic questions asked after the interviewee
had provided their entire testimony in order to provide details for potential comparison among
interviewees. While complete objectivity in a qualitative study such as this is not possible, a
concerted effort was made to avoid tainting the response of interviewees. This was done
primarily through the unstructured interview format that allowed interviewees to freely recount
their experiences without questions affecting or leading their story and by my decision to remain
independent from any official organizational affiliation.
The legal doctrine and primary and secondary data used in this thesis lead to the construction of
a legal argument that is both normatively persuasive and grounded in the realities of both the
international legal system and the experiences of combatants and civilians in Sierra Leone and
the DRC. Together, these methods permit this thesis to establish a problem with the current
application of IHL to armed groups due to a gap between the protections currently afforded to
civilians during conflict which are based largely on the protections afforded to individuals in
peace and the protections necessary to achieve the humanitarian goal of civilian protection
during NIACs.
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The following chapter will begin the legal doctrinal analysis of IHL to establish the current
content of the law. First, it establishes the legal concept of armed group, the regulation of whose
members is the focus of this thesis. The chapter then proceeds to demonstrate the current legal
basis for binding non-state armed groups under IHL and international human rights law. The fact
that armed groups are bound by existing IHL indicates that new IHL regulations such as those
recommended in chapter 8 are likely to affect the members of armed groups.
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Chapter 3
3 International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Armed Groups
This thesis advances the claim that an analysis of the IHL protections for civilians applicable to
non-state armed groups, as compared to peacetime law applicable to all individuals, shows gaps:
conflict-specific regulation of combatant behaviour for the protection of civilians, distinct from
peacetime behavioural regulation for the protection of individuals, is needed. This chapter
addresses two key concepts central to this thesis: who is considered to be part of a non-state
armed group under IHL and the fact that IHL applies to these individuals. The manner in which
armed groups are bound by IHL can alter the scope of rules applicable to them. For example,
some approaches posit that armed groups are only bound to treaty law, while other approaches
contend that they are only bound to customary rules of IHL.
This chapter begins by exploring the legal definition of an armed group under the law of NIACs.
It is not all groups of persons with weapons who are the non-state addressees of IHL. Rather,
only groups which fulfill the requisite legal elements of an organized armed group are bound by
IHL.168 With this understanding of the non-state addressees of the law of NIACs, the chapter
turns to a discussion of the principle of the equality of belligerents. This principle requires all
parties to the conflict to be bound by the same IHL rules as each other.169 This principle is meant
to create a sense of reciprocal obligations among parties to a conflict that will engender mutually
reinforcing compliance with the law.170 If armed groups are only bound by a portion of IHL
rules, as opposed to the entire body of law, it could create a conflict with the principle of equality
of belligerents. Consequently, the principle of equality of belligerents is often an important
consideration in assessing different approaches that have been advanced to explain how IHL
binds armed groups. Seven different approaches have been articulated in literature as means of
explaining the legal application of IHL to armed groups: (1) legislative jurisdiction; (2) national
law; (3) third party treaty application; (4) de facto authority; (5) claims to represent the state; (6)
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customary international and international legal personality; and, (7) consent.171 Each of these
approaches is examined in turn in this chapter. Finally, this chapter addresses the application of
international human rights law during times of armed conflict and whether, like IHL, it creates
binding obligations for armed groups.
The establishment of how IHL is binding on armed groups in this chapter and what rules of IHL
are binding (established in chapter 4) is critical in order to demonstrate that new rules or
regulations proposed in chapter 8 would be likely to be applicable to these actors. Since IHL is
binding on armed groups and their members, this justifies the focus on IHL in this thesis as a tool
to address violence committed by armed groups toward civilians during NIACs. This chapter
demonstrates that there are several solid legal bases for the binding application of IHL to armed
groups. Armed groups are bound by the legislative jurisdiction of the states in which they operate
and by their own limited international legal personality. A limited number of armed groups are
also bound by IHL when they exercise de facto authority over civilians and/or territory. This
chapter further demonstrates that international human rights law applies during armed conflict
and creates binding obligations for some armed groups. Consequently, international human
rights law must also be considered in the development of new IHL regulations in chapter 8.

3.1 Non-State Actors in the International Legal System
The question of how armed groups are bound by IHL has stemmed largely from the traditional
structure of the international legal system, which, since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, has
been premised on states and state sovereignty.172 This means that, for over three centuries,
“international law [has been] primarily a law for the international conduct of states, and not their
citizens … [and] the subjects of the rights and duties arising from international law are states
solely and exclusively.”173 Since the mid-twentieth century, the subjects of international law
have been expanded beyond states to include non-state actors such as international
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organizations174 and individuals.175 However, “states remain in ultimate control over the formal
content of international law.”176
The nature of international law is such that treaties can only be concluded between states, and,
more recently, between states and international organizations.177 States remain the primary
authors of international treaties. States parties to a treaty must provide their express consent to be
bound by the terms of the treaty.178 This is done through signature and ratification, or
accession.179 Critically, treaties generally do not apply to third parties.180 In order to bind a third
party to obligations in a treaty, they must expressly consent to be bound.181 These foundational
rules of treaty making raise questions about how non-state armed groups can be bound by
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Common Article 3)182 and the 1977
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II).183 Common Article 3
and Additional Protocol II are the two most important treaties governing NIACs and the
protection of civilians during such conflicts. While Common Article 3 applies to all NIACs, the
threshold for application of Additional Protocol II is, as will be discussed in this chapter, higher
than that for Common Article 3. The rules applicable during an armed conflict may also come
from customary international law: Common Article 3, as well as the core provisions of
Additional Protocol II, are now considered to be part of customary IHL.184 Further, the ICRC has
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suggested that the content of some treaty rules for international armed conflicts is now also
applicable during NIACs because it has become customary international law.185

3.2 The Definition of an Armed Group in International Humanitarian Law
There is no codified legal definition of a non-state armed group in IHL treaty law. However, an
armed group under IHL is more than simply a group of people in possession of weapons.186
Groups which take up arms in a NIAC are not automatically considered to be armed groups and
therefore non-state parties to the conflict. Instead, Additional Protocol II explicitly requires that a
group be an “organized armed group[]” thereby requiring the armed group to possess a certain
level of organization if it is to be considered a non-state party to a NIAC.187 While Common
Article 3 does not explicitly refer to “organized armed groups”, this phrase has been interpreted
to also require that an armed group possess a certain level of organization in order to be
considered a party to a NIAC.188 The level of organization required under Common Article 3 is
less than that required for the application of Additional Protocol II.189 The language of
Additional Protocol II requires armed groups to be sufficiently organized to be able to control
territory as well as to carry out “sustained and concerted military operations”.190 However, as
discussed below, the exact degree of organization required under Common Article 3 is
unclear.191
The case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has
provided guidance on how to assess the level of organization possessed by a group. The ICTY
considered the issue of the requisite level of organization in judgments addressing the question of
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whether the Kosovo Liberation Army was an “organized armed group”. The court concluded that
an “organized armed group” would require sufficient organization so that “as a minimum…the
basic obligations of Common Article 3… may be implemented”.192 This does not, however,
mean that they are required to have the same degree of organization as state armed forces.193
This is very important, because there is likely to be a significant difference between “an armed
group that operates underground and state armed forces that are operating out in the open.”194
The criterion of sufficient organization to implement IHL turns on whether the group has the
capacity to implement and enforce IHL, not whether it actually does implement or enforce
IHL.195 This consideration can be met by the existence of internal rules within the armed group
as well as a process by which to enforce these rules. The process of enforcement - that is, an
internal disciplinary system - “need not be greatly developed”; however, “at least a semblance
[of internal discipline] is required”.196 A higher degree of organization is required for a group to
be considered an ‘organized armed group” under Additional Protocol II than for Common
Article 3 due to the “more detailed rules … that apply in Additional Protocol II conflicts”.197 The
fact that an armed group commits frequent IHL violations does not inherently mean it lacks
sufficient organization to fulfill this criterion.198 A group may be sufficiently organized and
adopt a policy of committing IHL violations.199 The organization of a group may come into
question, however, where “individual members act entirely on their own initiative, in total
disregard of a countervailing policy espoused by the armed group”.200 This is because such
independent individual IHL violations may suggest a lack of internal discipline within the group.
While armed groups can also vary widely in the manner in which they are organized, two
dominant forms of organization have been identified: (1) vertical chains of command that are
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clearly established, centralized, hierarchical, and very similar to those traditionally seen in state
regular armed forces; and, (2) more horizontally structured command with decentralized power
and, frequently, “less clearly delineated roles and responsibilities.”201 The level of organization
of groups in the first category will likely be much more easily assessed, but groups within the
second category are also capable of meeting the requirement to be considered an “organized
armed group”.202 A good example of an armed group that fit the second category is the Taliban
in Afghanistan.203
The ICTY has also identified a non-exhaustive list of indicative factors to assess whether an
armed group is sufficiently organized to be deemed an “organized armed group” under IHL.
These factors are categorized into five broad groupings. The first set of factors looks for the
existence of a command structure in the armed group, taking into consideration whether the
group has a “chain of military hierarchy between the various levels of commanders”, whether the
group has internal regulations, and how those regulations are disseminated to soldiers and
commanders.204 The second set of factors focuses on the capacities of the group and examines
whether “the group could carry out operations in an organised manner”.205 To determine this, one
considers “the group’s ability to determine a unified military strategy and to conduct large scale
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military operations, the capacity to control territory,… the capacity of operational units to
coordinate their actions, and the effective dissemination of … orders”.206 The capacity to control
territory, although identified as a potential indicator of a group’s level of organization, is not a
requirement under Common Article 3 for organized armed groups.207 The capacity to control
territory is, however, required under Additional Protocol II.208 The consideration of capacity to
control territory as an indicator of an armed group’s level of organization does not rest on a
specific amount of territory being controlled but, rather, the ability of the armed group to carry
out the requisite military operations and to implement the provisions of Additional Protocol II.209
The amount of territorial control and location may vary during a conflict.210 The third set of
factors deals with the “level of logistics” of the group, taking into consideration “the ability to
recruit new members; the providing of military training; the organized supply of military
weapons; [and] the supply and use of uniforms”.211 The fourth set of factors examines “whether
an armed group possesse[s] a level of discipline and the ability to implement the basic
obligations of Common Article 3”.212 Finally, the fifth set of factors looks at a group’s ability
“to speak with one voice” such as “its ability to negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease
fire or peace accords.”213 Responsible command is an important requirement and is closely
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linked to the degree of organization of a group.214 Responsible command merely requires that
“there be some sort of relationship of effective control by which one individual has the power to
control the acts of another, in particular the power to prevent or punish particular acts of that
other individual.”215 It does not, however, require a hierarchical, military chain of command.216

3.3 The Principle of Equality of Belligerents
The previous section addressed the legal concept of an armed group under IHL. It explained that
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II are both addressed only to organized armed
groups, a category which does not include unorganized non-state groups bearing weapons. In a
NIAC, IHL also applies to the armed forces of a state involved in fighting an armed group. This
section will discuss the principle of the equality of belligerents that is fundamental to
international humanitarian law.217 The fundamental nature of the principle of equality of
belligerents is derived from the necessity that “each Party to the conflict … be bound to apply
[IHL]”218 in order to realize the object and purpose of IHL: management of the problem of
unrestrained violence between states and organized groups within states and the protection of
individuals who do not directly participate in hostilities.219
Equality of belligerents means that all parties to a conflict are subject to the same rights and
obligations under IHL, regardless of which party is the aggressor and regardless of the nature of
the cause for which they are fighting.220 Historically, this principle was tied to reciprocal
214
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adherence to the law by parties to the conflict.221 However, the principle has developed such that
there is now “a recognition that there is an obligation to respect the law that does not depend
completely on reciprocity.”222 This is supported by the International Committee of the Red
Cross’ (ICRC) Customary IHL Study, which cited significant state practice demonstrating this
shift away from reciprocity.223
The principle of equality of belligerents applies equally to NIACs and international armed
conflicts.224 However, the application of the principle in NIACs may be problematic. First, many
states are strongly opposed to any suggestion within IHL of equal status between their own
armed forces and an armed group, which the principle of equality of belligerents assumes.225
Second, the members of an armed group have no legal right to take up arms against the state.226
Rather, they are often considered to be criminals by states under domestic law from the moment
they engage the state in armed violence.227 By contrast, the members of the state’s armed forces
can legally take up arms to defend the state from such armed groups.228
IHL does not provide legal authority for an actor to take up arms against a state because it only
regulates conduct during an armed conflict and is indifferent as to how the conflict came to exist.
The fact it is illegal to take up arms against the state is a matter of domestic law. Consequently,
Sassoli has argued that this inequality vis à vis who may legally take up arms in a NIAC does not
jeopardize the principle because this inequality arises at the level of domestic law, rather than
under international law.229 IHL applicable to NIACs still treats state and non-state parties
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equally.230 It is logical to distinguish between equality under IHL and equality under domestic
law as the principle of equality of belligerents is a principle of international law. While the fact
that it is a principle of international law does not necessarily preclude its application to domestic
law during armed conflict, the historical and current understanding of the principle is that it
refers to equality specifically with regard to the application of jus in bello (i.e., IHL).231 The
principle could nonetheless be inhibited at the international level if the scope of IHL applicable
to armed groups is not the same as that which binds states in a NIAC. Consequently, the legal
principle of equality of belligerents is an important consideration in evaluating different
approaches that attempt to explain how IHL is binding on armed groups and the scope of the
rules which are binding on these groups.

3.4 Approaches to Explaining How Armed Groups are Bound by International
Humanitarian Law
The previous sections have identified the type of armed group that is addressed by IHL as well as
the fundamental principle of the equality of belligerent, which provides that parties to an armed
conflict should be bound equally by the rules of IHL applicable to the conflict. The principle of
equality of belligerents is an important reason for the necessity of armed groups being bound by
IHL. Academic literature has identified many reasons as to why armed groups might deny that
they are bound by IHL.232 However, denial that one is bound does not prevent an individual or an
armed group from, in fact, being bound by IHL.233 There does, however, remain disagreement
over the precise legal explanation for the fact that armed groups are bound by IHL.234 This
section will examine the seven approaches that exist to explain how armed groups are bound by
IHL: 1) legislative jurisdiction; (2) national law; (3) third party treaty application; (4) de facto

230

Sassoli, supra note 224 at 241; Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 243.
See, e.g., Somer, supra note 220 at 659; Nathaniel Berman, “Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the
Legal Construction of War” (2004) 43:1 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1 at 12; Bugnion, supra note 224 at
174.
232
See, e.g., Olivier Bangerter, “Reasons why armed groups choose to respect international humanitarian law or
not” (2011) 93:882 International Review of the Red Cross 353.
233
Sandesh Sivakumaran, “The Addressees of Common Article 3” in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco
Sassoli, eds, The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 415 at 424;
Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 181.
234
Sivakumaran, supra note 233 at 424. For further discussion of the debate surrounding what mechanism binds
armed groups to IHL see, for example, Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 238–42; Moir, supra note 46 at 52–58; Jann
K Kleffner, “The applicability of international humanitarian law to organized armed groups” (2011) 93:882
International Review of the Red Cross 443; Daragh Murray, “How International Humanitarian Law Treaties Bind
Non-State Armed Groups” (2014) 20 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 101; Dinstein, supra note 46 at 63–73.
231

62
authority; (5) claims to represent the state; (6) customary international and international legal
personality; and, (7) consent.235 This section concludes that armed group consent to be bound is
not legally required to explain the binding quality of IHL on them. This section suggests that the
legislative jurisdiction and international legal personality are both solid legal explanations for the
binding nature of IHL on armed groups and, through their application, provide an explanation for
the binding effects of both treaty and customary IHL presumed by many academics, international
organizations, and courts.
3.4.1 Legislative Jurisdiction
The approach of legislative jurisdiction relies on the argument that state ratification of a treaty
“binds all individuals within its jurisdiction” to that treaty.236 Thus, according to this approach,
members of armed groups are bound by IHL treaty law through the ratification of an IHL treaty
by the state of which they are nationals.237 It is binding because treaty ratification is done “not
just on behalf of the state but also on behalf of all individuals within its jurisdiction.”238 While
this approach is generally used to explain the binding application of IHL treaty law to armed
groups, Kleffner has noted that this reasoning could also be employed to explain the binding
force of customary IHL to armed groups.239 Consequently, Murray has argued that this approach
“ha[s] the potential to explain the direct—and immediate—attribution of the entire spectrum of
international humanitarian law to all armed opposition groups”.240
The legislative jurisdiction approach has been described by some to be the dominant approach in
the literature.241 The approach received support from several states during the drafting of the
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Geneva Conventions,242 and again during the drafting of Additional Protocol II,243 as well as by
the ICRC.244 This approach does not, however, necessarily mean that an armed group will be
bound by all IHL treaties. That is because the approach requires that the relevant state be party to
an IHL treaty in order for the armed group to be bound by that treaty’s rules. The Geneva
Conventions, which contain Common Article 3, are universally ratified;245 however, Additional
Protocol II is not.246 The content of Additional Protocol II, however, is now largely considered
customary IHL; therefore, if the legislative doctrine argument is applied to customary IHL it
would render the content of Additional Protocol II universally applicable. However, other IHL
treaties, particularly those dealing with the prohibition or regulation of certain weapons are
neither universally ratified nor are they necessarily customary IHL.247 For example, the
Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention,248 which has 164 states parties - though notably not the
United States, Russia, China, Syria, Libya, and South Korea - is not yet considered to reflect
customary IHL.249 The legislative jurisdiction approach is nonetheless a strong approach to
explain how armed groups are bound by IHL as it is the only approach that, on its own, would
explain the binding nature of both treaty and customary IHL to armed groups while also
preserving the principle of equality of belligerents, discussed above, to the greatest extent among
the seven approaches.250
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The doctrine of legislative jurisdiction approach has been criticized for not differentiating
between international and national law.251 The suggestion is that this approach relies on the
binding applicability of national law to members of armed groups and, as a result, the approach
fails to provide justification for the binding nature of IHL on armed groups as a matter of
international law.252 The argument is that the binding quality of IHL with regards to armed
groups relies on the implementation of these rules by the state into domestic law.253 This
argument is flawed for two key reasons. First, the argument ignores the distinction between
monist and dualist nations. In the former, international obligations are automatically incorporated
into national law whereas in the latter implementing legislation is required.254 There are also
variations on this dichotomy among states.255 For example, Canada takes a dualist approach to
international treaties and a monist approach to customary international law.256 Second, it is not
unprecedented for international law to create direct rights or obligations for individuals as a
matter of international, rather than national, law.257 For example, this is the case under
international human rights law and international criminal law.
Other scholars have criticized the legislative jurisdiction approach because, in practice, armed
groups may refuse “to comply with rules that have been formulated by the very governments
with which they are in conflict.”258 It is possible that armed groups may take such a stance,
however, in practice, there is little evidence that armed groups actually do advance this
argument.259 Further, the application of a law to an individual does not rely on that individual’s
acceptance that they are indeed bound.260 Many scholars often evaluate the various approaches
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that have been advanced to explain how IHL binds armed groups based on how likely it is to
engender compliance from armed groups, ignoring the fact that the force of a law does not rely
on compliance. For example, speed limits remain legally binding on individuals regardless of
how frequently they fail to observe them. Of course, if one accepts the argument that the
requirement of consent to be bound under international law extends to non-state actors and not
just states, then this argument takes on new meaning. However, as is argued in section 3.3.7,
there is no evidence that such an extension of the consent requirement exists.
While Kleffner has suggested that the doctrine of legislative jurisdiction may be the “natural
choice” for some among the seven approaches to explain how armed groups of bound by IHL, he
has also argued that the approach suffers from a “fundamental conceptual defect”.261 In his view,
while this approach explains how individuals are bound by IHL, it does not explain how IHL can
bind an armed group directly as a collective entity. This would be relevant for assigning
responsibility for international wrongs to an armed group itself rather than one or more of the
individual members of that group.262 Further, it is armed groups, not individual members of
armed groups, who are the addressees of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II and
certain IHL obligations are directed at the armed group generally rather than individual
combatants and commanders.263 For example, the establishment of a “regularly constituted
court” or the provision of education for children are collective rather than individual
obligations.264 It is for this reason that this thesis argues in favour of the joint application of the
legislative jurisdiction and customary international law approaches to explain how IHL treaty
law and customary law respectively bind armed groups.
3.4.2 National Law
The second approach advanced to explain how armed groups are bound by IHL argues that
armed groups are bound through national law.265 Where treaties are automatically incorporated
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into domestic law upon ratification or where the content of a treaty has been incorporated into
domestic law through national procedures, armed groups will be bound by IHL based on the
content of the national law.266 Further, customary international law is often automatically
considered to be national law by many states; therefore, rules of customary IHL would be
binding through national law in such states.267 Certainly, there is no question that a state may
pass national legislation that binds actors on its territory to IHL norms. Also, this approach
would ensure respect for the principle of equality of belligerents as both state armed forces and
armed groups would be bound by the same national laws. However, if the national law approach
is relied on as the sole explanation of how armed groups are bound by IHL then, if IHL treaty or
customary international law were not implemented into domestic law, an armed group would not
be bound to rules of IHL.268 As a result, relying solely on this approach to bind armed groups
would limit the scope of IHL rules binding on armed groups in a manner contrary to “clear
international opinion” that armed groups are bound by the vast majority, if not all, rules of IHL
applicable in NIACs.269
3.4.3 Treaties and Third Parties
The legal effect of treaties on third-parties is the third approach advanced to explain how IHL
binds armed groups.270 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) codifies the rule
of pacta tertiis, which is also a rule of customary international law and explains when and how a
treaty can binding on a third-party.271 The rules require an intent, on the part of states parties to
the treaty in question, to create binding rights or obligations for the third party272 and the consent
of the third-party to assume the rights and/or obligations in question.273 The VCLT, however,
only applies to states.274 Consequently, it is unclear whether the rule could be applied to nonstate armed groups.275 Since armed groups cannot legally be parties to IHL treaties, they would
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necessarily be third parties to IHL treaties, though not third-party “states”.276 Cassese has
suggested that, while the rules of the VCLT apply only in the context of third party states, the
customary rule of pacta tertiis applies to “the effects of treaties on any international subject
taking the position of a third party vis-a-vis a treaty.”277 He further argues that the “[the VCLT]
does not rule out the applicability of its provisions to other international entities” such as armed
groups.278 If either or both of these assertions are correct - and Cassese provides no supporting
evidence for either assertion - then the requisite intent to bind third parties can indeed be found
in Common Article 3, which addresses “each Party to the conflict”. Since armed groups are nonstate parties to a NIAC, it appears clear that they are one of the addressees of Common Article
3.279 By contrast, Additional Protocol II does not explicitly address all the parties to a conflict
nor was there any clear consensus among states during the drafting of the treaty as to whether
they intended to bind armed groups or not.280
Cassese has argued that, though not explicit, the language of Additional Protocol II nonetheless
suggests an intent to bind armed groups.281 First, Additional Protocol II was intended to
“develop[] and supplement[] Common Article 3”282 and, as a result, “only expands and broadens
the protection granted by it.”283 It follows, therefore, according to Cassese, that since Common
Article 3 clearly applies to armed groups, then Additional Protocol II also applies to these
groups.284 This is a convincing argument as, if Additional Protocol was not intended to create
obligations for armed groups, this would necessarily limit the application of Additional Protocol
II vis-à-vis Common Article in direct contradiction of Article 1(1) of the Additional Protocol.
Cassese has also argued that Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II, which places an obligation on
the “authorities in power” at the end of hostilities, implicitly refers to both the State and armed
group. The application of this provision to armed groups leads Cassese to conclude that “[i]f this
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duty [in Art. 6(5)] is made incumbent on the rebels once they seize power in the territory or in
part of the territory, it is logical to maintain that the other rules of the Protocol also bind the
rebels before that final moment.”285 State parties to Additional Protocol II should therefore be
understood to have intended the provisions of the treaty to apply to armed groups, thereby
satisfying the first requirement of the VCLT test for third party application of treaties.286
The second requisite element of the pacta tertiis rule is the consent on an armed group to be
bound by Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. As will be discussed further in chapter
5,287 consent to be bound by international law on the part of non-state actors is not and should
not be a requisite element to explain how armed groups are bound by IHL.
In addition to the problem of the consent to be bound requirement, the third-party approach
remains weak because it lacks solid support to explain why the rule should be extended to armed
groups. Cassese’s unsupported assertion that the application of these rules can be extended to
third-party non-state actors fails to distinguish between types of non-state actors. While his focus
is on armed groups, it is not clear why extension of these rules beyond states would be limited to
non-state armed groups.288 Application of this rule to individuals would, however, run contrary
to the “widely accepted view that the consent of individuals is not required” for the acquisition of
rights or obligations by individuals under international treaties.289 For example, individual
consent is not required for the creation of individual rights under international human rights law
or for the creation of individual obligations under international criminal law.
Further, this approach would be inconsistent with the principle of equality of belligerents. This is
because, at minimum, the protections in Common Article 3 and customary IHL for civilians and
persons not taking direct part in hostilities are absolute and not dependent on reciprocity.290
Therefore, if the binding application of IHL, including Common Article 3 and customary IHL,
relied on an armed group to consent to be bound, a state would be bound by rules that would not
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be binding on the armed group. For this reason, and the reasons provided above, the third-party
approach appears to lack a sufficient legal basis to explain how armed groups are bound by IHL.
3.4.4 De Facto Authority
The fourth approach is based on the factual circumstance of an armed group exercising de facto
authority over territory.291 This approach argues that, where an armed group exercises de facto
control over territory, it “is bound by certain obligations that attach to states”.292 This is because
its exercise of control over territory renders it “akin to a state”.293 What is required is “stable
territorial control” on the part of the armed group, which distinguishes it from situations during
conflict where territorial control is constantly shifting between parties to the conflict.294 This
approach also requires the armed group to implement some form of “civilian administration” in
the territory it controls.295 This flows logically from the fact that treaties are binding on
successive governments, even where they have gained power through armed conflict; the “legal
personality of the State remains unchanged.”296 However, other discussions of this approach rely
only on de facto authority over persons and territory and do not include a requirement to exercise
state-like functions.297
The ability to bind such armed groups to IHL is highly advantageous for the protection of
civilians in NIACs because, while the law of international armed conflicts includes laws
applicable to belligerent occupation, there are no equivalent rules of occupation for NIACs under
either treaty or customary IHL.298 It is also logical to require an armed group that is operating as
a de facto state or sovereign authority to be held to the same standards as states. However, this
approach is incomplete on its own and cannot form the sole explanation for how armed groups
are bound by IHL. A conflict in which an armed group has stable territorial control will be an
Additional Protocol II conflict; however, in most contemporary NIACs armed groups do not
meet this territorial control standard.299 Consequently, this approach would not explain how
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armed groups in the majority of NIACs are bound by IHL.300 It would only capture and explain
how IHL binds a very small portion of armed groups. Further, even where an armed group does
have stable territorial control, that group may not attempt to exercise state-like functions on that
territory, in which case they, too, would not be captured by this approach. Consequently, this
approach is very strong as a partial explanation for how armed groups are bound by IHL, but it is
unsatisfactory as the sole approach to explain IHL’s binding power on armed groups.
3.4.5 Claims of the Armed Group to Represent the State
The fifth approach to explain how armed groups are bound by IHL only applies to armed groups
that make claims to represent the state. Armed groups have also been said to be bound by IHL if
they “claim to represent the state against which they are fighting.”301 Treaty ratification and
customary international law bind not only the government which ratifies the treaty or is in power
when a customary rule crystallizes, but also subsequent governments under the principle that
“extraconstitutional changes to the government do not affect the person of the state.”302 Under
this approach to binding armed groups, the group is bound by treaties ratified by the state not
only if and when they win the conflict and form a new government, but before any victory if they
“claim[] to be the government or to represent the state” and they “exercise effective
sovereignty”.303
There may be overlap between this approach and the previous approach based on de facto
authority where the group making such claims also has stable territorial control and is exercising
state-like functions. Since this approach relies solely on whether the armed group claims to
represent the state, there is no requirement of territorial control or the exercise of state-like
functions. This may mean this approach is capable of capturing some of the armed groups not
captured by the de facto authority approach. However, it would not explain how armed groups
who do not claim to represent the state would be bound by IHL (assuming they also do not have
stable control over territory or exercise state-like functions).304 Many armed groups do not seek
to take over the state’s government.305 For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, some
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groups have clearly aspired to take over the government, such as the Alliance des Forces
Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre, which ultimately did successfully take over
the government. However, other groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo do not have
political aspirations - for example, some have economic aspirations or seek only to protect their
community or ethnic group.306 Consequently, this approach has a solid legal foundation, but
would be unsatisfactory as the sole approach to explain how armed groups are bound by IHL.
3.4.6 Customary International Law
This sixth approach considers customary IHL rules binding on armed groups by virtue of the
rules’ status as customary international law. Consequently, it obviates any need to tie a non-state
actor to treaty obligations. It does not face the same obstacles to binding non-state actors as
treaty law. Dinstein has argued that, not only does customary IHL bind all states, it is also
“capable of imposing obligations on all individuals”.307 The Special Court for Sierra Leone
considered the Revolutionary United Front bound by IHL based on customary rules of IHL and
the International Court of Justice found the same with respect to the Contras in Nicaragua.308
Common Article 3 and the norms which stem from its text are “unquestionably of a customary
international law status.”309 This is supported by case law from the International Court of Justice,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Special Court for Sierra Leone, and numerous domestic courts.310 This approach is
further supported by the ICRC 2016 Commentary on Common Article 3.311 It is also favoured by
many respected academics.312 However, this approach again grounds its explanation, like the
legislative jurisdiction explanation discussed earlier, in the fact that individual group members
are bound by customary IHL. It fails to explain how customary IHL binds armed groups as
collective entities.313
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Other scholars have argued that the binding quality of customary IHL on armed groups rests on
the fact that they have international legal personality.314 This approach would explain how armed
groups are directly bound by customary IHL. This was also the position taken by the UNsponsored International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, though the Commission included a
territorial control component. The Commission stated in its report that “all insurgents that have
reached a certain threshold of organization, stability and effective control of territory, possess
international legal personality and are therefore bound by the relevant rules of customary
international law on internal armed conflicts”.315 Sassoli has argued that “IHL implicitly confers
upon parties to non-international armed conflicts - whether they end up succeeding or not - the
functional international legal personality necessary to have the rights and obligations foreseen by
it”.316 Consequently, territorial control is not, according to Sassoli, a requirement for an armed
group to possess international legal personality. Zegveld has also taken this approach, though
noting that armed groups have only “limited legal personality”.317
International legal personality is not limited to states. The International Court of Justice in 1949
identified the potential for non-state actors to acquire international legal personality and found
that an international organization, the United Nations, did in fact have international legal
personality.318 The Court, in its 1980 Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of
25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, stated that “subjects of international law … are
bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law” by
virtue of their status as a subject of international law.319 The Court has also noted that the extent
and scope of rights and obligations possessed by subjects of international law could vary in
different subjects of international law could vary based on the “needs of the [international]
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community.”320 This means the customary rules of international law applicable to states need not
necessarily be identical to those of an armed group. This is important to explain how an armed
group’s limited legal personality would not necessarily mean all of customary international law
would apply to it.321 The case law of the International Court of Justice demonstrates that it is
possible for armed groups to have limited international legal personality and, based on that legal
personality, they are bound by customary IHL.
An advantage of the customary international law approach to explain how armed groups are
bound by IHL is that it binds the armed group directly as a collective entity as opposed to relying
solely on the binding nature of rules on individual members of the group.322 This approach,
however, would bind armed groups only to customary IHL and not IHL treaty law. Much of the
content of the core IHL treaties (e.g., Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols of
1977) are now customary international, therefore this would explain how armed groups are
bound by most rules of IHL. However, not all IHL treaties have achieved customary legal
status.323 Where there is no equivalent customary rule, states would nonetheless be bound by the
treaty obligations they have assumed. This poses a problem for the principle of equality of
belligerents.324 However, if we jointly consider both the legislative jurisdiction approach and
customary international approach as explaining how armed groups are bound by IHL, this would
mean armed groups would be bound by rules of customary IHL as well as treaty rules that have
not achieved customary status where members of armed groups are citizens of a state party to
such treaties.325 It is for this reason that the phrase “shall not affect the legal status of the Parties
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to the conflict” was included in Common Article 3.326 Kleffner has argued that “[t]he fact that a
given entity enjoys certain rights under international law and is subject to certain obligations
does not necessarily confer legitimacy on that entity.”327 The question of whether entities are
seen as “legitimate” “is divorced from the question of whether they are endowed with
international legal personality.”328 Therefore, state opposition to conferring legitimacy on armed
groups does not necessarily conflict with the possession of international legal personality on the
part of armed groups.
It is possible that the use of the phrase “shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict” was the drafters’ attempt to distinguish organized armed groups from the concept of
recognition of belligerency. Recognition of belligerency arose in the mid-19th century and
allowed for a non-state armed group fulfilling certain criteria in a civil war, if recognized by a
state, to be entitled to the full protection of the laws of war which, prior to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, only governed international armed conflicts.329 Recognition of
belligerency accorded the members of the non-state armed group equal status with the state’s
own soldiers.330 Corn et al. note that “resistance to this form of recognition that brought a special
status to non-State actors was strong” and it was rarely employed by states.331 Indeed, by World
War II, recognition of belligerency had fallen into disuse.332 After the failure to invoke
recognition of belligerency during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), commentators declared
that “‘the antiquated and inadequate character of recognition of belligerency [had] bec[o]me
manifest’ and [they] demanded the development of fundamental humanitarian rules that would
regulate internal armed conflicts”.333 In the wake of World War II, the international community
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came together to draft the Geneva Conventions, including the first ever regulation for NIACs,
Common Article 3. The framework of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II sought to
regulate NIACs without altering the “legal status” of non-state armed groups and their
combatants.334 IHL rules applicable to NIACs do not accord non-state armed groups and their
members equal status to Government soldiers.335 The phrase “shall not affect the legal status of
the Parties to the conflict” in Common Article 3 is an attempt to prevent an interpretation of the
Article that would invoke either the historical concept of belligerency or the altered legal
relationship between state and armed group that belligerency had created.336
Kleffner has argued that the reliance on legal personality to explain the binding nature of IHL on
armed groups is problematic due to the argument’s “circularity”.337 The attribution of
international legal personality relies on an entity possessing rights and obligations under
international law.338 Therefore, Kleffner argues, an armed group’s legal personality relies on
armed group having rights and obligations under IHL but this legal personality is also advanced
as the reason for those same IHL rights and obligations.339 I believe this seeming circularity may
be remedied by clarifying that the international legal personality explanation is advanced to
explain how customary IHL, but not treaty law, binds armed groups. The International Court of
Justice’s decision in the Reparations Case demonstrated that states may accord rights and
obligations to a non-state actor that implicitly bestows that actor with international legal
personality.340 That scope of that legal personality is limited to that which is necessary to allow
the actor to carry out the duties that states have bestowed on them.341 The language of Common
Article 3 that addresses armed groups and creates obligations for them under IHL may then
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arguably be considered to have given armed groups limited international legal personality, as
does subsequent customary IHL342 for NIACs and Additional Protocol II.343
Fortin has advanced an explanation of armed group international legal personality that fits with
the argument made above. She has argued, as I have, that legal personality is bestowed by
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II on armed groups.344 This legal personality is,
however, “abstract” because, according to Fortin, Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II
do not “give[], or seek[] to give, specific armed groups legal personality.”345 Rather, the legal
personality bestowed by these instruments is only activated, or becomes “concrete” when an
armed group achieves the sufficient level of organization and participates in a NIAC against
either a state or another armed group.346 Therefore, “the application of the international
humanitarian law precedes, or coincides with, the application of international legal
personality.”347 Fortin’s approach provides a logical means of understanding and assessing the
existence of an armed group’s legal personality. This is consistent with the approach to
international legal personality articulated by the International Court of Justice in the Reparations
Case and limits the scope an armed group’s legal personality to that required to fulfill the
obligations addressed to it under Common Article 3, Additional Protocol, and customary IHL.
Some scholars have suggested that a benefit of the customary international law-based
international legal personality is that is does not rely on actions of the state against which the
armed group is fighting to explain how the armed group is bound by IHL.348 However, though
this explanation is less obviously tied to the state, the fact the construction of rules of customary
IHL rely on state practice and state opinio juris means that, in actuality, it is still the
“international community of states at large that binds them.”349 Therefore, the customary
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international law explanation could still be perceived by armed groups as an imposition of the
rules on the group rather than fostering “sense of ownership of those rules”.350 As noted earlier
and discussed in greater detail in the following section, how an armed group feels about the legal
explanation for how IHL is binding on them is not relevant to the legality of the explanation.
However, the fact that armed groups play no role in the formation of customary IHL has led
some scholars to argue that, in order for armed groups to be bound by customary IHL, their
practice should be considered in developing rules of customary IHL.351 Further, others have
argued that armed groups should only be bound by rules of customary international law whose
creation armed groups played a role in.352
The fact that states were traditionally both subject and creator of rules of customary international
law does not necessarily mean that armed groups must participate in law creation in order to be
bound by the law. The ICJ has stated that the fact an entity, such as an international organization,
has legal personality does not mean “that its rights and duties are the same as those of a State.”353
Consequently, it is “possible that certain subjects of international law possess the right to create
law, while others do not.”354 For example, only state ratification is relevant to the entry into force
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations
or between International Organisations, even though international organizations can legally
become parties to that Convention.355 Finally, the ICJ Interpretation of the Agreement of 25
March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, stated that “subjects of international law … are bound
by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law” not only by
rules of international law that they have had a role in forming.356
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The customary international law explanation based on international legal personality provides
strong legal grounds to explain how rules of IHL bind non-state armed groups. If only one
explanation could be given, this might be the preferred explanation if the goal is to ensure that
the maximum number of rules possible apply to armed groups. However, there can be multiple
explanations as to how IHL binds armed groups. Thus, the customary international law
explanation of how IHL binds individual members, coupled with the international legal
personality explanation of how IHL binds the armed group as a whole, can be used in
conjunction with legislative jurisdiction, national law, de facto authority, and claims to represent
the state explanations.
3.4.7 Consent of the Armed Group
The final approach that has been advanced to explain how IHL binds armed groups is based on
the consent of the armed group to be bound. It has been advanced as an explanation unto itself,
but it is also the determinative element for explaining how groups are bound under the thirdparty treaty application explanation discussed earlier. An armed group may consent to be bound
by IHL rules or treaties either by unilateral declaration or through an agreement with the other
party, or parties, to the conflict.357 While traditionally in international law the issue of consent
focuses on state consent to be bound by international legal rules, the idea that an armed group’s
consent can bind it to rules of IHL can be seen in Common Article 3. Common Article 3
expressly urges parties to a conflict to “endeavour to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the [Geneva] Convention[s].” This provision is
addressed to both state and non-state parties to a NIAC and implies that these special agreements
are capable of creating legally binding obligations, not only for states parties, but also for nonstate armed groups.358 Further, as Common Article 3 can apply to conflicts between armed
groups, this suggests that the binding nature of such special agreements is not dependent on the
legal power or status of the state.
In addition to special agreements, it has also been said that unilateral declarations issued by
armed groups can both demonstrate their consent to be bound by rules referenced in such
357
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declarations and can explain how some rules of IHL bind armed groups.359 Some unilateral
declarations are very formal, such as that issued by the Rwandan Patriotic Front in October
1992,360 while others take the form of more informal statements of commitment, codes of
conduct, and internal laws. For example, the Kosovo Liberation Army stated, in 2001, that it
“recognize[d] the Geneva Conventions and the conventions governing the conduct of war, even
though it ha[d] not been offered the chance of signing them, as it would have done”.361 In
practice, armed groups have often made “ad hoc commitments” to be bound by IHL generally or
by certain rules of IHL.362 An example of an ad hoc commitment can be seen in the 1991
declaration of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines and the 2002 Agreement on the
Protection of Civilians and Civilian Facilities between the Sudanese government and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).363 In practice, an armed group may or may not abide by
its commitments made in this fashion.364 Groups, like some states, may make commitments to
certain rules more for the reputational benefits than based on good faith.365 Sivakumaran has
suggested that where the “commitment is followed” or where “it is followed to an extent”, it
should be “taken seriously”.366 While not definitively established, the work of academics and
international bodies appears to indicate that such declarations and agreements create legally
binding obligations on armed groups and therefore can explain how they come to be bound by
certain rules of IHL.367 Dinstein has, however, suggested that the obligations flowing from these
agreements or declarations are not international legal obligations but, rather, “obligations under
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the domestic law of the State”.368 His argument appears to be that, because these agreements are
not and cannot be treaties, a fact supported by international jurisprudence,369 they are incapable
of creating international legal obligations.370 While I take no issue with the suggestion that these
are not treaties, I do challenge the suggestion that, as a result, they can only bind armed groups
under national as opposed to international law.371 Dinstein’s discussion appears to assume the
agreements in question will always be between a state and an armed group.372 Yet, as noted
above, the nature of these agreements is indicated by Common Article 3, which references the
parties to the conflict and does not explicitly indicate that a state must be party to the agreement.
Common Article 3 applies to all NIACs, including conflicts between armed groups without state
involvement.
While it is possible that consent can explain how IHL comes to bind armed groups, there is
nothing to suggest that consent on the part of armed groups is legally required to explain how
they are bound by IHL. First, several of the preceding sections have provided legally sound
explanations for how armed groups come to be bound by IHL which do not include consent as a
requisite element.373 Further, reliance solely on consent to explain how armed groups are bound
by IHL could be highly problematic for the principle of equality of belligerents. In a NIAC
between a state and an armed group, the state would remain bound by its own obligations under
IHL, but the armed group could, in theory, withhold consent for any and all rules of IHL. Third,
neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II contain language that suggests their
binding authority on armed groups is dependent on those groups’ consent. Rather, an armed
group is merely required to be capable of implementing the obligations they contain and, as such,
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the groups’ willingness to comply is irrelevant to the question of whether they are bound.374
Consent to be bound is necessary for a state to be bound by international law;375 however, there
is nothing to suggest that consent is necessary on the part of non-state actors, such as armed
groups. Certainly, under national law there is no requirement for express consent in order for
individual citizens to be bound. Similarly, at the international level, individuals have been found
to be bound, for example under international criminal law, without need for consent.376 However,
it could be suggested that collective entities, such as armed groups, are subject to different rules
than individuals. This suggestion would, however, be incorrect. Again, under national law, states
often create obligations for collective entities, notably corporations, that do not require corporate
consent to be bound.377 At the international level, international investment treaties can create
rights for corporations.378 More broadly and more akin to the obligations of armed groups under
IHL, the draft for an international treaty on business and human rights contains obligations for
transnational corporations but only provides for states to be parties to the treaty.379 This all
suggests that, while state consent to be bound is required under international law, consent to be
bound is not required by either individuals or collective entities under international law.
While many have argued in favour of the consent explanation, they largely base their arguments
on the positive effects consent may have on armed group compliance.380 Yet, as already
discussed, there is nothing in Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II, or under international
law more generally that suggests consent is a requisite element of being bound. So, while armed
group consent may increase armed group compliance with IHL, it is widely considered not to be
374
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essential for IHL application to non-state parties. An armed group’s “obligation [to respect IHL,
specifically Common Article 3] is not only independent of an express acceptance of common
Article 3 by the non-State Party, but also of whether an opposing Party in practice adheres to the
provisions of common Article 3.”381 Further, regardless of the rules agreed to in a special
agreement between parties to a NIAC, the parties to the conflict are bound by all applicable rules
of IHL.382 In other words, parties to a NIAC cannot attempt to avoid being bound by rules of IHL
through mutual agreement. Consequently, a limited agreement will not exempt or constrain the
parties’ obligations under IHL. IHL clearly seeks to separate issues of compliance from
questions of binding obligations. While developing approaches to engaging armed groups that
will increase compliance is very important in IHL, the degree to which any of the seven
explanations for how armed groups come to be bound by IHL increases compliance is not
determinative of the legal soundness of the explanation.

3.5 The Application of International Human Rights Law during Armed Conflicts
The preceding sections established that armed groups are bound by IHL and that they are bound
regardless of whether or not they have consented to be bound. This section examines the
application of international human rights law (IHRL) during armed conflict and whether it, too,
creates binding obligations for armed groups. Although the focus of this thesis is on IHL, it is
necessary to consider IHRL when identifying gaps and weaknesses in existing IHL. This is
because IHRL, historically thought to only apply during peacetime, is now considered to
continue to apply during armed conflict.383 Historically, treaties and law beyond the scope of
IHL were considered inoperative when armed conflict began.384 Under this approach, IHRL
stopped applying upon the outbreak of war and did not resume its application until after the
conclusion of hostilities.385 This approach to legal regulation during times of armed conflict was
381
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based on the view that IHL in its entirety was lex specialis and, as a result, operated in a position
of priority over all other law between the parties to a conflict.386 It is no longer the case that
IHRL is considered completely inoperative during armed conflict.387 Rather, armed conflict is
now considered “a continuation of interstate relation[s] and, thus, subject to legal limits”388 and,
therefore, IHRL continues to apply during armed conflict.389 Consequently, IHL is no longer
considered to suspend the operation of IHRL. Instead, IHL and other bodies of law can operate
concurrently,390 with IHL serving to “complement[ other areas of law] and [to] bring[] greater
specificity to their applicability in conflict.”391
The ongoing application of IHRL during armed conflict was specifically addressed in the
International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons.392 In this opinion,
the court clearly articulated its view that IHRL continues to operate during armed conflict. It
stated: “The protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] does
not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency.”393 Under the ICCPR, seven
provisions are protected from derogation in all circumstances, including national emergencies
such as an armed conflict. Rights protected even during armed conflict include the right not to be
arbitrarily deprived of life,394 the right to not be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or
386
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degrading treatment,395 the right to not be subjected to slavery,396 and the right to freedom of
religion.397
The ability to derogate from the protection of certain human rights during armed conflict is
strictly interpreted in IHRL. Derogation, according to the UN Human Rights Committee, is
limited “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”.398 This means that
derogation measures must be proportional to the state of emergency in terms of the “duration,
geographical coverage and material scope of the state of emergency”.399 Accordingly, the UN
Human Rights Committee expressed the belief that “[i]n practice this will ensure that no
provision of the Covenant, however validly derogated from, will be entirely inapplicable to the
behaviour of a State party.”400
The International Court of Justice has further clarified how provisions of IHL and IHRL operate
together because some provisions, such as the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life, will
differ in meaning depending on whether one is in the context of peace or war. The principle of
lex specialis remains relevant, however. The Court stated that, while the right to life continues to
operate during armed conflict, the meaning of “arbitrary deprivation of life” in armed conflict
“can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from
the terms of the [ICCPR] itself.”401 In the concurrent application of IHL and IHRL, the ICRC has
stated that, in the case of NIACs, the interplay of IHL and IHRL requires consideration of
customary IHL in addition to IHL treaty provisions in determining the proper application of
specific rules from these bodies of law.402
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Traditionally, IHRL was considered to only apply to states,403 however, some have argued that it
is now also applicable to armed groups during NIACs.404 Scholars who consider IHRL
inapplicable to armed groups emphasize that, while IHL applicable to NIACs has always been
intended to apply to armed groups, IHRL was developed to apply to states, not armed groups.405
Fortin’s review of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention Against Torture, found
no evidence that anything in those instruments conveyed an intent to bind armed groups.406
There are two human rights treaties that do manifest an intent to bind armed groups: the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which addresses the participation of
children in hostilities;407 and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, which both explicitly address obligations to armed
groups.408 Some scholars have argued that “intent is one of the main determinants of
international rights and obligations”409 and that the absence of intent on the part of the drafters of
IHRL treaties blocks the potential to bind armed groups to this body of law based on the
legislative jurisdiction approach discussed earlier.410 By contrast, Clapham has stated that
legislative jurisdiction “could … justify the application to individuals and non-state actors of
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certain human rights obligations found in treaties” though he does not specify which human
rights obligations could be justifiably applied to non-state actors.411
It has been argued that, in exceptional circumstances, IHRL obligations can create binding
obligations for armed groups.412 These arguments for the binding nature of IHRL on armed
groups tend to rely predominantly on the “[armed group’s] relationship with the territorial
State.”413 The exercise of de facto authority on the part of an armed group, through territorial
control and some form of administration over that territory, is said to warrant the assumption of
human rights obligations because the group has de facto taken the place of the state vis-à-vis the
population in the territory under its control.414 It has been suggested that, when an armed group is
a de facto authority, it is bound by “obligations of fundamental IHRL” because these
fundamental rights, such as the right to life or the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment, are customary international law.415 The de facto authority argument
tends to be viewed as the strongest, and perhaps only, legitimate explanation of how some armed
groups may be legally bound by IHRL.416 Indeed, even the ICRC, which has long taken the
position that armed groups do not and cannot have human rights obligations, has recognized an
exception to this position in “cases in which a group, usually by virtue of stable control of
territory, has the ability to act like a state authority”.417 In that case, then “[that armed group’s]
human rights responsibilities may therefore be recognized de facto.”418
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The fact that many armed groups do not exercise de facto authority means that, beyond the
possibility of being bound to fundamental IHRL obligations under customary international law, a
worrisome gap may exist in the protection of human rights.419 It is well established that “the acts
of unsuccessful insurrectional movements are not attributable to the State”.420 That means that
the state will not be responsible for human rights violations committed by members of an armed
group that does not exercise de facto authority. It has been suggested that IHRL obligations may
apply to armed groups that do not meet the “control of territory and some form of
administration” requirement for the exercise of de facto authority.421 This argument is made
based on the fact that the acts of an armed group that successfully defeats the Government can
incur international responsibility. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State
Responsibility state that, where an armed group goes on to form a new government, “[t]he
situation requires that acts committed during the struggle for power by the [armed group] should
be attributable to the state, alongside acts of the then established Government.”422 Murray has
argued that this means that:
the law of state responsibility accepts that international
obligations can be directly imposed on a non-state armed group
– including those existing below the de facto authority threshold
– concurrent to the imposition of obligation son the territorial
state.423
Murray further argues that armed groups below the de facto authority threshold must still meet
the threshold of being beyond the control of the state;424 however, this threshold can be met by
the existence of a NIAC because this “[would] clearly indicate a state’s inability to reasonably
impose its will”.425 He states that an armed group beyond the control of the state that “exercise[s]
control over an area or population … should be regarded as a vertical authority” that is bound by
IHRL obligations.426 He appears to adopt a very loose understanding of “control over …
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population” based on the ability of an armed group in a NIAC to “exert unregulated authority”
due to the fact that it is beyond state control.427 It appears it is only the exercise of “governmentlike functions” that Murray deems non-essential for an armed group to possess de facto
authority.428
Murray’s approach to the requisite elements of de facto authority provides a legal argument for
the binding application of IHRL to armed groups under customary international law and
international treaty law. However, Murray does not simply lower the traditional de facto
authority threshold of territorial control and some form of administration: he essentially replaces
it with the threshold for a NIAC. This would only require an armed group to have sufficient
organization for the application of Common Article 3. Since an armed group under Common
Article 3 need only have sufficient organization to implement its obligations under that provision
and requires no territorial control whatsoever, its organizational capacity may be minimal. Some
scholars have expressed concern that groups which lack territorial control or control over
population are unlikely to have the capacity to implement many human rights beyond the basic
ones under customary international law.429 The lack of sufficient capacity concern is also the
ICRC’s primary argument against the suggestion that armed groups, other than de facto
authorities, can have IHRL obligations.430 However, the lack of capacity does not necessarily
mean that these armed groups could not be, or are not, bound by IHRL. Murray attempts to
address this possible problem by advocating a “gradated application” of IHRL obligations to
armed groups based on each group’s capacity to apply the rules of IHRL.431
International practice appears to support the argument that armed groups operating as de facto
authorities have IHRL obligations.432 For example, the UN Security Council has frequently
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called upon non-state parties to a conflict to “comply strictly with the obligations applicable to
them under international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law”.433 Fortin has
noted that in international practice there are repeated references to the fact that “‘it is now
increasingly accepted that non-state groups exercising de facto control over a part of a State’s
territory must respect fundamental human rights of persons in that territory” international
practice repeatedly references does not explicitly eliminate the requirement that an armed group
exercise government functions in addition to territorial control in order to be bound as a de facto
authority.434 These references in international practice rarely mention the exercise of government
functions requirement.435 This would seem to suggest that, at the very least, territorial control
accompanied by the exercise of government-like functions almost certainly leads to IHRL
obligations for armed groups and it is possible, though not definitively established, that territorial
control alone may be sufficient to bind armed groups to IHRL.
The fact that at least some armed groups appear to be bound by IHRL warrants consideration of
this body of law when assessing whether a particular combatant behaviour is or is not currently
regulated during armed conflict. Rules and principles of IHRL remain relevant in the context of
armed conflict with respect to both state and at least some non-state parties. The ability to
derogate to a certain degree from certain rules of IHRL may mean that, in times of conflict,
certain rights may be largely inapplicable or may operate in a restricted manner. However, it is
unclear whether armed groups have the ability to derogate from certain IHRL obligations as
states can. Even where IHRL does or might address the behaviours identified through
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psychological insights in this thesis, new IHL regulations or approaches may still be needed if
the application of existing IHRL during conflict is ambiguous or insufficient.

3.6 Conclusion
This thesis examines the issue of civilian protection from abuses committed by members of
armed groups during NIACs. The thesis advances the claim that behavioural regulations distinct
from regulations for the protection of individuals in peacetime are needed to prevent violations
of IHL protections for civilians. This chapter has demonstrated to whom current IHL applies and,
therefore, which armed groups may be captured or affected by the new rules and regulations
proposed in chapter 8. It has also demonstrated that IHRL applies during armed conflict
generally and creates binding obligations for some armed groups.
The chapter began by explaining that only armed groups that possess a requisite degree of
organization are the addressees of this body of law. The object and purpose of IHL as well as the
principle of equality belligerents necessitates that all parties to an armed conflict, including
armed groups, be bound by IHL. The main focus of this chapter was the seven different
explanations that have been advanced in the literature for the binding application of IHL to
armed groups. The application of international law to armed groups is complicated by the fact
that, traditionally, international law is made for and by states. Many discussions assessing the
various explanations for how IHL binds armed groups have evaluated the explanations based in
part on their anticipated effects on armed group compliance with the law. This is problematic
because the strength of a legal explanation is distinct from the issue of compliance. Compliance
is very important, but it is and should be considered separately from the question of legality. De
facto authority and claims to represent the state will explain how IHL binds only a small portion
of armed groups. They are good explanations, but should be used alongside other explanations
rather than advanced as the sole explanation for the binding nature of IHL obligations for armed
groups. The incorporation and implementation of IHL into national law can explain how armed
groups are bound by many rules of IHL; however, it cannot explain how application of IHL
binds directly as a matter of international, rather than national, law. Legislative jurisdiction
provides a strong legal explanation for how armed groups are bound under international law
based on state ratification and acceptance of IHL on behalf of its citizens. This explanation can
also be used to explain how rules of customary IHL bind armed groups; however, the case law
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from the International Court of Justice also supports the customary international law explanation
based on the limited international legal personality. It is consistent with this case law to view
Common Article 3 and subsequent regulation of NIACs also addressed to armed groups as
creating the requisite international legal personality to fulfill the obligations assigned to them by
states under IHL. There is nothing to prevent both legislative jurisdiction and international legal
personality explanations from operating as legal explanations for how armed groups are bound
by both treaty and customary IHL. This chapter has challenged the consent explanation and the
third-party treaty application explanation (which turns on the issue of consent). The language of
Common Article 3 suggests that consent may be a valid explanation for how some rules of IHL
come to bind armed groups; however, it is by no means sufficient unto itself to fully explain how
IHL more broadly binds armed groups. The suggestion from some scholars that consent is
required for an armed group to be bound by IHL is unfounded. While consent is requisite for
states to be bound by IHL, there is no evidence that the consent requirement extends to non-state
actors. Finally, this chapter addressed the application of IHRL during armed conflict and
demonstrated that it creates binding obligations for armed groups acting as de facto authorities.
This chapter established that organized armed groups are bound by IHL. The fact they are
currently bound by IHL, and some are also bound by IHRL, suggests they would likely be
affected by new rules and regulations recommended in later chapters of this thesis. The next
chapter will turn to the specific protections for civilians available in IHL. An understanding of
existing protections is essential, as it provides the existing framework that will be examined in
chapter 8 to identify combatant behaviours not currently captured by IHL, but which require
regulation for the protection of civilians.
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Chapter 4
4 International Humanitarian Law Protections for Civilians in NonInternational Armed Conflicts
IHL is designed to operate in situations where all other legal order has broken down. It is an
attempt to instill a modicum of order into a situation of chaos. It represents the effort of the
international community to balance military necessity with the dictates of humanity.436
Unfortunately, and perhaps unsurprisingly, there is inherent tension between these two concepts.
For example, whereas the dictates of humanity prohibits all harm to civilians unless the harm
was unavoidable, the principle of proportionality permits harm to civilians that may be avoidable
so long as it is incidental to an attack on a legitimate military target and the civilian harm does
not outweigh the military advantage of the attack in question.437 In NIACs, this tension is
exacerbated by further friction between the dictates of humanity and state sovereignty, which has
traditionally allowed states the right to control all matters within their territory with limited
outside interference.438 This right has been eroded in certain ways through the development of
international law.439 For example, international human rights law erodes state sovereignty
through its regulation of how a state may treat its citizens.440
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Common Article 3 in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 represents the first international
codification of IHL rules applicable to NIACs.441 These protections were elaborated upon and
supplemented by Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention in 1977.442 This treaty law is
complemented by, and protections for civilians expanded through, the application of customary
IHL in NIACs.443 The previous chapter demonstrated to whom and how the rules of IHL are
binding during these conflicts. This chapter explores the content of the rules in this body of law
that aim to protect civilians from the worst effects of war.
This chapter begins by examining the foundational principles of customary IHL and treaty law
applicable to NIACs. First, the chapter considers the humanitarian foundations of civilian
protections in IHL, including the principle of humanity and the requirement of humane treatment
which are at the core of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. The chapter then turns to
a consideration of the basis for all civilian protections in conflict: the principle of distinction. The
principle of distinction requires parties to the conflict to distinguish between combatants, who
are legal targets, and civilians, who may not be directly targeted.444 This chapter therefore
reviews how ‘civilian’ is defined in IHL, and how civilians are distinguished from combatants
under this principle. This section is followed by discussion of the principle of proportionality in
which the effort to balance between military necessity and humanity is most evident. The final
section of the first part of this chapter reflects on the requirement that military actors take
precautions in military operations for the protection of civilians.
The remainder of the chapter examines specific prohibited acts in the context of NIACs, such as
murder, torture, and pillage. While the core prohibitions in Common Article 3 and AP II are
identified, a more detailed discussion is only provided for the prohibitions most often violated in
NIACs, in particular in the context of the two case study conflicts, Sierra Leone and the
Democratic Republic of Congo, examined in this thesis. This section demonstrates how the
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existing specific protections for civilians largely prohibit behaviour that is also considered illegal
under many domestic jurisdictions during peacetime. The chapter argues that there may be
behaviours that have been accorded certain legal parameters in peacetime, and which may
warrant IHL-specific regulation during armed conflict.
It must be noted that much of the existing understanding of the principles and specific
prohibitions examined in this chapter comes from international criminal law decisions and
judgments. This case law is extremely useful and rightly relied upon to help practitioners,
academics, and parties to conflicts understand the content of crimes identified in IHL.
International criminal law has helped to provide detail to an otherwise limited body of rules for
NIACs.445 However, it is critical to remember, particularly for the purposes of this thesis, that
there is a distinction between IHL and international criminal law. First, not all violations of IHL
are criminalized under international criminal law. Second, due to the nature of international
criminal law, acts prohibited under IHL will often have more restrictive definitions and
application under international criminal law: for example, a higher threshold of mens rea will
often be required under international criminal law.446 This means that new IHL rules developed
for NIACs will not necessarily also be considered to be crimes under international criminal law.
Further, even if new IHL rules are considered to be international crimes, the elements of a
prohibition under IHL need not align with all of the same standards that would be required in
international criminal law. Therefore, due to the differences between IHL and international
criminal law, the latter’s case law should be taken as “useful guidance in understanding the
relevant international humanitarian law rule” rather than as a definitive expression of IHL.447
This thesis advances the claim that an examination of existing civilian protection provisions in
IHL reveals a gap between the regulation of behaviour for the protection of individuals in peace
and the regulations needed to protect civilians from combatant violence during war. This chapter
argues that the current framework for civilian protection in NIACs is based largely on
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protections afforded to individuals during peacetime. It demonstrates that the substantive content
of IHL is founded in the humanitarian objective of protecting individuals, in particular civilians,
who do not take direct part in hostilities. Consequently, ongoing harm toward civilians in armed
conflicts warrants consideration of whether the substantive content of IHL might be further
developed in order to better achieve the humanitarian aim of protecting civilians during war.
Ultimately, this chapter provides the framework that serves as the starting point for analysis in
chapter 8 in order to determine what behaviours require regulation under IHL during NIACs.

4.1 The Humanitarian Foundation of Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict
This section will discuss the humanitarian ideals that undergird much of modern IHL. These
ideals serve as the basis in this thesis for the further substantive development of IHL in order to
improve civilian protection during armed conflict. Inherent in the name ‘international
humanitarian law’ is the idea of humanity. While some actors, particularly national armed forces,
continue to refer to this body of law as the ‘law of armed conflict’,448 ‘international humanitarian
law’ has gained greater traction outside of that realm, including recognition by the International
Court of Justice.449 Similarly, the statutes of the International Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda refer to ‘international humanitarian law’.450
The International Court of Justice has recognized the principle of humanity in IHL. The court
first acknowledged the existence of a principle of humanity in war, albeit indirectly, in its 1949
judgment in the Corfu Channel case.451 In that case, the court recognized an obligation of a
principle of “elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in
war”.452 The court has since addressed the principle of humanity during war more directly in its
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention,453 its Nuclear Weapons
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Advisory Opinion,454 and its decisions in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua455 and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.456 In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the court
stated that the provisions of Common Article 3 “constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to
the more elaborate rules which are also to apply to international conflicts; and they are rules
which, in the Court's opinion, reflect what the Court in 1949 called 'elementary considerations of
humanity.'”457 More recently, in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the International Court
of Justice noted the “intrinsically humanitarian character of legal principles [of IHL …] which
permeates the entire law of armed conflict”.458
Coupland has argued that a “fundamental and objective relationship exists between humanity,
armed violence and international law and that this relationship has long been recognized.”459
“[E]lementary considerations of humanity” have played a large role in the development of norms
and “the elaboration of new standards”;460 however, humanity is not the only consideration in the
development of IHL. Humanity is often counterbalanced in IHL with military necessity. Schmitt
has described the relationship between military necessity and the principle of humanity as a
“symbiotic relationship [that] determines in which direction, and at what speed, IHL evolves.”461
This relationship requires parties to a conflict to take both military necessity and humanity into
consideration during armed conflict.462 Consequently, “[a]n equilibrium between military
necessity and humanitarian considerations underlies every norm of the law of international
armed conflict”.463
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Some of the earliest origins of contemporary IHL have codified this desire to balance humanity
and necessity. The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration explicitly noted the need to “fix[] the
technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of
humanity.”464 The preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) on the Laws and Customs of
War on Land voiced a “desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements
permit.”465 The desire to balance these two concepts is, however, often easier said than done.
Military necessity and humanity are often at odds with each other in armed conflict.466 Military
necessity seeks to allow anything and everything necessary for military success,467 whereas
humanity seeks to limit the destructiveness and suffering that can often accompany war. Military
necessity can sometimes temper more humanitarian rules of IHL. For example, while the
principle of distinction prohibits the direct targeting of civilians, the principle of proportionality
allows for incidental injury or death to civilians when the military advantage outweighs the risk
to civilians.468 While military necessity can restrict the humanitarian aims of certain rules of IHL,
this does not negate the existence of a principle of humanity undergirding IHL. Most IHL rules
are characterized by a “consistent sensitivity to the balance between military necessity and
humanity.”469
Meron has noted that the “growing protection [for civilians] extended by the laws of war … rests
on the requirements of humanity”.470 Schmitt has suggested that the balance between military
necessity and humanity has “gradually shifted in emphasis toward humanitarian
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considerations.”471 Not all states have embraced this shift. For example, the United States is not a
state party to either Additional Protocol I or II, the Landmine Ban Convention, or the Cluster
Munitions Convention.472 There has also been resistance to what some states have considered
misapplications of IHL in an effort to advance humanitarian goals.473 For example, the United
States has criticized the International Committee of the Red Cross’ customary IHL study,
expressing the view that some of the rules lack sufficient evidentiary support.474 While the
balancing of military necessity and humanity has been criticized at times, the fact that there is
balancing required is generally accepted.475
Humanitarian considerations for the protection of civilians continue to propel the development of
IHL. States have continued to seek new agreements for the protection of civilians, for example,
through treaties regulating or prohibiting the use of certain weapons, such as anti-personnel
landmines and cluster munitions.476 Thus, not only is the principle of humanity firmly
established as part of IHL, it continues to be a motivating factor in the continuing development
of this body of law.

4.2 International Humanitarian Law Protections for Civilians
There are four general principles of IHL which apply regardless of the nature of the armed
conflict: (1) the principle of distinction;477 (2) the principle of proportionality;478 (3) the
requirement to take precautions to protect civilians;479 and, (4) the principle of humane
treatment.480 While this thesis argues that specific prohibited acts, such as murder and torture, are
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drawn from peacetime protections for individuals, the principles discussed in this section provide
a necessary distinction in the regulation of behaviour during armed conflict. This distinction
stems primarily from the first principle discussed, distinction, which is necessary for civilian
protection in conflict due to the legality of killing enemy combatants, which erodes the generally
absolute peacetime prohibition on murder. This section will examine the principles of distinction,
proportionality, precaution, and humane treatment in turn.
4.2.1 Distinction
The principle of distinction is a rule of customary international law applicable to both
international armed conflicts and NIACs.481 It is also implicit in Article 13 of Additional
Protocol II, which protects the civilian population and individual civilians.482 It has been said that
there is no principle in IHL which is “more critical than the ‘principle of distinction’.”483 This is
because the principle embodies the “overarching and all-encompassing need in IHL to preserve
the principles of humanity from being completely subordinated to interests of military
necessity.”484 It juxtaposes civilians and fighters, as opposed to civilians and members of armed
forces, as it is sometimes articulated by the ICRC.485
The principle of distinction can be difficult to apply in NIACs, as members of armed groups “do
not usually wear uniforms or use other external marks identifying them as fighters.”486 Further,
“[t]here is no authoritative guidance as to what an insurgent fighter is supposed to do in order to
enable an adversary to tell him apart from civilians.”487 Whereas combatants in international
armed conflicts are required to wear a “fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance” and to
“carry[] arms openly”,488 there is no equivalent provision for NIACs. In spite of potential
difficulties associated with distinction in NIAC, the principle is still applicable to such
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conflicts.489 In other words, the principle of distinction is considered to apply at all times during
a non-international armed conflict.490 In order to properly apply the principle of distinction
between civilians and fighters, however, it is necessary to understand how ‘civilian’ is defined in
IHL.
4.2.1.i Definition of Civilian in IHL
The question of who is a civilian in an armed conflict can be a highly contested issue.491 The
language of Common Article 3 “implies a concept of civilian comprising those individuals “who
do not bear arms” on behalf of a party to the conflict.”492 The final text of Additional Protocol II
did not include an explicit definition of ‘civilian.’ Nonetheless, the language of the final text, as
interpreted by the ICRC, supports the premise that the “civilian population and individual
civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations”
conducted by “armed forces,” “dissident armed forces,” and “other organized armed groups,”
“unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”.493 While the legal definition of
civilian as someone who is not a member of the armed forces or an armed group seems quite
straightforward, in practice it is highly debated. For example, it is often questioned whether
“civilian contractors working with the military, or terrorists, or certain part-time participants in a
civil war, should or should not be considered civilians.”494
The definition of ‘civilian’ applicable to NIACs is drawn from IHL treaties applicable to IACs.
While the use of the term ‘civilian’ in IHL originated between 1874 and 1970;495 it was not until
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12
August 1949 (Geneva Convention IV) that robust protections for civilians were codified in
IHL.496 The protection for civilians codified in this Convention focused on “the treatment of
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civilians in the hands of the adversary, whether in occupied territory or in internment.”497 It
defined civilians as “those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find
themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”.498 Legal protection for civilians was
expanded in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Additional Protocol I
provided a new and broader definition of civilian which encompass all persons ineligible for the
protection of prisoner of war status.499 Further, it created a presumption that, where there is doubt
as to “whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian”.500 It also
included, at Article 48, a “Basic Rule” regarding civilian protection:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall
at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against
military objectives.
Civilians who take part in hostilities may, however, be targeted while they participate
actively/directly in hostilities.501 Consequently, civilian protection is not absolute. On
ratification, many states issued declarations or statements of understanding regarding the
interpretation of provisions protecting civilians and civilian objects. In particular, many states
took the position that civilian protection was dependent on the information available to a
commander at the time of an operation and that, where civilian objects are used for a military
purpose, the objects would lose their protection.502
While all armed conflicts inevitably place civilians in danger, certain tactics of modern armed
conflicts, particularly non-international conflicts, present distinct risks of the direct targeting of
civilians.503 For example, the increasing occurrence of urban warfare has significantly increased
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the risks to civilians.504 Other tactics create significant ambiguity in the distinction between
combatants and civilians, such as guerilla warfare and terrorism.505 Regardless of the challenges
in applying the standard, however, civilian protection and the principle of distinction remain
cornerstones of international humanitarian law.
While the principle of distinction prohibits the direct targeting of civilians during armed conflict,
not all civilian deaths or injuries during armed conflict amount to a violation of IHL: the
principle of proportionality accepts the possibility of civilian death or injury under certain
conditions. The next section will discuss the principle of proportionality in more detail.
4.2.2 Proportionality
Where a military operation to attack a legitimate target poses the risk of death or injury to
civilians, it will not necessarily be prohibited, provided the civilians are not directly targeted.
The principle of proportionality provides guidance as to the circumstances in which such
incidental death or injury will be an IHL violation. An attack on a legitimate military target will
still be prohibited if it
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.506
The phrase “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” is the
crux of the proportionality principle: it requires military actors to balance the risks to civilians
with the advantages to the military and, only where the advantage is proportional to the risk, will
the attack be legal. The proportionality of attacks must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.507
The principle of proportionality “is by its nature imprecise” and complicated.508 This is because
“[p]roportionality calculations are heterogeneous, … dissimilar value genres – military and
humanitarian – are being weighed against each other.”509 Consequently, proportionality is often
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likely to be assessed differently depending on the position of the decision maker, that is, whether
they are on the “winning or losing side” at the time the assessment is conducted.510
There is nothing in Additional Protocol II that explicitly prohibits “excessive collateral
damage”,511 which has led some commentators to suggest the principle does not, or may not,
apply to NIACs.512 This assessment is widely considered to be incorrect. At minimum, the
principle applies to NIACs as a rule of customary international law.513 This is confirmed by the
ICRC 1987 Commentary on Additional Protocol II, which clearly notes that “[the principle of
proportionality] appl[ies] irrespective of whether the conflict is an international or an internal
one.”514 Furthermore, the Commentary on the San Remo Manual on the Law of NonInternational Armed Conflict addresses the issue of proportionality, stating that: “[t]he relative
absence of express mention of proportionality in instruments governing non-international armed
conflict should not be construed as meaning that it is inapplicable in such conflict.”515 This is
further confirmed by other IHL treaties,516 the ICRC Customary IHL Study,517 and academic
literature.518
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The assessment of proportionality turns on the “excessive” threshold: only attacks where the
damage to civilians and/or civilian objects would “be excessive in relation to the ‘concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated’” are prohibited.519 It is essentially a standard of
“reasonableness”: excessive damage would “indicate[] unreasonable conduct in light of the
circumstances prevailing at the time.”520 It is both an objective and subjective assessment:
if the attacker knew or should have known that the civilian
damage or injury caused would be excessive relative to the
anticipated military advantage, the rule will have been
violated.521
It is largely agreed that the ‘military advantage’ of the entire attack must be considered in
proportion to anticipated damage and not the advantage of certain “isolated or particular parts of
the attack.”522 The assessment may not be based solely on that attack’s immediate or short-term
effects, but must also consider the long-term consequences of the act.523 Further, it will
“include[] a broad range of issues extending from ‘force protection’ to diverting the attention of
the enemy from an intended site of invasion.”524 Again, this is why proportionality must be
assessed on a case-by-case basis.525 The fact that proportionality must be assessed case-by-case
does, however, leave some ambiguity in the law as “precise parameters of this zone of
proportionality are very much in dispute amidst the complexity of modern armed conflicts”.526
Even where an operation satisfies the proportionality requirement, a military commander will
also need to take certain additional precautions to protect civilians. The next section will briefly
elaborate on the precaution requirement in IHL.
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4.2.3 Precaution
While not explicitly referenced in either Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II,
precautions must also be taken in NIACs to protect civilians and the civilian population.
Precautions are necessitated by both the principle of distinction and the principle of
proportionality.527 Further, the customary nature of this rule precedes the adoption of Additional
Protocol II.528 Parties must take “all feasible precautions”, which are defined as “those
precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances
ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”529 This includes
choosing, where multiple options are available, the “methods and means for conducting an
attack… that [will] minimise civilian danger”.530 Precautions, therefore, ensure that even where
an attack is legal, additional steps will need to be taken to minimize the risk to civilians from that
attack.
4.2.4 Humane Treatment
The final key principle of IHL is the principle of humane treatment, which is required explicitly
in the language of Common Article 3(1) as well as in Additional Protocol II, where Part II of the
Protocol is titled “Humane Treatment”.531 Humane treatment is not subject to a single exhaustive
definition, but, rather, it is “context specific” and must be considered with due regard to “both
objective and subjective elements, such as the environment, the physical and mental condition of
the person, as well as his or her age, social, cultural, religious or political background and past
experiences.”532 That “humane treatment” was left open to interpretation could be beneficial for
civilian protection because it allows for such a contextual analysis. Unlike the ambiguity in the
principle of proportionality, which can sometimes be skewed in favour of military necessity, the
principle of humane treatment cannot be restricted: the ambiguity will either have no effect on
civilian protection, or it could be interpreted in a manner that provides greater protection to
civilians.533 This is because the principle of humane treatment, as codified in Common Article 3
and Additional Protocol II, is accompanied by certain specific prohibited acts. These acts include
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torture and murder.534 These prohibited acts, which are listed as examples and not as an
exhaustive list, provide guidance as to the types of treatment considered to be inhumane.535
These prohibited acts also create a base level of protection for civilians: humane treatment
cannot be interpreted in a manner that impinges on those specific prohibitions because they are
expressly identified as being “prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever”.536 However,
the principle could be interpreted to include more protections for civilians than those specifically
enumerated in these treaties because the specific prohibited acts are provided “[w]ithout
prejudice to the generality of the [separate requirement that civilians ‘shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely]”.537
Humane treatment is required “in all circumstances” under IHL for NIACs.538 While its precise
nature may vary slightly based on different circumstances in different conflicts, the language of
Common Article 3 indicates that there are no exceptions to its application in NIAC and that this
requirement represents the “minimum standard of treatment to be accorded to all fellow human
beings” in such conflicts.539 Parties to a conflict may, however, provide treatment above and
beyond the minimum standard required under Common Article 3.540 The phrase “in all
circumstances” has also been interpreted as indicating that “[m]ilitary necessity arguments … do
not justify acts or omissions inconsistent with the requirements of humane treatment.”541 Further,
“in all circumstances” serves to reinforce the fact that the rules of IHL, particularly those for the
protection of civilians, are “non-reciprocal ” because they apply regardless of whether other
parties to the conflict adhere to these rules or not.542
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The four core principles of IHL – distinction, proportionality, precaution, and humane treatment
– further demonstrate the centrality of civilian protection in this body of law. The principle of
distinction, as the cardinal principle of IHL, places civilian protection at the heart of IHL. While
military necessity tempers the absolute protection for civilians by allowing for incidental death
or injury to civilians if it is proportional to the military advantage, distinction, precaution and
humane treatment indicate an effort on the part of states - the authors of this body of law - to
protect civilians inasmuch as possible within armed conflict. This effort to protect civilians
suggests that a review of IHL is warranted, particularly consideration of whether additional
protections for civilians are necessary in order to implement the primary objectives of IHL. The
next section will turn to an examination of some of the specific acts prohibited for the protection
of civilians during armed conflicts. It will show that the acts, for the most part, are representative
of existing domestic crimes during peace.

4.3 Specific Prohibited Acts
As noted above, the inclusion of the principle of humane treatment in Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II is accompanied by certain specifically prohibited acts as examples of
inhumane treatment. This part of the chapter will focus on an examination of some of these
prohibited acts, based on those acts which were most prevalent in the case study conflicts in
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The previous part of the chapter focused on
general principles applicable to civilian protection during armed conflict. The aim of this part of
the chapter is to outline certain specific protections for civilians, as well as to demonstrate that
most of these prohibited acts exist in ordinary domestic criminal law.
Jean Pictet’s 1958 Commentary on the fourth Geneva Convention noted that “[Common Article
3] merely demands respect for certain rules, which were already recognized as essential in all
civilized countries, and enacted in municipal law of the States in question, long before the
Convention was signed.”543 Pictet further notes that the specific prohibited behaviours of
Common Article 3, such as torture and mutilation, apply regardless of whether an armed conflict
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exists because they are “essential rules which [a state] in fact observes daily, under its own laws,
even when dealing with common criminals.”544 Further evidence of the parallel between
peacetime prohibited conduct and prohibited conduct during armed conflict can be seen in the
International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes and in the drafting process for the Elements of
Crimes. If one examines the elements of the war crimes of murder, rape, torture, etc., it is
possible to see that the key distinction between these acts in peace and during armed conflict is
based on the protected status of the victim545 and on the context in which the act was committed,
namely, the act was committed in the context of an armed conflict.546 Further, the perpetrator
must be aware of the existence of the armed conflict; an element deemed necessary if an
individual was to be subjected to “greater international stigma [for a war crime] than for an
ordinary crime”.547 This last fact is extremely important as it indicates that the majority of states
negotiating the Elements of Crimes felt that awareness of the existence of an armed conflict was
crucial to the differentiation between the conduct prohibited in peacetime and the conduct
prohibited during armed conflict. The fact that these existing specific IHL prohibitions for
civilians are imported from domestic criminal laws for the protection of individuals establishes
the starting point for the gap this thesis argues exists between the protections provided for the
safety of individuals during peace and the additional protections required under IHL to protect
civilians during war.
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II are designed to protect those who do not, or are no
longer, actively/directly participating in hostilities during a NIAC. Common Article 3
accomplishes this primarily through prohibitions on certain acts, such as murder, torture, and
outrages on personal dignity, in relation to these protected persons. Subparagraph 1 of Common
Article 3 states:
… the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons:
544

Pictet, supra note 98 at 36.
ICC, Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court (The Hague: ICC, 2011) at Articles 8(2)(c)(i)-1
(murder); 8(2)(c)(i)-2 (mutilation); 8(2)(c)(i)-3 (cruel treatment); 8(2)(c)(i)-4(torture);
546
Ibid at Articles 8(2)(c)(i)-1 (murder); 8(2)(c)(i)-2 (mutilation); 8(2)(c)(i)-3 (cruel treatment); 8(2)(c)(i)-4(torture);
8(2)(e)(vi)-1 (rape).
547
Knut Dörmann, Eva La Haye & Herman von Hebel, “The Context of War Crimes” in Roy S Lee, ed, The
International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley, NY:
Transnational Publishers, Inc, 2001) 112 at 121.
545

109
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
Additional Protocol II includes these prohibitions, as well as other explicit prohibitions,
including on corporal punishment, collective punishments, acts of terrorism, slavery, and
pillage.548 Article 4(2) of Additional Protocol II states:
… the following acts against the persons referred to in
paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever:
(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being
of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such
as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
(b) collective punishments;
(c) taking of hostages;
(d) acts of terrorism;
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of
indecent assault;
(f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
(g) pillage;
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
With respect to the prohibition on violence to life and person in Common Article 3, Additional
Protocol II extends this to also prohibit violence to health and mental well-being.549 It also
explicitly prohibits threatening to commit any of the prohibited acts in article 4(2).550
Threatening these prohibited acts would also likely be captured by the prohibition on violence to
mental well-being.551 Much as Common Article 3 applies in “all circumstances”, the prohibitions
contained in Additional Protocol II article 4(2) are “prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever”. Additional Protocol II also includes explicit protections for children,552 most
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notably it prohibits the recruitment or use in hostilities of children under 15 years of age under
article 4(3)(c), which reads:
(c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall
neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to
take part in hostilities.
Common Article 3 contains specific protections for civilians; however, it does not contain any
explicit rules governing the manner in which military operations may be conducted.553 One
possible exception to this is the “prohibition of murder which has been found in some cases to
apply to unlawful attacks in the conduct of hostilities.”554 This exception does find some support
in the literature,555 but is strongly contested in the ICRC 2016 Commentary on Common Article
3, which notes that nothing in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 was intended to govern the
conduct of hostilities.556 The Commentary’s position is supported by evidence of the intention of
drafters of the Geneva Conventions and rearticulated during the drafting of Additional Protocol
II.557 Consequently, for regulation of the conduct of hostilities in NIAC, actors must rely
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primarily on customary international law,558 though a few provisions of Additional Protocol II
also regulate the conduct of hostilities.559
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II prohibit a number of specific acts directed toward
civilians and there is considerable overlap between the prohibitions in each text. I will now turn
to an examination of some of these specific prohibitions that were frequently violated in the
conflicts in both Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
4.3.1 Violence to Life and Person
The prohibition on violence to life and person in subparagraph 1(a) of Common Article 3 is
considered of “fundamental importance in ensuring humane treatment.”560 This prohibition is
also found in Article 4(2)(a) of Additional Protocol II, prohibiting violence to health and mental
well-being. The violence is prohibited against those who do not, or are no longer, actively
participating in the conflict. Violence against such persons is not militarily necessary and would
therefore be “gratuitous” and “is irreconcilable with the imperative of humane treatment”.561
Violence is considered to refer to both injury and/or death and is considered to capture certain
omissions, such as the failure to provide food or medical care to those under one’s control.562
The provision contains a non-exhaustive list of acts captured by “violence to life and person”,
such as “murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture”. Since this list is nonexhaustive, other acts may be captured by “violence to life and person”, “for example, [an act
that] does not amount to torture or cruel treatment can still be prohibited as an act of violence to
person.”563 While not explicit in Common Article 3, it is widely accepted that the “prohibition of
torture and cruel treatment under Common Article 3 … includes acts detrimental to the mental
integrity of the person” and is not limited to physical violence.564 Consequently, the
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interpretation of Common Article 3 captures the added prohibitions explicitly listed in Article
4(2)(a) of Additional Protocol II.
3.3.2 Murder
Common Article 3(1)(a) prohibits “murder of all kinds”. This prohibition is also found in Article
4(2)(a) of Additional Protocol II and has long existed under customary international law.565
Murder in this context refers to the “intentional, unjustified killings of those not actively
participating in armed conflict”.566 Under Common Article 3, “murder clearly includes killings
committed with direct intent, whether by act or omission, of both civilians and members of the
armed forces taking no active part in hostilities who are physically captured, detained, or
otherwise in the physical control of the relevant party to the armed conflict.”567 It is also likely
that recklessness constitutes sufficient intent for a violation of the prohibition of murder to have
occurred.568 While this suggestion has been contested by some,569 Knuckey has argued that
“indirect intent or recklessness better comports with the broad protection for life provided by the
language of Common Article 3, domestic criminal law, and early war crimes cases.”570 The
inclusion of a standard of recklessness in this prohibition is supported by the ICRC’s 2016
Commentary on Common Article 3.571 Further, both “acts and omissions are prohibited”.572
What is not included under this prohibition, however, is “killing during the conduct of
hostilities.”573 Such deaths must be considered with regard to the particular rules governing the
conduct of hostilities, in particular “rules of distinction, proportionality and precautions.”574
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4.3.3 Mutilation
Mutilation is also expressly prohibited as violence to life and person under Common Article 3, as
well as being prohibited under customary international law.575 The term itself is not defined in
international humanitarian law. The ICRC’s 2016 Commentary on Common Article 3 draws
upon the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes document addressing mutilation to
provide a basic definition for the purpose of Common Article 3.576 The Commentary defines
mutilation as “‘permanently disfiguring the person or persons’ or ‘permanently disabling or
removing an organ or appendage’”.577 It defines “permanent” as “lasting or remaining unchanged
indefinitely, or intended to be so; not temporary” and concludes that this means the injury need
not last forever.578 Disfiguring” is defined as “[t]o ‘spoil’” and “[it] requires a certain degree of
severity.”579 Practices in recent conflicts that constituted mutilation include the “amputati[on] of
hands or feet, cutting off other body parts, mutilation of sexual organs, or carving somebody’s
body.”580 One exception would be medical grounds, “such as the amputation of a gangrenous
limb.”581 Finally, the mutilation of dead bodies is not captured by the prohibition on
mutilation.582 It is, however, captured by the prohibition on outrages on personal dignity in
Common Article 3(1)(c) and under customary international law.583
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4.3.4 Torture and Cruel Treatment
Torture and cruel treatment or punishment are unquestionably prohibited under NIAC in both
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II article 4(2)(a) and (e).584 These acts are equally
prohibited under customary international law and are considered to rise to the level of jus cogens
norms.585 There are no exceptions, such as national security, to this prohibition.586 The definition
of torture under Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture has been considered largely
applicable to armed conflict.587 It defines torture as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.588
The only element of this definition that has been considered unnecessary or not applicable to
torture under IHL is the requirement of the “presence of a state official or of any other authoritywielding person in the torture process”.589 The omission of this element is particularly important
in the context of NIAC to ensure that armed groups are equally prohibited from committing acts
of torture.
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While official involvement is not required, the act or acts must still be done for a “specific
purpose or motive.”590 There is no exhaustive list of purposes or motives which will satisfy this
requirement; however, the three purposes articulated in the definition of torture above – “(a) to
obtain[] information or a confession, (b) punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third
person, and (c) discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person” – are widely
accepted.591 The purpose or motive that satisfies the requirement “need be neither the sole nor
the main purpose of inflicting the severe pain or suffering”.592
The threshold for pain and suffering under torture is “severe”, and is contrasted with the lower
threshold of “serious” for cruel treatment.593 The severity of pain or suffering should be assessed
on a case-by-case basis with due consideration to “both the objective elements related to the
severity of the harm and the subjective elements related to the condition of the victim.”594 In
particular, consideration should be given to “‘the nature and context of the infliction of pain’,
‘the premeditation and institutionalisation of the ill-treatment’, ‘the physical condition of the
victim’, ‘the manner and method used’, and ‘the position of inferiority of the victim’.”595 Torture
can consist of one act or it may be the consequence of multiple acts over time.596 It does not have
a “durational requirement”,597 nor does it require permanent injury.598 Consequently, “evidence
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of the suffering need not even be visible after the commission of the crime”.599 Acts that have
been deemed torture include “suffocation by or under water” and “mock executions”.600
Cruel treatment and inhuman treatment are essentially indistinguishable from one another.601
They have been defined as “[forms of] treatment which cause[] serious mental or physical
suffering or injury or constitute[] a serious attack on human dignity”.602 Unlike torture, cruel or
inhuman treatment does not require that the suffering or injury be inflicted with a specific
purpose.603 The threshold for the severity of suffering under cruel or inhuman treatment is also
lower than that under torture.604 More often than not, cruel treatment will consist of “a
combination or accumulation of several acts which, taken individually, may not amount to cruel
treatment.”605 In assessing whether an act or acts amount to cruel treatment, the ICTY has
considered “the nature of the act or omission, the context in which it occurs, its duration and/or
repetition, the physical, mental and moral effects of the act on the victim and the personal
circumstances of the victim, including age, sex and health.”606 While the suffering does “not
need to be lasting”, it does need to be “real and serious”.607 The duration of the effects of the
cruel treatment may, however, contribute to the determination of seriousness.608 Examples of
acts that have been deemed cruel treatment include beatings and attempted murder.609 Corporal
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punishment is explicitly prohibited in Additional Protocol II as well as under customary
international law.610
4.3.5 Outrages upon Personal Dignity and Humiliating and Degrading Treatment
The prohibition on “outrages upon personal dignity” under Common Article 3 and Article
4(2)(e) of Additional Protocol II includes, but is not limited to, “humiliating and degrading
treatment,” although “it is hard to conceive of ‘outrages’ which would not be humiliating or
degrading.”611 This prohibition is also considered to be customary international law.612 While
acts prohibited under outrages upon personal dignity may be related to cruel treatment or torture,
it is its own distinct prohibition. Although the phrase is not defined in either the Geneva
Conventions or the Additional Protocols, the ICTY defined “outrages upon personal dignity” as
requiring that
the accused intentionally committed or participated in an act or
an omission which would be generally considered to cause
serious humiliation, degradation or otherwise would be a serious
attack on human dignity.613
The assessment of whether an act satisfies this definition should consider both “subjective
criteria related to the sensitivity of the victim” and “objective criteria related to the gravity of the
act.”614 A violation of the prohibition on outrages upon personal dignity may be the result of a
single act or an aggregation of acts: “the seriousness of an act and its consequences may arise
either from the nature of the act per se or from the repetition of an act or from a combination of
different acts”.615 There is no need for the humiliation and degradation to be long-lasting;
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however, it must be “real and serious”.616 It has been suggested that this threshold only applies to
the prohibition under international criminal law and that, while a threshold must still be met
under IHL, it is likely to be lower than that found in international criminal law. 617
No distinction has been made between humiliating treatment and degrading treatment in
international case law and “their ordinary meaning is nearly identical.”618 “[T]he severity of the
suffering imposed is of less importance than the humiliation of the victim, regardless of whether
this is in the eyes of others or those of the victim himself or herself.”619 Acts which have been
considered to violate the prohibition include “forced public nudity”620 and “rape and sexual
violence”.621
4.3.6 Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence
Rape and other forms of sexual violence are not explicitly prohibited under Common Article 3;
however, they are captured by both the prohibition on “violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture” and the prohibition on “outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment”.622 These prohibitions
also exist under article 4(2) of Additional Protocol II, which includes explicit prohibitions on
“rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault”. While enforced prostitution and
indecent assault are not explicitly noted in Common Article 3, they are listed as forms of
inhumane treatment in article 27 of Geneva Convention IV and thus can be considered prohibited
under Common Article 3’s requirement that all protected persons be treated humanely and
without distinction. Rape and sexual violence were defined by the Trial Chamber of the
International Criminal Court as:
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1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration,
however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual
organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of
the body.
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of
power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive
environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine
consent…623
Circumstances which are coercive can include, but are not limited to, “force, threat of force, or
coercion cause, for example, by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power.”624 Rape and sexual violence can constitute torture where the requisite elements
of the prohibition on torture are met.625
While historically this prohibition addressed the protection of women from sexual violence and
rape,626 it is now understood to protect all persons, regardless of gender.627 This can be seen in
the language of Additional Protocol II article 4(2)(e) and article 75(2)(b) of Additional Protocol
I. The gender-neutral prohibition of rape and sexual violence is also a rule of customary
international law.628
4.3.7 Collective Punishment
Collective punishment is not prohibited under Common Article 3; however, certain acts
commonly used as forms of collective punishment, such as taking hostages or outrages on
personal dignity, are prohibited.629 Collective punishment is explicitly prohibited under Article
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4(2)(b) of Additional Protocol II. It was also purposely included under Article 4, “Fundamental
Guarantees”, as opposed to Article 6, “Penal Prosecutions”, to ensure that this prohibition was
not limited to penalties issued by courts.630 The prohibition is also considered customary
international law in NIACs.631 Collective punishment refers to “penalties of any kind inflicted on
persons or entire groups of persons, in defiance of the most elementary principles of humanity,
for acts that these persons have not committed”.632 The prohibition on collective punishment
applies to “civilians in the hands of the enemy, both in occupied territories and in the territories
of the parties” to the conflict.633 Collective punishment can be distinguished from other
collective measures on the basis of the purpose for which the act is undertaken: the purpose is to
punish in “response to a prior unlawful or hostile act”.634 Consequently, collective punishment
may consist of a wide range of acts including “property destruction, murder of civilians,
detention, prolonged curfews, and inhuman treatment”.635
4.3.8 Pillage
Pillage is prohibited under Article 4(2)(g) of Additional Protocol II, as well as under customary
international law applicable to NIACs.636 It has not been clearly defined in international
humanitarian law; however, the ICTY Trial Chamber has provided this definition:
all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict
for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under
international law, including those acts traditionally described as
“pillage”.637
The prohibition of pillage includes “both organized pillage and pillage resulting from isolated
acts of indiscipline.”638 Even though this prohibition is firmly established in IHL, pillage tends to
be quite prevalent in armed conflicts.639 While the ICTY definition above provides clarity, the
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question of whether pillage is limited to appropriation for personal or private use, thereby
permitting appropriation for reasons of military necessity, is still under debate.640 This question
arises due to the differences between international criminal law and IHL: this focus on personal
or private use is an element of the crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court,641 but the idea that it applies to IHL has been strongly contested by some
commentators.642
4.3.9 Recruitment or Use of Children under 15 Years Old
Of the specific protection of civilians prohibitions in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol
II, the prohibition of the recruitment or use of children under 15 years in hostilities is the one
most directly linked to the specific context of armed conflict. Although peacetime protections for
children prohibit kidnapping and forced labour,643 the IHL prohibition captures the particular
harm of causing a child to perform the functions of a soldier within an armed conflict, which has
been labelled one of the “worst forms of child labour”.644 The prohibition on the recruitment and
use of children under 15 years of age in hostilities is absolute in NIACs because children cannot
directly participate in hostilities as a combatant, nor can they participate indirectly, such as to
deliver food or to serve as a domestic servant for combatants.645 It is a rare example of a rule of
IHL that seems to provide stronger protection in NIACs than in IACs. This is because, while the
prohibition is absolute in NIACs, in international armed conflicts parties are only required to
take “all feasible measures” to avoid the recruitment of children.646 Additionally, their “direct
participation” is prohibited in international armed conflicts as opposed to any participation in
hostilities in Additional Protocol II.647 Customary IHL applicable to both international armed
conflicts and NIACs prohibits both the recruitment of children and participation of children in
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hostilities.648 The Additional Protocol II prohibition includes not only conscription, but also the
voluntary enlistment of children under fifteen years.649 The prohibition on participation in
hostilities includes activities such as “gathering information, transmitting orders, transporting
ammunition and foodstuffs, or acts of sabotage.”650
The minimum age for participation in armed conflict set by Additional Protocol II was the
subject of considerable debate during the drafting of the provision.651 Some felt that the age limit
should be set at 18 years of age.652 Under international human rights law, persons under the age
of 18 are considered children.653 While the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) does not
change the 15 year age limit in IHL, it states that, when recruiting children between the ages of
15 and 18, “States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those [children] who are oldest.”654
The 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict sets the age for
recruitment and participation in armed conflict as 18 years.655 Eighteen years of age is also used
in the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed
Groups.656 Despite the wide ratification of this Protocol as well as domestic legislation
implementing the 18 year old standard,657 the use of children under 18 years, as well as under 15
years, continues to be common in armed conflicts, such as in the ongoing conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.

4.4 Conclusion
Protections for civilians in NIACs appear fairly robust given the extensive list of prohibitions in
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, and particularly their expansion through rules of
customary IHL. Yet, while there are many examples of compliance with these protections by
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armed groups,658 there is also evidence of numerous violations.659 The first part of this chapter
focused on the foundational principles and concepts of IHL. It demonstrated the centrality of
humanitarian concerns, particularly for the protection of civilians. It also highlighted how
military necessity will sometimes temper the extent to which civilians are protected in certain
circumstances in armed conflict. This first part of the chapter also discussed the foundational
principles of IHL applicable to NIACs: distinction, proportionality, precaution, and humane
treatment. These principles limit both the methods and means by which conflicts can be
conducted. These principles provide basic protection for civilians distinct from that provided to
individuals during peace insofar as they require combatants to distinguish between legal targets
in the form of enemy combatants and illegal targets in the form of civilians. However, military
necessity means that this protection for civilians in conflict is not absolute. The second part of
the chapter focused on some acts specifically prohibited in NIACs, such as murder, torture, and
rape. The point was made that these prohibited acts, with the possible exception of the
recruitment and use of child soldiers, are drawn from acts criminalized in domestic criminal law.
In other words, they provide civilians in armed conflict with the same protections afforded to
individuals in peacetime.
This thesis identifies a gap between the protections for individuals in peacetime and the
protections needed to better protect civilians from combatant violence during armed conflict. The
thesis argues that new substantive IHL rules are needed in order to address this distinction
between peace and war and to better realize the humanitarian goals of IHL. This chapter has
helped advance this argument by showing that: (1) a review of existing IHL is consistent with its
humanitarian objective and (2) existing specific protections for civilians during conflict are
largely imported from domestic criminal law protections for individuals in peacetime. Existing
IHL protections fail to account for the exceptional context of armed conflict and, consequently,
ignore certain problematic behaviours that pose a particular risk to civilians in conflict. Chapter 8
will examine combatant behaviours that are regulated in some forms during peacetime but are
currently unregulated under IHL and must be addressed for civilian protection.
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The next chapter turns to the two case studies examined in this thesis, Sierra Leone and the
Democratic Republic of Congo. It examines the widespread violations directed against civilians
by non-state armed groups that occurred during the internal armed conflicts in these two
countries. The mere existence of these violations does not usually provide any insight into
psychological factors that may have contributed to their commission. However, an examination
of cognitive factors that may be contributing to these violations could be one means of
identifying new ways to realize the humanitarian objective of civilian protection in IHL.
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Chapter 5
5 International Humanitarian Law Violations in Sierra Leone and the
Democratic Republic of Congo
The preceding chapter outlined the existing IHL rules for the protection of civilians during
NIACs and demonstrated that existing IHL protections for civilians are based largely on
protections equally afforded to individuals during peacetime. This chapter is intended to
demonstrate the prevalence of violations of specific acts prohibited in IHL for the protection of
civilians during armed conflict in practice. This chapter examines violations of these specific
prohibited acts in case studies of two conflict-affected countries: Sierra Leone and the DRC. In
the last three decades, these countries have experienced long-term armed conflict. First, Sierra
Leone experienced a violent civil war from 1991-2002. In the DRC, escalating levels of violence
in the early 1990s led to the First Congo War (1996-1997), the Second Congo War (1998-2003),
and ongoing conflict between the national armed forces and armed groups or between multiple
armed groups in the eastern provinces of the country. Chapter 2 discussed some of the reasons
behind the selection of these two countries as case studies in this thesis. This chapter focusses
specifically on the widespread IHL violations of civilian protections for which these conflicts
have become known.
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the two countries, first Sierra Leone and then the
DRC, and the conflicts they have experienced. These introductory sections provide basic
demographic and geographic information, as well as brief histories of the conflicts in each of the
two case study countries. This provides the context to explain the widespread IHL violations that
are the focus of this chapter. The chapter then turns to an examination of IHL violations directed
against civilians in Sierra Leone and the DRC. Although chapter 4 discussed existing specific
IHL protections for civilians separately,660 during armed conflict violations of these IHL
protections do not occur in isolation from one another. Rather, during conflict, some or all of the
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civilian IHL protections may be violated concurrently during one military operation661 and/or the
cumulation of different prohibited acts can amount to other violations, such as a violation of the
prohibition on terrorizing the civilian population.662 Consequently, to structure the discussion of
IHL violations, I have organized the violations that occurred in Sierra Leone and the DRC into
three categories, which are inclusive of the prohibited acts discussed in chapter 4. The three
categories I use are (1) theft of civilian and public goods; (2) forced recruitment of individuals
for various tasks; and, (3) violation of bodily integrity and/or terrorization of civilians. The
chapter examines IHL violations in each of these three categories in order to demonstrate how
little insight mere knowledge of IHL violations provides to understand the psychology behind
the violations.
The discussion of IHL violations in this chapter serves two key purposes in this thesis. First, the
chapter demonstrates the prevalence of violations of IHL protections for civilians, which
indicates that, in practice, the current status quo of IHL is not providing sufficient protection for
civilians during armed conflict. It would be easy to assume that these violations are purely an
issue of non-compliance with existing IHL that can be addressed through engagement, education,
and training with armed groups. However, the second key point of the chapter is that the
prevalence of violations in practice does not in and of itself provide much, if any, insight into the
psychology of combatants committing these IHL violations, even though that psychology
influences the commission of these IHL violations. This is important because the theories of
social psychology and criminology discussed in chapter 7 explain how combatant behaviour is
adversely affected by psychological processes, such as dehumanization and the abdication of
responsibility for one’s actions, that reframe combatants’ conceptions of right and wrong and, in
so doing, fundamentally alter the way in which combatants view the IHL rules intended to
protect civilians. This reinforces the fact that combatant psychology can provide information not
661
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otherwise readily available or apparent from mere awareness of the occurrence of IHL violations.
Thus, this chapter’s discussion of the prevalence of IHL violations in the context of the Sierra
Leone Civil War and the conflicts in the DRC, demonstrates that the psychology of IHL
violations can provide a new means of examining such violations and can reveal deeper insight
than mere knowledge of the existence of widespread IHL violations.

5.1 Sierra Leone: Demographics and Civil War
The first focus conflict in this thesis is the Sierra Leone Civil War. This section will provide
some brief demographics for Sierra Leone and facts about the conflict to provide context for the
subsequent discussion of IHL violations during this armed conflict.
Sierra Leone, a former British colony that gained independence in 1961, is a small country in
West Africa. It is bordered by Guinea to the northeast, Liberia to the southeast, and the North
Atlantic Ocean to the southwest. It is divided into four provinces and one area,663 sixteen
districts,664 and 190 chiefdoms.665 The capital, Freetown, is located in the Western Area on the
coast of Sierra Leone. Its current population is approximately 7.4 million people.666 There are
sixteen different ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, the largest of which are the Temne, located
primarily in the north and around Freetown, and the Mende, who are predominantly located in
southeastern Sierra Leone and the Kono district.667 The most recent figures on poverty in Sierra
Leone date from 2011, when the World Bank found that over 50% of the country’s population
was living in extreme poverty (i.e., living on U.S. $1.90 or less a day).668 According to data from
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the International Monetary Fund published in 2018, Sierra Leone ranked as the tenth poorest
country in the world.669
In early 1991, a Sierra Leonean armed group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) crossed into
Sierra Leone from Liberia where it had been training for several months.670 The RUF was
supported by members of the Liberian armed group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia.671
This marked the beginning of the Sierra Leone Civil War, which would last until 2002. Between
1991 and 2002, as many as 75,000 people were killed, as well as a further 20,000 people
mutilated, and approximately half the country’s population were displaced.672 Although the
conflict began with only two parties, the RUF and the Sierra Leone Army, other armed groups
emerged during the conflict. Many of these groups had their origins in local defense groups and
traditional hunting societies,673 the largest of which were the Kamajors who fought on the side of
the Sierra Leone government.674 Control of the government switched hands several times during
the conflict. A successful coup d’état installed a military junta government in 1992,675 then a
democratically elected government, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), in 1996.676 That
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government operated in exile after a second coup d’état in 1997 by members of the national
armed forces who formed the new armed group, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(AFRC).677 The local defence groups, including the Kamajors, came to be known collectively as
the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and were directed by the SLPP Government in exile. The CDF
continued to fight on behalf of the SLPP Government after it was restored to power in 1998. The
Lomé Peace Accord was signed between the SLPP Government, the AFRC, and RUF in 1999678
and the end of the war was officially declared on 18 January 2002.679 The eleven year-long civil
war was characterized by widespread IHL violations against civilians recorded by international
organizations, such as Human Rights Watch,680 the Sierra Leone Truth Commission,681 and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone which tried the leaders of the three armed groups, the AFRC,682
CDF,683 and RUF684 in the aftermath of the conflict.

5.2 Democratic Republic of Congo: Demographics and Civil Wars
The second case study in this thesis is the series of conflicts experienced in the DRC since the
mid-1990s. This section will provide some brief demographics about the DRC and facts about
these conflicts to provide context for the subsequent discussion of IHL violations during this
civil war.
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The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (formerly Zaire), in Central Africa, is a former
Belgian colony that gained independence in 1960. It is the second largest country in Africa and
the eleventh largest country in the world. Due to its size and location in Central Africa, it is
bordered by numerous countries: Republic of Congo (and Atlantic Ocean) to the west; Angola to
the southwest; Zambia to the south; the Central African Republic and South Sudan to the north;
and Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda to the east. It is divided into twenty-six
provinces,685 though prior to the 2006 constitution it consisted of only ten provinces and one
city.686 The capital, Kinshasa, is located in the far west of the country on the Congo River
opposite the capital of the Republic of Congo, Brazzaville. The capital of the province of North
Kivu, Goma, on the far east border with Rwanda is 1,573km (977 miles) by plane from Kinshasa
or over 2,500km by road. The current population of the DRC is approximately 81.5 million.687
There are over two hundred ethnic groups in the country and over two hundred languages,
though many people speak one of the four “national” languages: Swahili, Tshiluba, Lingala, and
Kongo.688 The official language used in the DRC is French. The most recent figures on poverty
in the DRC date from 2012 when the World Bank found that over 77% of the country’s
population was living in extreme poverty (i.e., living on U.S. $1.90 or less a day).689 According
to data from the International Monetary Fund published in 2018, the DRC ranked as the seventh
poorest country in the world.690
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Armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is extremely complex and has spanned
decades. Beginning in the early- to mid-1990s,691 the violence continues today and seems, to
some, destined to never end.692 These decades have encompassed multiple armed conflicts, both
international and non-international in nature. Some of these conflicts have been between the
national armed forces of numerous countries in the region, though the most involved has been,
without question, Rwanda.693 The First Congo War was initiated in 1996 by the armed group
Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Congo; AFDL), supported by Rwanda,694 and ended in 1997 with
the successful overthrow of the government.695 The Second Congo War, also known as Africa’s
World War due to the many foreign nations that were parties to the conflict, began in 1998 with
a mutiny within the national armed forces (known currently as the Forces armées de la
République Démocratique du Congo or FARDC) that led to the formation of the armed group,
the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Rally for Congolese Democracy; RCD).696
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While the Second Congo War officially ended in 2003,697 armed groups have continued to
operate and clash frequently with the FARDC698 and with each other.699 Although violence has,
for the most part, decreased since 2003 and many parts of the country have returned to relative
peace and stability, the conflict, violence, and instability have never completely ended in the
eastern part of the DRC, particularly in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri
(formerly part of Orientale province).700 As in Sierra Leone’s civil war, many small armed
groups, known as mai-mai,701 have formed under the pretense of protecting the local population
in different areas in the East;702 however, they also commit IHL violations against civilians.703.
Armed conflict in the DRC has been characterized by fluctuation and fragmentation in the nature
and existence of non-state armed groups.704 Groups have alternated between existing as non-state
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armed groups and existing as, or integrated into, the national armed forces.705 Non-state armed
groups have also frequently splintered in separate groups as a result of disputes among leaders
and commanders.706 This has led to the proliferation of armed groups in Eastern Congo and, as of
December 2017, around 120 armed groups of varying sizes and levels of organization were
believed to be operating in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu.707

5.3 IHL Violations of Civilians Protections
As noted above, the conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC were and, in the case of the DRC,
continue to be characterized by widespread IHL violations against civilians.708 The following
sections will discuss in more detail the specific IHL violations committed against civilians in
practice during the Sierra Leone Civil War and the conflicts in the DRC. The substantive legal
content of IHL protections for civilians was discussed in chapter 4. The reality of IHL violations
in practice is that many violations often occur concurrently during a single operation.709 For
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example, in the DRC, an attack on Bogoro carried out on 24 February 2003 included direct
attacks on civilians, murder, rape and sexual slavery, the use of children under the age of 15
years in hostilities, destruction of property and pillage.710 Therefore, for the purposes of framing
the discussion of IHL violations in the Sierra Leone and DRC conflicts in the following sections,
I have grouped the most common IHL violations committed against civilians into three
categories: (1) theft of civilian and public goods; 2) forced recruitment of individuals for various
tasks; and, (3) violations of bodily integrity and/or terrorization of civilians.
5.3.1 Theft of Civilian or Public Goods
Pillage, the “unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict”,711 has been particularly
prevalent in practice among armed groups in both Sierra Leone and the DRC.712 This IHL
violation was used by armed groups both as personal sources of income as well as a means to
finance the activities of the armed group.713 Members of armed groups were often unpaid and
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expected to pillage in order to ‘pay’ themselves.714 In the DRC, Human Rights Watch identified
pillage as not only a means of enriching the armed group or members of the group, but also as a
means of punishing or deterring civilians from supporting enemy combatants.715 Pillage could be
an extremely profitable means of supporting an armed group: for example, the Mouvement du
mars 23 (M23; March 23 Movement) in the DRC is believed to have stolen as much as
$3,000,000 US worth of goods during its occupation of Goma in November 2012.716
After pillaging property, combatants often destroyed whatever was left behind.717 For example,
in Sierra Leone there were many reports of houses being burned, sometimes with their
inhabitants locked inside.718 In fact, this was something that the RUF did so frequently that it
became known as “a signature of RUF attacks on villages.”719 Similar reports of civilians being
burned alive in their homes have emerged from the DRC, as well.720
In both Sierra Leone and the DRC, pillage was not limited to the theft of civilian possessions but,
rather, also extended to the pillage of natural resources.721 In both countries, the pillage of natural
714
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resources directly fuelled and funded the conflict.722 In Sierra Leone, parties to the conflict
fought for control over diamonds and diamonds mines, in order to benefit financially from these
resources.723 In the DRC, armed groups as well as units of the national armed forces have fought
for control of, in particular, gold mines,724 but also diamond mines725 and mining sites for
tungsten, tantalum, and tin.726 These are often referred to as conflict minerals.727
In addition to theft of possessions and natural resources, two common forms of pillage employed
by members of armed groups have been extortion and illegal taxation in territories under armed
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group control.728 These groups often create checkpoints or roadblocks along roads under their
control, where they will extort money, food, and other goods or charge illegal ‘customs duties’ to
all people travelling the road.729 In 2011 in the DRC, the Forces démocratiques de liberation du
Rwanda (FDLR; Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) were reported as having
specific units devoted to producing income for the group from, among other things, illegal
taxation.730 Illegal taxation and extortion can be extremely profitable for armed groups: in the
DRC in early 2013, members of the M23 were believed to be earning $180,000 US a month from
these IHL violations.731
5.3.2 Forced Recruitment of Individuals for Various Tasks
Armed groups in Sierra Leone and the DRC have also used abduction and forced recruitment of
both adults and children to serve as combatants,732 or for forced labour.733 Women and girls have
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been targeted in particular for domestic and sexual enslavement.734 The use of child soldiers was
extremely prevalent in both Sierra Leone and the DRC.735 Indeed, the armed conflict in “Sierra
Leone … bec[a]me synonymous with child soldiering.”736 Abduction and forced recruitment of
children was widespread among all four of the primary parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone
(i.e., the AFRC, CDF, RUF, and SLA).737 These children were then forced to fight for these
armed groups.738 It is possible that “as many as half of the RUF’s combatants were between eight
and fourteen years old” and the vast majority “reported being forcibly abducted”.739 Abducted
children in Sierra Leone were also required to do forced labour and subjected to “rape, sexual
slavery and other forms of sexual abuse.”740 In the DRC, while armed groups have often pledged
to discontinue the practice of recruiting children, these commitments have been frequently short-
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lived and unrealized.741 In both conflicts, children caught trying to escape were, at best, severely
beaten, and at worst, killed immediately.742 In 2000, it was estimated that 15-30 percent of new
recruits in the DRC were under 18 years of age, with a significant number of these children
under the age of 12 years.743
Armed groups in Sierra Leone and the DRC frequently used forced labour to support their
activities during the conflict.744 For example, in both conflicts, armed groups forced (and, in the
DRC continue to force) both children and adults to transport their supplies or to undertake
manual labour in mining camps.745 In Sierra Leone, the RUF and CDF forced people to conduct
agricultural work and turn the proceeds over to their leaders.746 In both Sierra Leone and the
DRC, captives were often forced to perform domestic work for both senior and junior
combatants, such as preparing food and cleaning.747
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5.3.3 Violations of Bodily Integrity and/or Terrorization of Civilians748
During the conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC, amputations,749 rape and other forms of sexual
violence,750 torture,751 and murder752 were all used to violate the bodily integrity of and/or
terrorize civilians. Amputation was particularly prominent during the Sierra Leone civil war,753
where the Truth and Reconciliation Commission found the RUF to be responsible for nearly 40
percent of the amputations they recorded, and the AFRC to be responsible for a further 27
percent of recorded amputations.754 Amputation has not been a common feature of conflict in the
DRC in the same manner as in Sierra Leone; however, mutilation through the use of machetes to
attack civilians has been recorded.755
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Rape and other forms of sexual violence were particularly widespread during the conflicts in
both Sierra Leone and the DRC.756 In Sierra Leone, women and girls were subjected rape, sexual
slavery, and what would come to be known through the jurisprudence of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone as forced marriage.757 As many as an “estimated 250,000 women and girls were
Lancet 304; Human Rights Watch, supra note 18; Zoe Marks, “Sexual violence in Sierra Leone’s civil war:
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raped and forced into sexual slavery, or, experienced other crimes of sexual violence” during the
Sierra Leone civil war.758 In the DRC, conflict-related rape and other forms of sexual violence,
such as sexual mutilation, have also been particularly endemic, with a 2011 report stating that 48
women in the DRC were raped every hour.759 In March 2019, the UN Secretary General reported
that approximately 70 per cent of the documented cases of conflict-related sexual violence in the
DRC in 2018 were perpetrated by members of armed groups.760
Other IHL violations have also been used as a means of punishing or terrorizing civilians, in
particular assault and murder.761 Beatings and murder were often used to control and punish
civilians, and deter disobedience among civilians.762 Torture was another terror tactic,763 often
carried out in public for maximum effect on communities.764 Assault was a common tool used by
armed groups to punish civilians, as well as to coerce compliance from civilians.765 Killing
civilians was also a means of controlling civilians by creating and enhancing the terror of
civilians and to serve as an example to others of what could happen to them if they disobeyed
combatants.766
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5.2 Conclusion
Although the discussion of IHL protections for civilians in chapter 4 suggested that extensive
protections do exist for civilians, this chapter’s discussion of the conflicts in Sierra Leone and the
DRC has demonstrated that, in practice, civilians often suffer from the widespread perpetration
of IHL violations. This chapter has demonstrated two key points. First, the prevalence of
violations of IHL protections for civilians during these conflicts indicates that, in practice, the
current status quo of IHL is not providing sufficient protection for civilians during armed
conflict. Second, the identification and description of these violations does not provide insight
into the psychology of the commission of these violations. The lack of understanding of the
perpetration of IHL violations by members of armed groups has been discussed by IHL
practitioners.767 These discussions have drawn primarily on practical experiences of physical
engagement with armed groups. These works by IHL practitioners attempt to understand IHL
violations for the purpose of improving strategies for engaging with armed groups. IHL
practitioners appreciate how an understanding of IHL violations can help them to do their jobs –
engaging with armed groups to promote compliance and provide IHL training – more effectively.
Vincent Bernard, Editor-in-Chief of the ICRC’s International Review of the Red Cross, has
stated that “[i]t is vital to comprehend why armed groups choose to respect or flout the law.”768
Therefore, the idea that it is both possible and beneficial to have a deeper understanding of IHL
violations already exists. However, the addition of an understanding of the psychology
underlying IHL violations has rarely been examined.769 Psychology has entered into IHL
literature aimed at using effective persuasion to secure armed group compliance with IHL.770

767

See, e.g., Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Reactions to Norms Armed
Groups and the Protection of Civilians, Policy Briefing No 1 (Geneva: Geneva Academy of International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2014); Muñoz-Rojas & Frésard, supra note 12; Bangerter, supra note 232.
768
Vincent Bernard, “Editorial: Understanding Armed Groups and the Law” (2011) 93:882 International Review of
the Red Cross 261 at 264.
769
One study that did examine the psychology of combatants was the ICRC’s “Roots of Behaviour” study, which
focused on using the psychological insights to improve ICRC engagement strategies. Muñoz-Rojas & Frésard, supra
note 12.
770
See, e.g., Olivier Bangerter, “Comment - Persuading Armed Groups to Better Respect International Humanitarian
Law” in Heike Krieger, ed, Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African
Great Lakes Region (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 112; Steven R Ratner, “Persuading to
Comply: On the Development and Avoidance of Legal Argumentation” in Jeffrey L Dunoff & Mark A Pollack, eds,
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 568; Ulrich Schneckener & Claudia Hofmann, “The Power of Persuasion”
in Heike Krieger, ed, Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great
Lakes Region (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 79; Claudia Hofmann & Ulrich Schneckener,

144
This thesis argues that understanding the psychology behind IHL violations is vital, not only for
engaging with armed groups, but also for identifying and devising ways to develop the
substantive regulation of armed conflicts under IHL. Understanding combatant psychology
allows IHL academics and practitioners alike to further develop IHL policy and practice to
prevent violations.
The next chapter examines whether legal theory can provide a deeper understanding of the
perpetration of violence toward civilians by members of armed groups. While legal theories tend
to leave questions of compliance and deviance to other academic disciplines, such as social
psychology and criminology, there are three legal theories that address the psychology of
individuals and their interaction with the law: Law and Economics theory, Behavioural Law and
Economics theory, and the theory of Socialization and International Law. The chapter will assess
the viability of using any of these theories to provide an adequate explanation of the psychology
of combatant deviance from IHL protections for civilians.

“Engaging non-state armed actors in state- and peace-building: options and strategies” (2011) 93:883 International
Review of the Red Cross 1 at 10–11.

145

Chapter 6
6 The Limitations of Existing Legal Theory to Explain Combatant
Behaviour
This thesis advances the claim that there is a gap between the regulation of behaviour for the
protection of individuals in peace and the regulations needed to protect civilians from combatant
violence during war. The previous chapters examined existing IHL protections for civilians
during NIACs as they apply to armed groups in both theory and practice. Those chapters
demonstrated that existing civilian protections are based largely on the same protections afforded
to individuals in peace and that the widespread existence of violence toward civilians in practice
provides little to no insight into the psychology of the perpetrators of that violence.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether legal theory can provide an explanation for
combatant deviance from the IHL provisions designed to protect civilians during armed conflict.
Legal theories typically focus on the function and formation of law,771 with legal theorists
addressing questions such as “what is law”,772 “what should the law be”,773 “who gets to make
law and for whose benefit”.774 In most international law-focused legal theories, the behaviour of
771
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states and not individuals is addressed. Further, the behaviour of states is generally only
considered for the purpose of determining what the law is or should be. International legal
positivism is focused on the formal sources of international law and considers state behaviour
only so far as is necessary to identify “‘international law as it is’”.775 Most other international
legal theories use international legal positivism “as their starting point to ascertain lex lata, even
if their purpose is primarily to critique any such concept.”776 Other international legal theories
tend to focus on the need to include actors other than states or other than American and European
states.777 Consequently, Marxist International Legal theory and Third World Approaches to
International Law argue that existing international law is imperialist and the voices of different
classes and developing states need to be incorporated into both the formation of international law
and the functioning of the international legal system.778 Feminist International Legal theory
advocates for greater inclusion of women in international law-making and institutions.779
Interactional legal theory promotes inclusion of both state and non-state actors in international
law making and promotes the importance of factors such as generality, clarity, constancy and
congruence in the content of law.780 However, while these theories address what the law should
be, they do not seek to explain why individuals do or do not comply with the law. Where
international legal theories do broach the topic of compliance, they generally target macro-level,
that is, state, compliance with international law based on the process of international law
formation.781 The issue of individual combatant deviance is, however, far removed from the
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state-driven process of international law formation. There is also, a body of theories in
International Law and International Relations theory that address compliance drawing on
mechanisms of either coercion and material inducement782 or persuasion.783 The focus of these
theories tends to be on the behaviour and compliance of states; however, these schools of thought
are incorporated into the three-mechanisms that form Socialization and International Law theory.
Consequently, they will be addressed through the discussion of material inducement and
persuasion under Socialization and International Law theory in section 6.3 of this chapter.
In this chapter, I focus on three international legal theories that address the psychology of
individuals in their interaction with law: Law and Economics theory, Behavioural Law and
Economics theory, and Socialization and International Law theory. Law and Economics and
Behavioural Law and Economics theories both develop an individual behavioural model to
explain individual decision-making and interaction with the law. Socialization and International
Law theory is primarily focused on addressing state compliance with international law; however,
I have included it in this chapter because the theory draws heavily on individual psychology to
understand how individuals interact with the law. This chapter examines the psychological
explanations for compliance and deviance provided by each of these three theories (Law and
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Economics, Behavioural Law and Economics, and Socialization and International Law) in order
to determine whether or not they can provide an adequate explanation of the psychology of
combatant deviance from IHL protections for civilians.
The chapter begins with a discussion of Law and Economics theory. It examines and critiques
the three key components of individual psychology advanced by Law and Economics theory to
explain how individuals interact with law: (1) individuals are rational, self-interested actors; (2)
individual preferences are both quantifiable and universal; and, (3) individual decision-making is
consistent in all contexts. The chapter next turns to a discussion of Behavioural Law and
Economics theory, a derivative of Law and Economics theory, premised on addressing existing
critiques of Law and Economics theory. It examines how Behavioural Law and Economics
theorists have drawn on insights from psychology to develop a more nuanced understanding of
how individuals interact with law based on concepts of bounded rationality and bounded selfinterest. This section of the chapter evaluates whether the psychological insights used by
Behavioural Law and Economics theorists provide an adequate explanation of individual
psychology that can be used to understand and explain combatant violence toward civilians. The
final section of the chapter discuses Socialization and International Law theory. The chapter
examines the three components of this theory that are said to influence behaviour: (1) material
inducement; (2) persuasion; and, (3) acculturation. Each of these components is analysed to
assess whether they provide the necessary framework to understand and explain psychological
processes that lead to deviance.
Ultimately, this chapter argues that none of the three legal theories discussed provide an
explanation for combatant deviance from the IHL provisions designed to protect civilians during
armed conflict. The failure of these theories to provide an adequate explanation of combatant
deviance is linked in large part to the fact that these theories are designed to be broadly
applicable to the legal system, whether national or international, in a typical context. The typical
context is peacetime. Therefore, just as there is a gap between the legal protections afforded to
individuals in peace and the protections required for the safety of civilians in war, there is a
similar gap in existing legal theories that seek to explain the psychology of individual interaction
with law. A broadly applicable behavioural model based largely on individual legal compliance
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and deviance in peacetime is inadequate for the exceptional context of armed conflict. This thesis
advocates for the use of psychological and behavioural insights specific to the context of armed
conflict, rather than insights more generalizable to human behaviour in a multitude of contexts as
is done in Law and Economics, Behavioural Law and Economics, and Socialization and
International Law. This chapter is important because it demonstrates the absence of a legal
theory that provides the necessary specificity about individual deviance in armed conflict. The
inadequacy of existing behavioural models from Law and Economics, Behavioural Law and
Economics, and Socialization and International Law, which will be established in this chapter,
supports the approach to the examination of IHL employed in this thesis: a turn to theories of
criminology and social psychology that have been used to explain individual deviance during
armed conflicts.784

6.1 Law and Economics Theory
Law and Economics argues that principles of economics can be used to explain individual legal
compliance and deviance.785 This is because, according to Law and Economics theory,
individuals make decisions about whether to follow or break the law based on an economic
evaluation of the personal costs and benefits of compliance.786 Consequently, if laws are made
that increase the costs of negative behaviour and decrease the benefits, individuals should be
more likely to comply with a law.787 Law and Economics theory relies on several key
assumptions a both about the world and human nature: (1) all people are rational and self-
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interested;788 (2) utility maximization is people’s ultimate goal;789 (3) all people assign the same
value to specific preferences and that value is quantifiable;790 and, (4) context does not play a
role in the construction of individual preferences.791 These assumptions have been heavily
criticized by Behavioural Law and Economics scholars.792 For example, the work of Amos
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman has demonstrated how individuals are not entirely rational in
their decision-making.793 This section will examine these flawed assumptions of Law and
Economics theory in order to demonstrate that it cannot provide a useful model for
understanding combatant violence toward civilians during armed conflict.
6.1.1 People are Rational and Self-Interested
Law and Economics theory assumes that individuals are both rational and self-interested and are
guided by these characteristics in everything that they do.794 While people’s ability to maximize
their goals (preferences) will be limited by their access to resources and external restrictions
placed on their ability to act, they will nonetheless evaluate available options based on a costbenefit analysis.795 On the basis of such an analysis, the rational choice is considered to be the
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option for which the benefits are outweighed by the costs. Further, because the individual is selfinterested, the costs and benefits will be based solely on the individual’s personal interests and
preferences. As Freeman describes it, the value ascribed to a thing by an individual “is said to be
‘measured’ by the maximum that person would be willing to pay for it, or the minimum for
which the person would be willing to take to give it up.”796 The utility of assuming that people
are rational and self-interested is that it allows Law and Economics scholars to make predictions
about how individuals will behave in a given situation. It means that, based on the information
available to an individual, we can assume that they will “make[s] consistent and logical
choices”.797 Self-interest, along with Law and Economics’ assumption of utility maximization,
allow Law and Economics theorists to make predictions about individuals’ goals and
preferences.
Issacharoff notes that assuming all people are rational and self-interested is a “highly reductionist
view of human psyche”.798 The assumption in Law and Economics theory that individuals are
rational and self-interested is problematic for three important reasons. First, people often make
decisions that are irrational due to an array of flawed cognitive processes.799 For example, people
often have flawed memories and relying on flawed memories can lead to irrational choices or
which may limit their rationality.800 This is addressed in Behavioural Law and Economics theory
discussed below. Second, Law and Economics theory makes assumptions about the availability
of information to a decision-maker and about the stability of individual preferences.801 It assumes
that people’s preferences are both fixed and stable.802 This assumption “is not so much
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empirically informed, but rather a methodological aid”,803 which adds to the flawed behavioural
model produced by Law and Economics theory. People do not always have access to all of the
information necessary to make the rational choice in a particular situation.804 Also, people’s
preferences are not static but can change over time and be affected by many internal and external
variables.805 Finally, the assumption that individuals will always make a choice based on their
own self-interest ignores the fact that people are sometimes motivated by, or their decisions
influenced by, other considerations such as “altruism, a concern for the community, [or] an
interest in the environment.”806 Not only are these flawed assumptions relevant in ordinary,
everyday types of decisions (e.g., to go to work or to call in sick; to give someone your seat on
the bus or to remain seated), but they are often magnified in situations of armed conflict when,
arguably, the rational, self-interested choice would be to remain home and let someone else risk
their life on the battlefield. Once a combatant, individuals may often lack complete information
about their situation and/or possible outcomes of their choices.807 They may jeopardize their own
safety, or even life, to help a fallen comrade. They may choose to treat unarmed civilians or
detainees violently when those civilians pose no threat to themselves or their fellow combatants.
Other times, an order from a commanding officer may seem to present combatants with no
option for choice at all,808 while some combatants (albeit a minority) may choose to disobey a
command and risk punishment. Even if the rational, self-interested, informed actor with stable
preferences was an accurate model in the peacetime context (which Behavioural Law and
Economics demonstrates is not the case),809 it is difficult to see how the rational actor model
could ever be a reliable framework for understanding individual decision-making in armed
conflict.
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6.1.2 Utility Maximization and the Quantification and Universality of Preferences
Another assumption of Law and Economics theory is that preferences can always be quantified.
Law and Economics theory states that individuals make decisions based on an end goal of utility
maximization.810 Utility maximization “assumes that all choices are made to maximize the
chooser’s utility, happiness, or pleasure” and “what maximizes a chooser’s utility, happiness, or
pleasure is achieving his or her goals.”811 Some economists, such as Posner, use wealth
maximization as an end goal as opposed to utility maximization and argue that wealth provides a
greater guide for decision-making than ‘utility’ since “utility whether as welfare or happiness is
both difficult to discover and to measure”.812 The basis for this is that “[m]oney is easier to
measure than utility.”813 Regardless of whether wealth maximization or utility maximization is
used as an end goal, both require some means evaluating and predicting the extent to which
individuals value (either monetarily or based on utility) the different courses of action between
which they are choosing. Law and Economics theory nonetheless “presupposes the ability to
measure and compare the ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ of various types of transactions”.814 Reliance on
utility maximization in lieu of wealth maximization helps to overcome the problem of
incommensurability, where a choice must be made between values which are not all easily
quantified, such as a choice between money and respect.815 Law and Economics theory does not
provide guidance on how to measure values that are not readily quantifiable, such as national
pride or friendship.816
Law and Economics theory considers a law to be efficient and “desirable even though it
produces losers as well as winners, as long as winners gain more than the losers lose.”817 In
addition to assuming the ability to quantify values or measure usefulness, as already mentioned,
this assumes an ability to universalize this measurement. To assume that a law can be used to
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direct the behaviour of individuals within a society requires an assumption that at least a
significant number of individuals will react similarly to the same legal incentives and
disincentives.818 However, such an assumption requires that individuals quantify the values and
goals affected, or intended to be affected, by the law in the same manner.819 This fails to account
for evidence that there are individual variations in preferences within a single society. It assumes
comparable, if not equal, valuation by both rich and poor, young and old, male and female or
even by two random people that cannot be classified into binary dichotomies such as these.
The assumption that all preferences are identifiable and quantifiable, and that such quantification
is universal, is problematic in two important ways. First, not all values can be monetized or
quantified.820 Second, even if a particular value can or could be quantified, it cannot be assumed
that this quantification is universal or generalizable within a group or a society.821
The assumption that all values are quantifiable is simply inaccurate. Law and Economics
theorists’ attempt to simplify the complexity of quantifying values has led to a tendency to
evaluate choices based on the monetization of preferences.822 However, not all preferences can
be easily monetized or monetized at all. For example, while a price may be assigned to the cost
of tuition for a four-year bachelor’s degree, a price for the knowledge gained from such an
education cannot easily be monetized. This is because, while most, if not all, societies provide a
framework or metric for objectively assessing the value of some goods, such as a car or a
house,823 other goods – such as abstract goods like friendship or the eradication of discrimination
- have no such standardized framework or metric for valuation.824 Some decisions may involve a
single metric for valuation, such as money, distance or weight, while some “[k]inds of valuation
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- love, respect, wonder and worship - embody no metric at all.”825 When dealing with values,
preferences, and goals for which there is no metric or which cannot be monetized, a cost-benefit
analysis is not possible and cannot accurately depict human decision-making.826 Even where
Law and Economics theory may adequately explain and describe market behaviours, it has
difficulty “accurately explain[ing] and predict[ing] non-market behavior.”827 Even where there is
an objective framework to assess the value of a particular good, this does not account for
individual variation, as will be discussed below. Further, goods and values may be valued either
instrumentally or intrinsically and the value assigned can often vary based on which form of
valuation is applied.828 It may be that a single actor may assign two (or more) values to a single
act. For example, a military operation may be assigned a monetary value based on the cost of
soldiers’ salaries, of weapons used, fuel for transport, and so on, but the same operation may also
possess an intangible value that cannot be monetized, such the value of a military victory or
defeat.
Finally, under Law and Economics theory, a law-maker must assume that the valuation of
specific preferences can be generalized across individuals in society because a single law or body
of laws is intended to produce a specific outcome from most, if not all, of these individuals. Law
and Economics effectively “assumes that the worth of £1 is the same to everyone”.829 A person
who is poor may value a dollar much more than a person who is rich. A person who is starving
may value acquiring food, even by theft, over a personal desire to be a law-abiding citizen. An
assumption that there will be no variation among individuals in their cost-benefit analysis of a
situation and that all people value all things equally is an untenable assumption. This is because
there are many different kinds or different modes of valuation: “[people] care about things and
[other] people in different ways, … such as love, respect, and admiration.”830 Not only do people
generally care about things in different ways, they also often care about things differently from
one another and this can result in valuation differences between individuals. While the former is
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often affected by context, which will be discussed more below, the latter may be influenced by
any number of factors. For example, a person who is spendthrift may value a dollar more than a
person is not particularly frugal, even if there is no disparity between their personal wealth. My
brother who dislikes Brussel sprouts likely values them less than I who love them. This is not to
say that there are never instances where certain values may be generalized to a particular society
or group of persons. Societies often have shared values such as “liv[ing] in … harmony with
nature” or cultural or racial purity.831 The argument here is that, while there will be times when
valuation of preferences may be generalizable, there will also be times when it is not and an
assumption to the contrary inhibits an accurate understanding of human behaviour.
6.1.3 Context
Finally, the omission of consideration of context within Law and Economics theory suggests a
flawed assumption that context is not relevant to individual decision-making, choices, or
preferences. The assumption is that social situations reveal human preferences and values, but
that social situations do not influence their construction.832 However, context is highly
relevant:833 “People do not value goods acontextually.”834 The choices I make while grocery
shopping are very different when my budget is small than when it is large. If my choices are
relied on to reveal my preferences, as is the practice according Law and Economics theory,
failure to consider the context, or situational factors, in which I am operating can lead to
erroneous conclusions about my preferences. Similarly, it is likely that assuming an individual’s
preferences during war are consistent with their preferences during peacetime is also likely to
lead to erroneous behavioural predictions of behaviour during armed conflict.
As a result of its flawed assumptions about human psychology and how individuals interact with
law, Law and Economics theory cannot provide an adequate understanding of combatant
behaviour during armed conflict. Even without these assumptions, Law and Economics theory in an effort to create a broadly generalizable theory - focuses on individual decision-making in
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typical, day-to-day, peacetime contexts, which cannot satisfactorily provide for the manner in
which the exceptional context of armed conflict affects individual behaviour. In an effort to
address the flawed assumptions of Law and Economics theory, scholars have developed the
derivative theory of Behavioural Law and Economics. Behavioural Law and Economics has
attempted to use the work of psychologists to develop a more nuanced, and more accurate,
understanding of human behaviour. The following section will examine Behavioural Law and
Economics and assess whether it can provide an adequate model for understanding and
explaining combatant violence toward civilians during armed conflict.

6.2 Behavioural Law and Economics
Behavioural Law and Economics scholars attempt "to model and predict behavior relevant to law
with the tools of traditional economic analysis, but with more accurate assumptions about human
behavior” than Law and Economics theorists.835 The field emerged from scholars’ arguments
that, while people often “violated[d] the predictions of rational choice theory”, their “reliance on
cognitive heuristics and on-the-spot preference construction [still led] to predictable biases in
judgment and choice”.836 Behavioural Law and Economics’ model for understanding individual
decision-making and interaction with law directly challenges Law and Economics’ assumptions
of pure rationality and pure self-interest while giving consideration to the influence of context on
individual preferences and values. The following sections will examine the manner in which
Behavioural Law and Economics challenges these assumptions.
6.2.1 Bounded Rationality
Behavioural Law and Economics has qualified Law and Economics’ depiction of humans as
rational beings. Instead, these theorists consider humans to possess “bounded rationality”.837
Jolls has categorized bounded rationality as either “judgment errors” or “departures from
expected utility theory.”838 Judgment errors are the result of inherent limitations on the human
ability to think, learn, understand, and process information.839 The work of many cognitive
psychologists has found “that people are myopic in their decisions, may lack skill in predicting
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their future tastes, and can be led to erroneous choices by fallible memory and incorrect
evaluation of past experiences.”840 Furthermore, “irrational ideas or prejudices will often persist
over time.”841 These limitations often lead to departures from the Law and Economics
assumption of unbounded rationality.842 Behavioural Law and Economics theorists do not argue
that people are always irrational but, rather, that the idea of unbounded rationality is an
excessively and unnecessarily limited understanding of human behaviour.843 The work of
Tversky and Kahneman has shown that these departures are often the result of the methods of
processes people use to form judgments and make decisions.844 People often use mental shortcuts
when forming a judgment, thereby differentiating actual judgments from unbiased forecasts.845
For example, Tversky and Kahneman demonstrate that, in situations of uncertainty, people will
often estimate the frequency of an event based on how easily they remember other instances of
this event, which can result in false conclusions.846 Similarly, how a problem is framed often
“leads the individual to focus on certain characteristics of a problem (whilst neglecting others)
and points towards certain decisions (and not to others).”847 The use of these shortcuts can also
contribute to how a problem is framed. How a problem is framed often “leads the individual to
focus on certain characteristics of a problem (whilst neglecting others) and points towards certain
decisions (and not to others).”848
Tversky and Kahneman’s work found that there is a certain predictability to people’s judgment
errors.849 While the use of a shortcut may be “rational[] in the sense of economizing on thinking
time” it may nonetheless “lead to errors in particular circumstances” meaning that the person
employing the shortcut still “make[]s] forecasts that are different from those that emerge from
the standard [law and economics] rational choice model.”850 However, although there may be a
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certain predictability to people’s use of heuristics, there is also variability in how these heuristics
affect, or the extent to which they affect, people. The manner in which a choice is framed may be
used to predict how some people will respond but some people will also be unaffected, or less
affected, by the frame such that their decision will differ from those affected by the frame.851
Korobkin has argued that this heterogeneity requires greater consideration to understand its
consequences for the scope of bounded rationality.852
Whereas past choices are assumed under Law and Economics theory to have either a negative
influence on future choices or no influence at all,853 Behavioural Law and Economics theorists
have demonstrated that people have habits and will “often repeat behaviors (or repeatedly choose
the same good or service) … as a way of reducing the costs of decision making.”854 People have
a bias for the status quo.855 For example, they tend to ascribe greater value to things they already
possess than those they do not (known as the endowment effect).856 This more nuanced
conception of the individual provided by Behavioural Law and Economics is a necessary step
forward from traditional Law and Economics’ flawed conception of the individual; however, as
will be discussed in Section 6.2.4, Behavioural Law and Economics unfortunately tends to limit
the extent to which it draws insights from psychology.
The second category of bounded rationality - departures from expected utility theory - addresses
Law and Economics’ assumption of wealth maximization as everyone’s end goal. Some
Behavioural Law and Economics scholars speak of utility maximization rather than wealth
maximization,857 while others continue to frame their theory around wealth maximization.858
Although there may be times when individuals seek to maximize utility, there are also many
times when they exhibit “satisficing behaviour” whereby they “aim to make a satisfactory
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choice-one that meets a specified aspiration level rather than one that maximizes their utility.”859
Failure to maximize utility is also often the result of the use of heuristics which contribute to
judgment errors.860 As it is Law and Economics’ assumption of unbounded rationality that
“permits the application of maximizing methods”, limitations on an individual’s rationality
similarly limit “the application of maximizing methods”.861 For example, the complexity of a
situation may render it impossible for an individual to cognitively assess which outcome will
maximize utility or an individual may chose “to limit her search for information or consideration
of the decision short of reaching a utility-maximizing decision.”862 People often use a
combination of different decision-making strategies rather than employ a single strategy.863
In the criminal law context, Behavioural Law and Economics does provide some useful insights
for IHL in its discussion of unbounded rationality. Behavioural Law and Economics suggests
that, in the calculation of costs and benefits of committing a criminal act, people “may make
systematic (as opposed to random) errors in computing these costs and benefits” as a result of
bounded rationality.864 As discussed, people make errors as to the frequency and probability of
events, such as the possibility of being caught committing a crime. This supports “making law
enforcement highly visible, holding constant the actual probability that offenders will be
caught”.865 Similarly, Behavioural Law and Economics identifies limits to people’s individual
self-control or will-power. In the criminal context, this means that emphasis among offenders
tends to be on the immediate benefits accruing from the criminal act rather than future (potential)
costs.866 The need for consistent enforcement of rules, perhaps at lower levels of severity in
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terms of punishment or perceived seriousness of the offence, can be useful in the context of IHL,
the enforcement of which under international criminal law internationally has tended to focus
only the most grave or serious violations of IHL. Behavioural Law and Economics analysis in
the criminal context also suggests that enforcement of IHL and sanctions for violations that are
more proximate to the time of the violation may have greater deterrent value as they will be
factored into short-term evaluations rather than downplayed as a distant, future potential cost.
This idea will be revisited in chapter 8.
6.2.2 Bounded Self-Interest
Behavioural Law and Economics has qualified Law and Economics theory’s assumption that
people always strive to maximize their self-interest. Conformity with social norms, defined by
Sunstein as “social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and
what ought not to be done”,867 may sometimes by the rational, self-interested choice; however, it
is often the case that compliance with a social norm will result in behaviour that is inconsistent
with self-interest. For example, a man may take his hat off in a church even if his preference is to
always wear a hat or a person will leave a tip in a restaurant in to which they will never return
based on social norms that say men should not wear hats in churches and people should tip for
good service.868 The power of social norms can be attributed to either a “desire for social
approval”869 or the “internalization [of norms]”870 or both.871 Thus, “[t]he primary deterrent
effect many laws have on undesirable behavior might not be the direct increase in the price of the
behavior … but the encouragement of a social norm against the activity.”872
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Behavioural Law and Economics theorists have focused in particular on the social norm of
fairness,873 or reciprocity.874 The unbounded self-interest of the actor in Law and Economics
theory precludes the potential for people to act based on “unenforced notions of fairness”.875
However, ‘fairness’ is a vague term.876 For Behavioural Law and Economics scholars, “fairness”
is understood to refer to the idea that “people will judge outcomes as unfair if they depart
substantially from the terms of a ‘reference transaction’ – a transaction that defines the
benchmark for the parties’ interactions”.877 Yet, ‘reference transactions’ “[are] not always
unique” and the use of different reference transactions by people can lead to disagreements about
what is fair in a particular situation.878 When an individual perceives someone’s actions or
something to be unfair, there is equal potential for that person to be motivated to retaliate.879 The
influence of social norms and variability of individual perception is one way in which
Behavioural Law and Economics incorporates consideration of the effect of context into its
model of human behaviour.
6.2.3 Context
Behavioural Law and Economics has given greater consideration to the role of context with
regards to individual behaviour through the idea of “context-dependent preferences”.880 The
existence of context-dependent preferences directly challenges Law and Economics theory’s
assumption that an individual’s preferences are stable and exist outside of situational factors
(discussed above). Instead, Behavioural Law and Economics considers social situations to play a
role in constructing human values and preferences: “preferences can be a product of procedure,
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description, and context at the time of choice.”881 Behavioural Law and Economics theory
demonstrates that “the ‘frame’ or the way options are presented will influence choices.”882 For
example, Tversky and Kahneman’s framing effect shows that, when outcomes are uncertain,
people are more likely to be risk averse when options are presented as gains and more riskseeking when options are presented as losses.883 Thus, Behavioural Law and Economics has been
able to identify contexts in which people will tend to shape their preferences in the similar ways
and based on the same predictable heuristics.
6.2.4 Limitations of Behavioural Law and Economics
Behavioural Law and Economics’ behavioural model represents a useful step forward from Law
and Economics’ flawed assumptions of unbounded rationality and self-interest as well as the
failure to consider the role of context on behaviour. However, Behavioural Law and Economics’
behavioural model remains limited in two key ways that render it an inadequate lens through
which to assess combatant behaviour in armed conflict. First, Behavioural Law and Economics
has, as yet, drawn only on a very limited sphere of insights from psychology to create its more
nuanced behavioural model. The tendency has been to draw only on "phenomena that have
reasonably precise implications for legal issues.”884 Hanson and Yosifon have criticized this,
stating that Behavioural Law and Economics scholars “pick and choose among psychological
findings, and select only those that seem directly applicable to a pre-existing policy debate
within the law and economics paradigm.”885 Behavioural Law and Economics scholars, such as
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, have strived to create “an approach spare enough to generate
predictions across a range of contexts, but not so spare that its predictions about behavior are
often incorrect” over a deeper and more robust behavioural model.886 The focus has been on
behavior patterns that generate distinct predictions, setting aside those that “fail to point in
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systematic directions”.887 This approach limits the degree to which the Behavioural Law and
Economics behavioural model can reflect the spectrum of human behavioural complexities.
The second key limitation of the current Behavioural Law and Economics behavioural model is
the extent or manner in which considerations of context have been incorporated into the model.
Behavioural Law and Economics is correct to note that context often, if not always, plays an
important role in constructing individual preferences and values which, in turn, affects their
decision-making and choices. However, context is incorporated into Behavioural Law and
Economics in a very broad and generalizable manner. Behavioural Law and Economics has
focused on context in terms such as the way a choice is framed,888 the influence of the status
quo,889 the influence of existing social norms,890 and the “temporal distance of the rule's
effects.”891 Behavioural Law and Economics’ insights have been applied to a variety of domestic
legal contexts such as tort,892 contracts,893 and corporations.894 However, those are relatively
stable domestic contexts during peace. Behavioural Law and Economics contemplates lawmaking during and for peacetime and therefore insights from psychology that may provide
insights unique or particularly relevant for a behavioral model of combatants in an armed conflict
context. This is not to say that the judgment heuristics used to develop the concepts of bounded
rationality and bounded self-interest are irrelevant in a behavioural model for armed conflict.
However, there may be - and the following chapter demonstrates that there are - psychological
theories supported by empirical studies that can be employed to develop a more armed conflictspecific behavioural model.
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There are, however, some Behavioural Law and Economics scholars, such as Korobkin and
Ulen, who have advocated that, rather than “a single unified theory designed to explain or predict
the full realm of human decision-making behavior”, the focus of Behavioural Law and
Economics should be on “a pragmatic collection of situation-specific insights that can assist
policymakers dealing with relevant problems.”895 Korobkin and Ulen consider a “collection of
situation-specific minitheories [of behaviour]” that can be used in the “analysis of discrete legal
problems” is far more preferable than a theory which has been drastically simplified to provide
for universal application.896 This approach of using situation-specific theories is used in this
thesis. Any model of human behaviour generalized or simplified to the point that it may be
applied to all contexts is likely to be dominated by understandings of human behaviour based on
day-to-day lives during peacetime, rather than armed conflict. The “average behavior of
actors”897 in such contexts will often stand in stark contrast to how people behave within the
extraordinary and exceptional context of armed conflict. Ultimately, the greatest utility of
Behavioural Law and Economics for this thesis is the approach of turning to other disciplines
such as psychology to help understand the how individuals interact with law. The final theory
discussed in the following section, Socialization and International Law, similarly draws on
another discipline, social psychology, to provide insight into individual behaviour and decisionmaking.

6.3 Socialization and International Law
The third theory of interest in the search to find a model to explain combatant violence toward
civilians is Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks’ Socialization and International Law.898 Goodman
and Jinks’ theory examines mechanisms for influencing state behaviour, specifically state
compliance with international human rights law.899 The primary focus of Goodman and Jinks’
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theory is on the interaction between “rights-regarding actors—including states, international
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations—and rights-disregarding actors.”900 Actors in
these interactions states are either influencers or the target of influence and which of these two
roles a state fulfills can vary depending on the behaviour at issue.901 For example, the United
States can be considered an influencer in the context of human rights compliance in the Syrian
civil war and a target of influence with respect to “the treatment of detainees in the ‘global war
on terror’.”902
Socialization and International Law turns to the “social and behavioral sciences” because those
disciplines “have developed an increasingly nuanced conception of the human actor”.903 This
conception of human behaviour developed in the social and behavioral sciences provides an
understanding that “qualifies both the oversimplified model of actors as wealth maximizers and
the idealized conception of actors as rational, deliberative agents”.904 Therefore, Goodman and
Jinks incorporate insights from sociology, psychology, anthropology, etc. to provide a more
accurate model of human behaviour than that used in the Law and Economics theories discussed
above.905
They identify two prominent mechanisms for influencing state behaviour in existing academic
literature: material inducement906 and persuasion.907 According to material inducement and
persuasion, the “international regime alters human rights practices … either by materially
inducing states (and individuals) or by persuading states (and individuals) of the validity and
legitimacy of human rights law.”908 Like the theorists of Behavioural Law and Economics,
900
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Goodman and Jinks advocate for “more sociologically plausible models of law’s influence”.909
Consequently, to the mechanisms of material inducement and persuasion, Goodman and Jinks
introduce the mechanism of acculturation, drawn from the fields of sociology and psychology, to
explain how international actors (international organizations and institutions as well as other
states) can induce or influence states to comply with international human rights norms.910
6.3.1 Material Inducement
The first mechanism discussed by Goodman and Jinks is material inducement, which is a
“process whereby target actors are influenced to change their behavior by the imposition of
material costs or the conferral of material benefits.”911 International institutions can employ
material inducement to influence state behaviour through the manipulation of “material rewards
and punishments”.912 Consequently, material inducement is largely premised on the model of
individual cost-benefit based decision-making developed in Law and Economics.913 Although
Goodman and Jinks refer to this mechanism as “material inducement” they discuss not only the
use of economic incentives and disincentives, but also the use of military power.914
Material inducement is already present in the context of IHL violations by armed groups.
Material incentives exist in the incentives provided to leaders of armed groups in order to
influence them into signing peace treaties. For example, in the DRC, rebel leaders are often
rewarded with high level positions in government or the national armed forces.915 This has
included high level military positions for rebel leaders - such as Bosco Ntaganda, subject to
arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against
humanity - at the time they received their prestigious military appointments.916 Rather than
909
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incentivize IHL compliance, this style of incentivized peace negotiation has given combatants in
the DRC the impression that joining an armed group is their best chance for gaining power and
social mobility.917
A different form of material inducement used to influence the behaviour of combatants exists in
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs aimed at creating incentives for
combatants to leave armed groups, relinquish their weapons, and reintegrate into society. These
programs usually have a monetary component as well as a re-training component to provide the
former combatant with skills and means to reintegrate into society.918 It is possible for
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to be successful. For example, the
program in Sierra Leone at the end of the civil war is considered to have succeeded beyond the
expectations of international actors at the time919 even though it faced obstacles such as limited
resources.920 Other programs have seen “limited success”, such as the disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration program in the DRC.921 Where programs are unsuccessful
there is a risk that, rather than incentivize laying down one’s arms, it may not only disincentivize
relinquishing arms, but also lead to previously demobilized ex-combatants taking up arms once
again.922
It is very difficult to explain violent acts toward civilians, though it may help to explain acts of
pillage, by members of armed groups as the product of material inducement. This is because
frequently members of armed groups receive little to no pay for their services as fighters.923 In
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spite of combatant poverty, however, the academic literature provides mixed views as to whether
economic incentives play a role in individuals joining armed groups. Although there are scholars
who advance a “greed” theory to explain that members of armed groups are economically
motivated to join armed groups,924 empirical studies in Liberia and Colombia suggest
otherwise.925 In one study, only four per cent of combatants interviewed identified money as the
reason they joined an armed group.926 Consequently, it is difficult to say whether material
inducement plays a role in affecting combatant behaviour and even more difficult to see how this
mechanism could adequately explain combatant violence toward civilians during armed conflict.
6.3.2 Persuasion
The second mechanism for influencing state behaviour discussed by Goodman and Jinks is
persuasion. This mechanism of persuasion explains how through “argument and deliberation”
states may come to “‘internalize’ new norms and rules of appropriate behavior and redefine their
interests and identities accordingly.”927 International actors employing persuasion to alter the
behaviour of states will center their approach around the “content of a norm” that they want the
target of influence to adopt and internalize.928 Successful use of the mechanism of persuasion
leads the target of influence not only to adapt their behaviour to correspond to the norm in
question, but also to completely internalize the norm into their value system.929
Goodman and Jinks discuss two microprocesses of persuasion: framing and cuing.930 The
process of framing explains that arguments are likely to have more “persuasive appeal” if
influencers structure their argument to “resonate” with norms already accepted by the target of
influence.931 Persuasion may also be successful where the microprocess of “cuing” is used.
Influencers can cue the target of influence through the “introduction of new information” which
924
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can lead the target of influence to “engage in a high intensity process of cognition, reflection, and
argument” that can ultimately lead to “changes in opinion”.932
Persuasion is the primary mechanism employed by international organizations, such as the
ICRC, that engage with armed groups to promote compliance with IHL norms.933 The use of
persuasion to influence armed group behaviour is also widely discussed in academic literature.934
Persuasion can be an effective tool to induce members of armed groups to comply with IHL
norms for the protection of civilians during armed conflict. For example, the non-governmental
organization Geneva Call, which engages armed groups on specific thematic issues, such as
landmines or child protection, has had significant success through dialogue and persuasion.935
Geneva Call has succeeded in getting 50 armed groups to commit to ban the use of antipersonnel landmines by their combatants.936 Most of these 50 armed groups having participated
in, “carried out[,] or cooperated in humanitarian mine action” and often the destruction of
stockpiled landmines since they made this commitment with Geneva Call.937 Geneva Call has
also successfully engaged 26 armed groups which have committed to “protecting children in
armed conflict, and have taken measures to enforce their obligations.”938 Persuasion can
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therefore be used to put an end to combatant deviance from IHL norms much in the same manner
as persuasion can be used to induce state compliance with human rights norms. However, it
provides limited insight into the psychology of how law-abiding citizens in peacetime become
law-breaking combatants during armed conflict. Although it is possible that combatants could be
persuaded to internalize norms advocating violence toward civilians, Goodman and Jinks’ work
on Socialization and International Law merely provides the mechanism of behavioural change
rather than providing a detailed understanding of the psychological shift from compliance to
deviance.
6.3.3 Acculturation
Acculturation, the third mechanism discussed by Goodman and Jinks, represents the central
component of Socialization and International Law theory. Goodman and Jinks seek to
demonstrate how “legal institutions at times influence actors through acculturation”.939
Acculturation is the “the process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the
surrounding culture”.940 As opposed to focussing on the content of a norm, as is the case with the
mechanism of persuasion, “acculturation emphasizes the relationship of the actor to a reference
group or wider cultural environment.”941 The focus on relationship as opposed to content means
that, unlike persuasion, where the target of influence internalizes a norm, acculturation could
lead to either complete or incomplete internalization of a norm even while altering an actor’s
behaviour.942
The process of acculturation includes both internal “[c]ognitive pressures” and external “social
pressures” that influence the state’s choices.943 Cognitive pressures exist when “individuals experience discomfort-including anxiety, regret, and guilt-whenever they confront cognitions
about some aspect of their behavior inconsistent with their self-concept (including any social
roles central to their identity)” which is referred to as cognitive dissonance by social
psychologists.944 Actors will try to address this discomfort by “either changing their behavior or
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finding ways to justify their past behavior.”945 Social pressures emerge through the actor’s desire
to conform to a group and to “minimize social costs”.946 Social pressure can be manipulated by
influencers through the “imposition of social-psychological costs through shaming or shunning”
or through the “conferral of social-psychological benefits through displays of public
approval.”947
The “identification” of an actor with a “reference group” plays an integral role in the
acculturation process.948 The “varying degrees of identification with a reference group” will
affect the extent to which the target of influence feels “cognitive and social pressures to
conform.”949 Additionally, the question of whether or not an actor will respond positively to
social pressure from external influencers can be affected by the “the strength, immediacy, and
size of the group.”950
Goodman and Jinks focus their discussion of acculturation on two microprocesses of the
mechanism: status maximization and mimicry.951 The microprocess of status maximization exists
where actors are “compelled by reputation- and status-based concerns”, rather than “[material]
cost-benefit calculations” to adapt their behaviour.952 Actors seek to gain or maintain the
“approval of, or status in, [a] reference group”,953 while also “minimiz[ing] social
disapproval.”954 Mimicry is linked to efforts for status maximization as actors are more likely to
“‘mimic’ the behavior of other highly legitimated actors”.955 Where states “value their position in
the group “they are more inclined to “‘identify’ with, or mimic, the group”.956 These
microprocesses of acculturation, like acculturation more generally, turn on pressures to conform,
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which drive an actor “to behave and think in ways consistent with the highly legitimated
purposes and attributes of that role” they have assumed.957
The manner in which acculturation captures internal and external pressures on an individual to
adopt certain behaviours makes acculturation the most useful of the three mechanisms examined
by Goodman and Jinks to help understand the psychology of combatant violence toward
civilians. The recognition in Socialization and International Law theory that multiple
mechanisms – material inducement, persuasion, and acculturation – can affect an actor’s
behaviour is similarly useful as it provides a more nuanced approach to understanding
behavioural change than that provided by Behavioural Law and Economics theorists. However,
Socialization and International Law theory remains an inadequate theory for understanding
combatant violence toward civilians and, more importantly, the process by which law-abiding
individuals transform into law-breaking combatants for one important reason specific to the
discussion of acculturation.
The reason Socialization and International Law theory’s acculturation mechanism is inadequate
for understanding the transition from law-abiding citizen to law-breaking combatant who
commits violent acts is the extent to which the theory draws on socio-psychological theories and
mechanisms to explain behavioural change. Goodman and Jinks themselves implicitly and
explicitly acknowledge this limitation. Acculturation is but one of “various social processes” that
contribute to “socialization processes”.958 The microprocesses of acculturation discussed by
Goodman and Jinks – mimicry and status maximization – are but two of an unknown (based on
Goodman and Jinks’ discussion) number of processes.959 Goodman and Jinks also acknowledge
that the fact “individual behavior and cognition reflect substantial social influence” is but “[o]ne
of the central insights of social psychology”.960 Further, Goodman and Jinks have acknowledged
the need for more “refinement” of the ideas they have introduced, including the need for “more

957

Goodman & Jinks, supra note 898 at 27.
Ibid at 6.
959
Ibid at 26.
960
Ibid.
958

174
highly specified causal pathways that involve micro-level, mechanism-based accounts”.961
Therefore, in reading Goodman and Jinks’ work on Socialization and International Law, one can
see both the utility of turning to theories of social-psychology, but one is also left to wonder what
more social-psychology can offer to help understand human behaviour, including in the specific
context of armed conflict. Goodman and Jinks’ Socialization and International Law theory,
therefore, points to the disciplines, particularly social psychology, that are likely to have at least
some of the answers necessary to understand combatant violence toward civilians and how lawabiding individuals transition into law-breaking combatants.

6.4 Conclusion
Most existing legal theories do not develop a behavioural model for understanding legal
deviance. This chapter has examined three existing legal theories that do develop behavioural
models and provide behavioural insights to explain legal compliance or deviance: Law and
Economics theory, Behavioural Law and Economics theory, and Socialization and International
Law. This chapter demonstrated how each of these three theories fail to provide an adequate
model for understanding the perpetration of violence toward civilians and the transition from
law-abiding individual to law-breaking combatant that perpetrators often undergo. First, the
behavioural model developed by Law and Economics theory is based on fundamentally flawed
assumptions about human rationality, self-interest, the ability to measure preferences, and goals.
Behavioural Law Economics theorists have turned to psychology to develop a behavioural model
that addresses the fundamental flaws in Law and Economics theory to demonstrate that there are
limits to the extent individuals are rational and self-interested. However, although Behavioural
Law and Economics theory does not suffer from the severe flaws of Law and Economics theory,
the Behavioural Law and Economics behavioural model nonetheless remains a model that is
intended to be generally applicable across a wide array of peacetime contexts. Consequently,
Behavioural Law and Economics fails to provide a behavioural model that can adequately
explain the transition of individuals from law-abiding in peace to law-breaking in conflict.
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Socialization and International Law draws more deeply on understandings of human behaviour
derived from behavioural sciences, in particular social psychology, than Behavioural Law and
Economics theory, which has limited its reliance on psychology to what is necessary to correct
the flawed assumptions of Law and Economics. The most useful component of Socialization and
International Law theory for beginning to understand the perpetration of violence toward
civilians is the socio-psychological state of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance explains
how individuals faced with contradictory values, beliefs, or ideas, such as possible contradictions
between the mildness of peace and the violence of war, suffer cognitive dissonance that they will
try to address by “either changing their behavior or finding ways to justify their past
behavior.”962 However, Socialization and International Law’s use of acculturation to explain how
internal and social pressures to conform can lead to behavioural change provides a limited and
incomplete model for understanding how law-abiding citizens come to be law-breaking
combatants who perpetrate acts of violence toward civilians. Acculturation and the two
microprocesses of mimicry and status maximization provide only one small component of a
more elaborate and detailed body of socio-psychological theory explaining individual behaviour.
Despite this weakness, Goodman and Jinks’ Socialization and International Law theory provides
an excellent introduction into the potential of employing social psychology theories to
understand legal compliance or deviance. Goodman and Jinks’ work further serves to
demonstrate the value to law and legal scholars both theoretically and in practice of borrowing
from other disciplines to improve understandings of human behaviour in the interactions of
people with legal rules and norms. This chapter has therefore demonstrated both the lack of an
existing legal theory capable of explaining the perpetration of violence toward civilians by
members of armed groups as well as the opportunity other academic disciplines supply to
develop an adequate understanding of combatant behaviour.
The next chapter seizes the opportunity to learn from academic disciplines like social
psychology. The chapter will discuss four theories of social psychology and criminology that
have been repeatedly relied on to explain how ordinary people come to commit violent acts
during conflict such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The four theories
962

Goodman & Jinks, supra note 898 at 641; Goodman & Jinks, supra note 898 at 27.

176
discussed have been developed to understand and explain the specific perpetration of violence
toward civilians within the exceptional and unique context of conflict. The chapter will provide a
nuanced understanding of human behaviour that, in addition to the social pressures to conform
used by Goodman and Jinks, captures more specific processes to explain behavioural change and
the transition from law-abiding citizen in peacetime to law-breaking individual in conflict.
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Chapter 7
7 How Ordinary People Come to Commit Extraordinary Acts of Violence
The previous chapters have demonstrated that IHL contains many rules for the protection of
civilians during NIACs that apply to the conduct of members of armed groups; however, in
practice, widespread IHL violations are often committed by members of armed groups against
civilians. The preceding chapter argued that there is no adequate legal theory to explain or
account for the reasons underlying these IHL violations. Therefore, this chapter turns to theories
of social psychology and criminology to help understand the perpetration of violent acts toward
civilians and how law-abiding civilians during peacetime come to be law-breaking combatants
during armed conflict.
This chapter examines four theories that explain how ordinary people come to commit acts of
violence against civilians during conflict: criminology’s theory of techniques of neutralization
and social psychology’s theories of moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to
authority. First, the chapter discusses the reason for selecting these four theories to help
understand combatant behaviour. Second, the chapter will discuss the concept of ‘ordinary
people’ as perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Then the chapter
examines each of the four theories in turn, beginning with techniques of neutralization and
followed by moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority. This chapter
develops a nuanced understanding of how law-abiding citizens in peacetime come to be lawbreaking combatants who commit violent acts toward civilians during conflict. This chapter
identifies two key themes: (1) the use of dehumanization by perpetrators to facilitate the
commission of violence toward civilians,963 and (2) the displacement of a sense of responsibility
963

Sociologists, such as Sherene Razack, have explored the danger of “[race thinking,] a structure of thought that
divides up the world between the deserving and the undeserving”: Sherene Razack, “‘Your Client has a Profile:’
Race and National Security in Canada after 9/11” (2007) 40 Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 3 at 7 See also,
e.g., ; Sherene Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2008); Sherene Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights: the Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and
the New Imperialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); George L Mosse, A History of European Racism
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Sociologists have also explored the effects of language,
specifically racist language, that is often the product of race thinking. Van Dijk has noted the tendency to focus on
violence that is a product of racism and overlook or ignore the implicit, everyday conveyance of racism: Teun A van

178
for one’s actions used by perpetrators to facilitate the commission of violence toward civilians.
These two themes are important because they indicate that combatant behaviour that
dehumanizes civilians and/or allows combatants to displace their sense of responsibility for their
actions can contribute to violence toward civilians. Therefore, this chapter explains the theories,
which are then employed in chapter 8 to identify specific combatant behaviours in need of IHL
regulation in order to advance the humanitarian goal of civilian protection in IHL. Ultimately,
using the theories outlined in this chapter, this thesis argues that dehumanizing behaviours and
behaviours that displace responsibility must be inhibited - through the use of law - before they
result in violence directed toward civilians.

7.1 Social Psychology and Criminology
In order to understand combatant violence toward civilians, this thesis has, like Goodman and
Jinks’ theory of Socialization and International Law discussed in the preceding chapter, turned to
other academic disciplines that can provide a nuanced understanding of human behaviour during
armed conflict: social psychology and criminology. Social psychology is “the systematic study
of the nature and causes of human social behavior.”964 This includes the study of “individuals’
activities in the presence of others and in particular situations, the processes of social interaction
between two or more persons, and the relationships among individuals and the groups to which
they belong.”965 The behaviour examined is not merely actions, but also emotions and
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thoughts.966 Criminology is the “study of the nature, extent, cause, and control of lawbreaking
behavior.”967 One of its central components is the “analysis of crime causation.”968 While not
limited to the study of psychological mechanisms which affect people’s behaviour, both social
psychology and criminology include theories which focus on this particular aspect of behaviour.
There is overlap between social psychology and criminology and, in the case of two of the
theories discussed in this chapter - techniques of neutralization and moral disengagement –
strong direct parallels between theories.
Both social psychology and criminology are expansive fields with many theories of human
behaviour. Consequently, it was essential to narrow the focus of this study to theories which
attempt to explain, either in their original form or through the subsequent application by other
scholars, the concept of how ordinary people come to commit acts of violence against civilians
during conflict, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.969 This thesis
focuses on the individual level of analysis, that is, on theories which explain the psychological
mechanisms or cognitive processes within an individual that produce or allow for destructive
behaviour (as opposed to those mechanism within a state, a society, or an organization that lead
to such behaviour). However, there is consideration of situational influences on the individual,
such as the social pressures discussed in Goodman and Jinks’ theory of Socialization and
International Law. This focus on the individual is not intended to suggest or imply that factors
beyond the individual are irrelevant to the commission of international crimes. On the contrary,
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these factors are often, if not always, highly influential.970 However, these factors are normally
beyond the scope of IHL. IHL governs how wars are conducted, including the means and
methods,971 and sometimes circumstances under which attacks may legally occur.972 IHL
establishes rules to govern the selection of legitimate targets.973 IHL defines who is a civilian and
who is a combatant.974 IHL is, for the most part, temporally limited to the space between the
commencement of hostilities and their end.975 The reason for the hostilities - that is, why the
parties have decided to go to war - is irrelevant under IHL.976 IHL largely limits itself to
consideration of conduct of parties to an armed conflict during an armed conflict. It addresses a
state’s armed forces and provides for state responsibility for violations of IHL; however, it does
not seek to regulate cultural,977 societal, or political aspects of the state beyond the scope of
armed conflict. Therefore, issues of ideology, economic hardship, cultural norms, government
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policy, etc., which have been identified by some scholars as important components of the
commission of international crimes, cannot be regulated through the application of IHL.978
Similarly, actors who are not part of an armed group, such as civilian state officials, are also
outside the scope of IHL. Furthermore, there are certain assumptions that must be accepted
within the context of IHL, namely that wars will occur and armed groups will exist. Thus, the
temporal scope that is the focus of this thesis is the period between the commencement of an
armed conflict and the conclusion of that conflict.
Many of the theories of the perpetration of international crimes or violence to civilians focus on
state-based crimes.979 Due to the individual level focus of this thesis, these state-focused theories
have been eliminated from consideration in this study. Where theories that predominantly focus
on an organization or group have been included, it is because these theories include aspects
applicable at the individual level of analysis, such as situational social pressures, or because they
have analogous applications to non-state military organizations. An analysis of the social
psychological and criminological literature reveals four theories that are the most frequently
relied upon to examine individual psychological processes that contribute to or facilitate the
commission of violence against civilians and international crimes: techniques of neutralization,
moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority.
Each of the four theories discussed in this chapter has been employed to explain the commission
of international crimes. In some cases, the theory has been used to explain genocide, other times
to explain crimes against humanity, and other times war crimes.980 This thesis considers that it is
both reasonable and logical to consider theories applied to the context of genocide or
commission of crimes against humanity (which do not fall under IHL, as they may also take
place during peacetime) to be transferable to the commission of war crimes (which are governed
978
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by IHL). This is because, while each of these types of crime fall under different categories within
international criminal law, the specific acts and the fact that violence is directed towards civilians
is common to all three categories of international crimes. For example, the murder of a civilian
could amount to a war crime, a crime against humanity, or an act of genocide during war, or a
crime against humanity or act of genocide during peace. It is possible - and has occurred in
practice - that the same act is charged as a war crime, a crime against humanity, and genocide
under international criminal law.981 There is little difference between most crimes against
humanity committed during an armed conflict and war crimes as neither inherently include or
require discriminatory intent. What renders crimes against humanity unique from war crimes is
that they can occur during peacetime. If crimes against humanity could only be committed
during armed conflict “[they] would have been largely redundant, since most or all of the
conduct involved would already have been covered as war crimes.”982 However, the crime of
genocide, whereby perpetrators seek to “destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group”983 inherently involves extensive dehumanization of victims,984 as does the
crime against humanity of persecution, which requires the perpetrator to target victims based on
“political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender …, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law”.985 It must be acknowledged
that the fact that dehumanization is inherent to these crimes may affect the extent to which
theories that have previously only been used to address genocide or persecution as a crime
against humanity can accurately explain IHL violations sufficiently. The following section turns
to a discussion of the four theories used in this thesis: techniques of neutralization, moral
disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority.
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7.2 Ordinary People, Monstrous Acts
It is widely accepted among social psychologists, psychiatrists, psychopathologists, and
criminologists that “the perpetrators [of international crimes] are ordinary people rather than
psychopaths, sadists, or mentally deranged people.”986 Although “the insistence that perpetrators
of mass evil are different from the rest of us still thrives, both in popular opinion and in legal
ones”,987 nearly all case studies and general studies on perpetrators of international crimes have
found that “perpetrators are indeed ordinary people who are not mentally deranged or otherwise
disturbed.”988 Waller has remarked that
not only does the claim of widespread psychopathology among
perpetrators contradict the available evidence, but it also
contradicts all diagnostic and statistical logic.989
The number of acts perpetrated in these violent contexts “greatly exceeds the crime rates under
ordinary circumstances.”990 The number of perpetrators of violence toward civilians during
NIACs far exceeds societal prevalence rates of sadism and psychopathy991 - personality disorders
that, during peace, are sometimes used to explain how individuals come to commit acts of
extreme violence against individuals. Consequently, the perpetration of these violent acts cannot
be dismissed as merely the result of individual defects unique to the perpetrators. The
perpetrators of these crimes are indeed law-abiding citizens who, in the context of conflict,
become law-breaking combatants, a process which Smeulers refers to as the “phenomenon of the
‘law-abiding criminal’”.992 Having demonstrated that the cause of these violent acts cannot be
attributed to psychological deficiencies in the perpetrators, there is a need to explore other causal
explanations. The following section will address each of the four dominant theories found in
986

Smeulers, supra note 22 at 234.
Saira Mohamed, “Of Monsters and Men: Perpetrator Trauma and Mass Atrocity” (2015) 115 Columbia Law
Review 1157 at 1169; See, e.g., Martha C Nussbaum, Hiding from humanity : disgust, shame, and the law
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 166–67 (on appeal of idea that these perpetrators are monsters);
Houge, supra note 83 at 189, 191 (discussing the common depiction of perpetrators tried by the ICTY as either
opportunists or sadists).
988
Smeulers, supra note 22 at 234.
989
Waller, supra note 22 at 69.
990
Smeulers, supra note 22 at 234.
991
The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders records the 12-month prevalence
rates of antisocial personality disorder, which includes psychopathy and sociopathy, at between 0.2% and 3.3%:
American Psychiatric Association, supra note 20; Torgersen, Kringlen & Cramer, supra note 20 A 2001 study based
on 2053 adults in Oslo, Norway found prevalence rates of sadism at 0.2% and antisocial personality disorder at
0.7%: .
992
Smeulers, supra note 22 at 234.
987

184
social psychology and criminology literature: techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement,
deindividuation, and obedience to authority.

7.3 The Dominant Theories of Ordinary Evil
This section discusses the four dominant theories in social psychology and criminology literature
to explain how ordinary civilians come to commit acts of violence toward civilians during
conflict. These four theories are: techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement,
deindividuation, and obedience to authority. Each of these theories contains specific patterns of
behaviour that can contribute to the perpetration of violence towards civilians and which have
been identified in perpetrator testimonies from historic instances of genocide, crimes against
humanity, or war crimes. These psychological processes all address how individuals overcome
societal and/or moral objections to harming innocent people. Techniques of neutralization and
moral disengagement are particularly interesting because, while they originate from different
fields of study, there is significant similarity in the behaviours they identify as facilitating crime.
Each of these theories will be discussed in turn to identify the common themes of
dehumanization993 and displacement of responsibility that will be used in chapter 8 to identify
combatant behaviours that would benefit from new IHL regulation in order to better for the
protection of civilians.
7.3.1 Techniques of Neutralization
The theory of “techniques of neutralization” was introduced by Gresham Sykes and David Matza
in 1957.994 They sought to explain how delinquents, having been socialized into the norms and
values of society, overcome this socialization to participate in deviant behaviour. Juvenile
offenders, for the most part, exhibit conforming and law-abiding behaviours, which is suggestive
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of an acceptance of the conventional beliefs and values of the larger society. As Sykes and Matza
note,
… the juvenile delinquent would appear to be at least partially
committed to the dominant social order in that he frequently
exhibits guilt or shame when he violates its proscriptions, accords
approval to certain conforming figures, and distinguishes between
appropriate and inappropriate targets for his deviance.995
The question is, then, how to explain deviant acts committed by delinquents in face of their at
least partial commitment to the dominant social order. Sykes and Matza explain that this is
accomplished through “justifications for deviance that are seen as valid by the delinquent but not
by the legal system or society at large.”996 Rationalizations are commonly used after a deviant
act has been committed in order to lessen feelings of self-blame and shield the individual from
the blame of others. However, the justifications Sykes and Matza identify are neutralizations
which precede the deviant act thereby serving to “neutralize[], turn[] back, or deflect[] in
advance”997 both internal disapproval and external disapproval from others in society. This
internal and external disapproval, feelings of self-blame, etc., represent the cognitive dissonance
that underlies acculturation in Goodman and Jinks’ theory of Socialization and International Law
discussed in the preceding chapter. The neutralizing justification blocks the social controls,
which would otherwise function to prevent the exercise of deviant impulses, so that the
delinquent is free to proceed with deviant acts “without serious damage to [their] self image.”998
The delinquent, therefore, has not adopted deviant values, rather they have merely qualified
existing societal values through the use of techniques of neutralization. It is the techniques of
neutralization that provide the specific process employed to address cognitive dissonance. They
have redefined these values in a way that suppresses their moral force in certain situations.
Consequently, through the use of these techniques of neutralization, “the delinquent represents
not a radical opposition to law-abiding society but something more like an apologetic failure,
often more sinned against than sinning in [their] own eyes.”999
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As noted, juvenile delinquents often exhibit guilt and shame when facing censure for deviant
acts. Consequently, techniques of neutralization “may not … fully shield the individual from the
force of [their] own internalized values and the reactions of conforming others”.1000 Nonetheless,
they are sufficient to facilitate the commission of the delinquent act in the first place. Further,
while Sykes and Matza’s introduction of the theory of techniques of neutralization originated in
the study of juvenile delinquents, the theory has since been applied more widely, including to
adult crimes.1001
Subsequent work on techniques of neutralization has called into question the temporal aspect of
Sykes and Matza’s depiction of the theory. Whereas Sykes and Matza emphasized that these
techniques were employed before the criminal activity, strong arguments have been put forward
that techniques of neutralization have significant utility after the commission of deviant acts,
though they remain useful prior to these acts as well. Travis Hirschi has argued that some early
acts of delinquency will occur prior to the formation of any technique of neutralization.1002
Instead, it is after these initial acts that the techniques will be formed as a result of these early
acts and serve to facilitate subsequent delinquent acts.1003 Stanley Cohen emphasizes that
neutralizations play important roles both before and after criminal acts. He states that
neutralizations “function[] after the act to protect the individual from both self-blame and blame
by others, and before the act to weaken social control . . . and make delinquency possible”.1004
This dual temporal utility is strongly supported by Shadd Maruna and Heith Copes’ thorough
analysis of techniques of neutralization in 2005.1005 They conclude that “neutralization theory,
then, is best understood as an explanation of persistence or desistance rather than of onset of
offending.”1006 The use of techniques of neutralization prior to any deviant activity is, however,
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difficult to empirically assess. As a result, studies examining the use of these techniques rely on
data collected after deviant acts have been committed. For this reason, it is likely that the
conclusions of Hirschi, Cohen, Maruna and Copes are a more accurate depiction of the theory’s
temporal aspect than Sykes and Matza’s earlier assertions.
Five types of techniques of neutralization were identified in the work of Sykes and Matza: (1)
denial of responsibility; (2) denial of injury; (3) denial of the victim; (4) condemnation of the
condemners; and, (5) appeal to higher loyalties. These five techniques remain at the heart of the
theory; however, subsequent scholars have identified five further techniques of neutralization. In
1974, Carl Klockars established the technique of the metaphor of the ledger.1007 The 1981 work
of W. William Minor describes the technique of defense of necessity.1008 Alexander Alvarez, in
his 1997 analysis of the theory, identified the technique of denial of humanity.1009 Finally, in
their 2017 article, Emily Bryant, Emily Brooke Schimke, Hollie Nyseth Brehm, and Christopher
Ugge describe two new techniques of neutralization: victimization and appeals to good
character.1010 These ten techniques of neutralization are now described in turn.
7.3.1.i Denial of Responsibility
The controlling and constraining power of a sense of responsibility can be undone or limited
where a delinquent employs the technique of denial of responsibility. The weight of
responsibility has an important social function: it acts as an inhibiting or constraining influence
on the actions of individuals. In using this technique of neutralization, the delinquent absolves
responsibility for acts that they deem either accidental or the products of forces beyond their
control. It is in “learning to view [themselves] as more acted upon than acting, [that] the
delinquent prepares the way for deviance from the dominant normative system without the
necessity of a frontal assault on the norms themselves.”1011 The denial of responsibility technique
captures the theme of responsibility across the dominant theories addressed in this chapter.
Consequently, this idea of a psychological mechanism that allows individuals to divest
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themselves of a sense of responsibility for their actions will play an important role in the review
of IHL protections for civilians in chapter 8.
7.3.1.ii Denial of Injury
The denial of injury technique is used by individuals to seek to minimize or negate the harm
caused by a deviant act in order to eliminate the censure, both internal and external, associated
with causing harm. This technique of neutralization occurs when individuals characterize acts
such as vandalism as “mischief” and stolen cars as being “borrowed”.1012 Individuals also justify
damaging people’s property or shoplifting from stores by claiming that insurance or wealth
excuse the actions.1013 What is important is that the deviant believes that, “since no obvious harm
has been done to anyone or anything, the behavior is acceptable.”1014
7.3.1.iii Denial of Victim
In the operation of the denial of the victim technique, delinquents may “accept[] the
responsibility for [their] deviant actions and [be] willing to admit that [their] deviant actions
involve an injury or hurt”.1015 However, individuals using this technique of neutralization render
the victims themselves responsible for their own victimization.1016 The perpetrators justify their
injurious acts as “rightful retaliation or punishment.”1017 The use of the denial of the victim
technique can be facilitated by circumstances surrounding the deviant act, such as where “the
victim is physically absent, unknown, or a vague abstraction.”1018 Ultimately, whatever the
context, the consequence of employing the denial of the victim technique is that the delinquents
recast themselves as justified in their actions and the victims are recast as deserving of the harms
they have suffered.
7.3.1.iv Condemnation of the Condemners
Individuals resorting to the condemnation of the condemners technique shift the focus from the
victim(s), as well as themselves, onto those members of society who would judge the actions of
the delinquent. The perpetrators claim that the condemners are the problem, not themselves, for
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the condemners “are hypocrites, deviants in disguise, or impelled by personal spite.”1019 The
delinquents may assert that the condemners are corrupt or unfair, in order to deflect focus from
their own actions. In doing so, “[t]he delinquent, in effect, has changed the subject of the
conversation in the dialogue between [their] own deviant impulses and the reactions of others;
and by attacking others, the wrongfulness of [their] own behavior is more easily repressed or lost
to view.”1020
7.3.1.v Appeal to Higher Loyalties
In the appeal to higher loyalties technique, delinquents deny that they are motivated by selfinterest; rather they claim that they are simply “sacrificing the demands of the larger society for
the demands of the smaller social groups to which the delinquent belongs such as the sibling
pair, the gang, or the friendship clique.”1021 The delinquent does not reject the conventional
values of dominant society, but instead prioritizes norms seen as “more pressing or involving a
higher loyalty”.1022
7.3.1.vi Metaphor of the Ledger
The metaphor of the ledger technique harkens to the use of a ledger in business, in which income
is tracked in a credit column and expenditures are tracked in a debit column.1023 In the optimal
business scenario, credits will exceed debits and the business will make money. Employed as a
technique of neutralization, the credits are good deeds - “acts of charity and benevolence” - while
delinquent acts constitute debits. Individuals employing this technique will justify criminal acts
through the reasoning that they have done more good things than bad things in life.1024 In the
balance of things, they are a good person, not a criminal. The application of this technique of
neutralization “allows [a person] to loosen the restraints of [their] moral order” and emerge with
“a positive, moral, decent self-image.”1025
7.3.1.vii Defense of Necessity
The defense of necessity technique of neutralization involves the perpetrator focusing on the
necessity of committing the delinquent act. This focus absolves the delinquent of any sense of
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guilt.1026 The concentration on necessity allows the perpetrator to challenge “[the act’s]
characterization as deviant.”1027 This technique may manifest itself in assertions by the
perpetrator that that deviant act is “standard practice” in the context, or that the act is the “only
way” to achieve the desired end.1028 While there may be similarities between the types of
rationalizations advanced under the defense of necessity technique and the technique of denial of
responsibility, the two techniques are “conceptually distinct” from each other.1029
7.3.1.viii Denial of Humanity
Under the denial of humanity technique, the perpetrator seeks to dehumanize the victim of the
deviant act. This serves to “distance[] participants … from their intended victims.1030 Victims
may be described as animals, demons, or objects.1031 The act of depriving victims of their
humanity means that “killing them no longer violates the religious and philosophical traditions
whereby human life is pronounced sacred and special.”1032 When there is no shared humanity
between perpetrator and victim, the bonds of society’s norms of morality are broken.1033 The
portrayal of victims as inferior beings or objects serves to create the “psychological distance”
common to all techniques of neutralization.1034 Alvarez notes that this technique of neutralization
was an essential component for participation in the Holocaust; however, it is unclear as to
whether he considers the denial of humanity technique as essential to the employment of
techniques of neutralization in order to participate in all acts of violence.1035
This technique of neutralization represents the second theme across the dominant theories
discussed in this chapter, the theme of dehumanization. In chapter 8, dehumanization will be
examined in the Sierra Leone and DRC case studies with a view to developing new IHL rules to
inhibit combatants’ use of this technique to facilitate violence toward civilians.
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7.3.1.ix Victimization
The technique of victimization differs from the denial of victim technique. Under the
victimization technique, rather than focus on denying that the victim is a victim, the perpetrators
focus on portraying themselves as victims.1036 There may also be a similarity with the technique
of condemning the condemners in that the individual “shifts blame from themselves”; however,
the technique of victimization “do[es] not include the necessary component of accusing
condemners.”1037 A person employing the technique of victimization will speak of their own
suffering or persecution. They will emphasize their own losses whether that be the loss of family,
friends, or property. They will speak of their own victimization or “that of their ethnic group” or
a minority group to which they belong.1038 This technique allows actors to take refuge in the
status of victimhood in order to avoid feelings of guilt for their own actions.
7.3.1.x Appeals to Good Character
In the appeals to good character technique of neutralization, actors “assert their good deeds or
admirable character attributes that they contend render them incapable of committing …
crimes.”1039 These good acts may include the protection of others from violence, attempts to
“stop violence, and calling for peace.”1040 In addition to such claims, people will “highlight other
positive character traits” by “denying any personal … animus” against victims or “by expressing
remorse for the violence.”1041 While there are similarities between the technique of appeals to
good character and the metaphor of the ledger technique, actors employing the technique of
appeals to good character refrain from “admitting guilt when cataloging their virtuous acts” and
emphasize not only good deeds but also good character.1042
7.3.1.xi Application of Techniques of Neutralization to International Crimes
The preceding subsections have discussed each of the ten techniques of neutralization. The
theory of techniques of neutralization was originally conceived and applied to domestic crimes
during peacetime; however, techniques of neutralization have subsequently been applied to
explain the commission of international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and
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war crimes.1043 This section will discuss the manner in which techniques of neutralization has
been applied to explain acts of violence against civilians during conflict, in particular during the
Holocaust and during the Rwandan genocide.
Of particular interest to this thesis is the application of techniques of neutralization to the context
of genocide, both by Alexander Alvarez and Bryant et al.1044 As noted above in section 7.1,
while genocide is a different crime than war crimes or crimes against humanity, specific
underlying acts of genocide, such as the murder of civilians, are common to both crimes against
humanity and war crimes. The focus of Alvarez and Bryant et al. is on how the violence of the
acts committed are facilitated by techniques of neutralization, rather than genocide per se. They
do not seek to explain genocide generally. Rather, their works examine individual perpetrators of
acts within the context of genocide.
Bryant et al. identify techniques of neutralization in the testimonies of defendants before the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Alvarez employs the theory to explain how
ordinary men and women came to participate, to varying degrees, in the Holocaust. Bryant et al.
focus on the frequency with which the various techniques are applied, noting “limited use of the
appeals to higher loyalty, denial of injury, and denial of the victim techniques”, but “frequent
reliance” on the techniques of denial of responsibility, condemnation of the condemners,
victimization, and appeals to good character. While interesting, consideration must be given to
whether and to what degree the techniques noted by Bryant et al. were actually employed by the
defendants to neutralize their behaviours before and during the commission of the acts. The
findings of Bryant et al. rely on testimonies given at trial and Bryant et al. acknowledge that the
status of the speakers as a defendants in criminal trials likely affected the types of techniques of
neutralization revealed in the testimonies considered in the study.1045 As Bryant et al. note,
“denying the genocidal violence or the humanity of Tutsis would be deleterious to both [the
defendants’] cases and their public image”.1046 Consequently, the failure to find the techniques of
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denial of injury and denial of humanity in these testimonies does not inherently mean that these
techniques were not employed by perpetrators. While defendant testimonies did not provide
evidence of the use of the denial of humanity technique, other sources have recorded the
widespread use of dehumanizing language during the Rwandan genocide by génocidaires, most
notably the use of the word ‘inyenzi’ (cockroach) to refer to Tutsis.1047 Since the denial of
humanity technique will often be absent from perpetrator accounts of conflict, one must look
beyond perpetrator accounts to other sources to determine whether this technique may have been
employed in a specific context.
Alvarez relies on evidence gathered during the Holocaust and statements made by perpetrators
after the Holocaust to identify the application of Sykes and Matza’s original five techniques of
neutralization.1048 The denial of responsibility technique can be identified in the statements of
many perpetrators, such as SS Lieutenant-Colonel Adolf Eichmann and Treblinka concentration
camp Commandant Franz Stangl, both of whom claimed that their participation in acts of
genocide was “innocent of wrongdoing because they were only following orders”.1049 The denial
of responsibility technique was employed by both to reassure themselves “that they remained
decent people forced to do a dirty job.”1050 In order to employ the denial of injury technique,
participants in the genocide employed euphemistic language to disguise the negative reality of
their actions. Rather than speak of genocide, they spoke of a “final solution” and instead of
speaking of killing, they used the terms “special treatment,” “treated appropriately,” or
“cleansing.”1051 The use of scientific and technical euphemisms allowed participants to
psychologically distance themselves from the true nature of their actions.1052
The denial of victim technique is evident in the way Jews were constructed as the enemy of
Germany and the German people; they were “scapegoats for the defeat Germany suffered in
World War I, the country’s subsequent economic collapse, and many other real or imagined
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social woes.”1053 This allowed participants in the genocide to perceive of themselves as the true
victims, rather than the Jews. Consequently, they “could operate from a position of moral
superiority and define their actions as just, moral, and necessary.”1054 Participants’ resort to the
appeal to higher loyalties technique was facilitated by the same propaganda which portrayed the
Jews as the cause of Germany’s woes. In depicting the Jews as the enemy, it was possible for
participants to appeal to their own sense of patriotism and their need to protect “their people and
their country.”1055 Finally, Alvarez cites the extensive use by Nazis of “virulent anti-Semitic
propaganda” that “focused on depicting Jewish people as subhuman” as evidence of the
technique of denial of humanity.1056 Ultimately, Alvarez successfully demonstrates how
techniques of neutralization were employed by participants in the Holocaust “to overcome
normative hurdles”.1057
The theory of techniques of neutralization developed by Sykes and Matza, and later elaborated
upon by Klockars, Minor, Alvarez, and Bryant et al., provides a framework for understanding
how ordinarily law-abiding individuals overcome society’s conventional normative constraints in
order to commit deviant acts. It is not that such individuals have abandoned the conventional
beliefs and values of larger society; rather, they have employed one or some of the ten
techniques of neutralization identified by these theorists in order to defeat, or minimize, the
power of social controls which would normally inhibit deviance. These techniques explain how
offenders recast their deviance in a positive light free from internal or external censure in order
to preserve their self-image. Social scientists have widely applied techniques of neutralization to
traditional forms of criminality, but Alvarez and Bryant et al. demonstrate that this theory can
also be usefully and successfully applied to international crimes such as acts of genocide.1058 The
techniques of denial of responsibility and denial of humanity are particularly important for the
remainder of this chapter and the thesis as a whole. The importance of these two techniques
comes from the fact that they capture the two themes of dehumanization and displacement of
responsibility for one’s actions identified across the theories discussed in this chapter. Further,
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the themes of dehumanization and displacement of responsibility for one’s actions form the basis
for analyzing combatant behaviour and identifying the need for new rules of IHL to protect
civilians in chapter 8.
7.3.2 Moral Disengagement
The theory of “moral disengagement” was developed by social psychologist Albert Bandura and
has its origins in Bandura’s 1986 Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive
Theory.1059 It was subsequently developed by Bandura in works devoted to the study of moral
behaviour.1060 There are numerous parallels between the mechanisms of moral disengagement
developed by Bandura in social psychology and the criminological theory of techniques of
neutralization. Bandura himself applied his theory to describe how people commit harmful acts,
or what Bandura referred to as “the perpetration of inhumanities”, in contravention of their moral
standards while “retain[ing] their sense of moral integrity.”1061 Moral standards are learned
through a combination of teaching and observation.1062 They are then used to regulate one’s
actions, guiding the commission of acts which meet these standards and deterring those which
violate them. Humans seek to engage in activities which provide them with “satisfaction and a
sense of self-worth” while abstaining from doing things that “will bring self-censure.”1063 The
“exercise of moral agency” is both inhibitive – preventing inhumane action – and proactive –
providing the capability to act humanely.1064 Consequently, individuals have the capacity to
choose to refrain from inhumane behavior by exercising self-influence.1065 Therefore, the
perpetration of violence against civilians is not inevitable. This suggests that if some, or all, of
these mechanisms of moral disengagement could be prevented, deterred or inhibited, it could
result in fewer IHL violations of protections for civilians.
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Bandura identifies social and psychological processes by which this ability to regulate one’s own
behaviour, through the exercise of internal control, “can be disengaged from inhumane conduct”
thus facilitating the exercise of harmful behaviour without the consequence of self-censure.1066
Disengagement of self-censure can occur by
reconstructing conduct as serving moral purposes, by obscuring
personal agency in detrimental activities, by disregarding or
misrepresenting the injurious consequences of one’s actions, or by
blaming and dehumanizing the victims.1067
Disengagement of self-censure can be accomplished through one or more of the eight
psychosocial mechanisms for moral disengagement: (1) moral, social, and economic
justification; (2) euphemistic language or labeling; (3) advantageous comparison; (4)
displacement of responsibility; (5) diffusion of responsibility; (6) disregard, distortion and denial
of harmful effects; (7) dehumanization; and, (8) attribution of blame.1068 Three of these
mechanisms of moral disengagement - displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility,
and dehumanization – expressly capture the themes of dehumanization and responsibility, which
are addressed by all of the dominant theories discussed in this chapter. However, the remaining
five mechanisms of moral disengagement also contribute to dehumanization, particularly the use
of euphemistic language, and the abdication of accountability for one’s acts.
The effect of the application or employment of mechanisms of moral disengagement by
individuals is not instantaneous; it “will not instantly transform considerate persons into cruel
ones.”1069 Self-censure is gradually disengaged. People begin by “perform[ing] milder aggressive
acts they can tolerate with some discomfort” and then, when “their self-reproof has been
diminished…, the level of ruthlessness increases, until eventually acts originally regarded as
abhorrent can be performed with little personal anguish or self-censure.”1070 It must be noted,
however, that the identification and operation of these processes of moral disengagement in the
behaviour of those who participate in inhumane acts in no way excuses the commission of such
acts. As Bandura clearly states, “[t]here is a marked difference between scientific explanations of
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how moral self-sanctions are disengaged from inhumane conduct and evaluative judgments of
that conduct.”1071 When considering violence against civilians during armed conflict, while IHL
provides the evaluative judgments of what conduct is legal and illegal, moral disengagement and
the other theories discussed in this chapter provide the scientific explanations for how
combatants come to commit acts of violence. These scientific explanations are a tool that can be
employed “to prevent and counteract the suspension of morality in the perpetration of
inhumanities.”1072
The technique of moral disengagement, like techniques of neutralization, explains specific
thought processes individuals use to overcome cognitive dissonance in the commission of
crimes. These mechanisms provide the specific content that Goodman and Jinks’ discussion of
cognitive dissonance in the context of acculturation lacked.1073 Further, as shown by Alvarez’s
application of techniques of neutralization to the Holocaust and Bryant et al.’s application to the
Rwandan genocide, evidence of these techniques can often be found in the testimonies of
perpetrators. The next sections briefly examine each of Bandura’s mechanisms of moral
disengagement in turn.
7.3.2.i Moral, Social, and Economic Justification
The first psychosocial mechanism for moral disengagement is moral, social, and economic1074
justification. Individuals use this mechanism to reconstrue their behaviour as morally acceptable.
The act in question “is made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it as serving
socially worthy or moral purposes.”1075 These justifications serve to imbue the deleterious
behaviour with a meritorious purpose: “[r]ighteous and worthy ends are used to justify harmful
means.”1076
Military conduct represents a clear example of the psychosocial process of moral and social
justification. The transformation of ordinary individuals into soldiers “is achieved not by altering
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their personality structures, aggressive drives, or moral standards,” but by “redefining the
morality of killing so that it can be done free from self-censure.”1077 Moral and social
justifications operate to construe armed combat as a fight against oppression, to preserve a way
of life, or to save humanity: “killing becomes an act of heroism.”1078 Upon discharge, the soldier
reverts to a civilian and “moral standards are reengaged” to once more deter deleterious
behavior.1079
A further example of social and moral justification can be identified in some civil rights
movements. Members of the movement identify the eradication of human rights violations as the
righteous end that justifies sometimes militant means. In such contexts, members “appeal[] to
what they regard as a higher level of morality derived from communal concerns.”1080 While not
acknowledged by Bandura, there is a parallel here to the appeal to higher loyalties technique of
neutralization identified by Sykes and Matza.
7.3.2.ii Euphemistic Language and Labelling
The use of euphemistic language or labeling by individuals is another psychosocial mechanism
that operates to disengage moral reasoning from moral conduct. This mechanism recognizes the
important role and effect language plays in how actions are perceived. The language used by
individuals to describe an activity can have a significant effect on the “personal and social
acceptability of [the activity]”.1081 Euphemistic language and labeling can be, and is, employed
by individuals to mask the true nature of destructive behaviour and acts, such that they are
rendered “benign and people who engage in [them] are relieved of a sense of personal
agency.”1082 The work of Richard Gambino identifies three types of euphemisms: (1) “sanitizing
and convoluted language”; (2) “the agentless passive form”; and, (3) “the borrowing of
specialized jargon from a respectable enterprise.”1083 Bandura returns to the context of the armed
forces to provide examples of these forms of euphemistic language. The sanitizing language of
“waste” and the acronym “KIA” (“killed in action”) are used to mask the soldier’s act of killing a
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person and neutralize the act’s repugnancy.1084 The agentless passive form is employed to
“creat[e] the appearance that harmful acts are the work of nameless forces rather than of
individuals.”1085 For example, the borrowed jargon of “clean, surgical strikes” describes bombing
attacks in a manner that evokes the image of healing and medicine.1086 The use of euphemistic
language thereby distances the act from the reality of its harmful nature and distances the actors
from responsibility for their acts. Again, there is a parallel between Bandura’s euphemistic
language mechanism of moral disengagement and Sykes and Matza’s denial of injury technique
of neutralization. Alvarez identifies the use of euphemisms such as “Final Solution” for genocide
and “special treatment” for killing that neutralize the horrific nature of the acts themselves.1087
Euphemistic language and labelling can also be linked to the mechanisms of dehumanization
used in the Rwandan genocide, when génocidaires were instructed to “go to work [because] there
was a lot of dirt that needed to be cleaned up.”1088 The euphemism ‘to clean up’ was used to
instruct people to kill, and Tutsis were dehumanized by being referred to as “dirt”.
7.3.3.iii Advantageous Comparison
The mechanism of advantageous comparison operates by comparing an act to another act that is
considered even more morally reprehensible, thereby casting the first act in a more favourable
light. The starker the contrast between the two activities, “the more likely it is that one’s own
destructive conduct will appear benevolent and righteous.”1089 For example, the United States
Cold War policy of containment - stopping the threat of “communist enslavement” - was
employed to detract from the horrors committed by American armed forces during the Vietnam
War.1090 Actors may also use historical comparisons to justify their destructive acts. For instance,
the oppressive acts of a current regime may be contrasted with the crimes of a previous
regime.1091 Advantageous comparison, along with moral and social justifications and
euphemistic language, represent, according to Bandura, “the most powerful set of psychological
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mechanisms for promoting detrimental activities.”1092 The use of these mechanisms to “invest[]
injurious means with high social or moral purpose not only eliminates self-deterrents but also
engages self-approval in the service of harmful exploits.”1093
7.3.2.iv Displacement of Responsibility and Diffusion of Responsibility
As already noted, one of the strong themes running through the theories discussed in this chapter
is the idea of responsibility and the process by which individuals divest themselves of a sense of
responsibility in order to perpetrate, or deal with having perpetrated, a crime. The following two
mechanisms of moral disengagement – displacement of responsibility and diffusion of
responsibility – serve to “obscure[] or distort[]” the link between the actor, their actions, and the
consequences of those actions.1094 The mechanism of displacement of responsibility is identified
in the works of Herbert Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton, and Stanley Milgram, discussed below.
They demonstrated that, when an authority figure accepts responsibility for the consequences of
a subordinate’s actions, the subordinate is willing to commit acts they would otherwise consider
inhumane.1095 The subordinate sees their act as flowing from the orders of the authority figure
and, therefore, the act and its consequences are not a product of the subordinate’s actions. The
subordinate has exempted themselves from any sense of culpability. The application of the
displacement of responsibility mechanism is apparent in the testimonies of many Nazi
commandants after the Holocaust. For example, the Commandant of Treblinka concentration
camp, Franz Stangl, stated that “[t]he motive to murder did not originate with him. He 'only'
carried out the order he had received in the best possible way.1096 Yitzhak Arad observes that,
“[l]ooking at the situation in this way relieved his conscience and enabled him to oversee the
death factory in which hundreds of thousands of people were murdered.”1097 A defence of
superior orders was refuted at the Nuremberg Trials.1098 Nonetheless, the employment of the
displacement of responsibility mechanism can be observed in subsequent instances of mass
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atrocities perpetrated by armed forces, such as the My Lai massacre in Vietnam.1099 A clear
parallel exists between the mechanism of displacement of responsibility and the technique of
neutralization, denial of responsibility.
A sense of culpability is weakened when responsibility for destructive acts is diffused amongst
numerous individuals.1100 Self-sanctions lose their power as the direct link between action and
consequence is obscured. This mechanism, known as diffusion of responsibility, can take three
forms: (1) group decision-making; (2) division of labour; and, (3) collective action.1101 Group
decision-making serves to obscure individual responsibility since the decision, act, and its
consequences can be attributed to the group and not one particular person: “[w]hen everyone is
responsible, no one really feels responsible.”1102 By dividing an action into its constituent parts
and assigning each part to a different individual, individual responsibility for the ultimate
product of the combined parts is dispersed and diminished. For example, the functions of death
row executions in the United States are divided amongst numerous officers: each straps down
only one part of the body, one inserts syringes, another attaches the heart monitor, and so on.1103
Finally, collective action also allows individuals to easily “attribute [harm] largely to the
behavior of others.”1104 One example is a firing squad where all shooters must fire
simultaneously and only one gun contains live ammunition. Further, collective action can serve
to create a “sense of anonymity” among group members.1105 The work of Bandura, Underwood,
and Fromson and Zimbardo demonstrates that “[p]eople behave more cruelly under group
responsibility than when they hold themselves personally accountable for their actions.”1106
Much like the closely related displacement of responsibility, the mechanism of diffusion of
responsibility parallels the technique of neutralization, denial of responsibility.
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7.3.2.v Disregard, Distortion and Denial of Harmful Effects
The mechanism of disregard, distortion and denial of harmful effects allows individuals to
disengage moral control by minimizing, discrediting, misrepresenting, or denying the
consequences of their actions. When people are insulated from the consequences of their actions
and the suffering of their victims, it is easier for them to complete their tasks.1107 Hierarchical
chains of command can serve to distance decision-making superiors from the consequences of
their orders executed by lower level functionaries.1108 However, even the commands of authority
figures are less likely to be obeyed when a person can “see and hear the suffering they cause”.1109
There is a parallel here between the moral disengagement mechanism of disregard, distortion and
denial of harmful effects and Sykes and Matza’s technique of neutralization denial of injury.
Both serve to distance the actor from the reality of the harms suffered as a result of their actions.
7.3.2.vi Dehumanization
The mechanism of dehumanization allows people to divest victims of the qualities which make
them human, resulting in the minimization or prevention of feelings of empathy and compassion
in the perpetrator.1110 There is a shared sense of common humanity when one sees others as
sentient beings like themselves, which renders it “difficult to inflict suffering on humanized
persons without experiencing distress and self-condemnation.”1111 Yet, when these same persons
are portrayed in subhuman terms, “it is easy to [inflict suffering] without guilt”.1112
Dehumanization of victims can be achieved by depicting them as “mindless ‘savages,’
‘degenerates’ and other despicable wretches.”1113 Perpetrators may use degrading labels and
ethnic slurs, for example American servicemen using the term “gook” during the Vietnam War
to describe the Vietnamese people or the terms “hajis” and “towel heads” to describe Iraqis
during the second Gulf War (2003-2011).1114 In an effort to further dehumanize victims,
perpetrators may resort to “attributing demonic or bestial qualities to [victims].”1115 This was
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done, for example, by the Nazis who referred to the Jewish people as “parasitic vermin” and by
Rwandan génocidaires who called their Tutsi victims “inyenzi” (cockroaches).
Laboratory studies have demonstrated that “when otherwise considerate people are given
punitive power, they treat dehumanized individuals more harshly than those who are
personalized or invested with human qualities.”1116 The mechanisms of dehumanization and
diffused responsibility, when combined, significantly increase the degree of punitiveness
demonstrated by perpetrators, whereas when responsibility is personalized and victims
humanized, there is a strong and positive effect on the exercise of self-restraint.1117 This means
that the combination of dehumanization and responsibility have the potential to be even more
problematic than either in isolation. Depersonalization allows actors to treat others with
“emotional detachment and little regard for them as persons.”1118 Depersonalization can be
facilitated through common phenomenon such as “[b]ureaucratization, automation, urbanisation,
and high mobility” that “lead people to relate to each other in anonymous, impersonal ways.”1119
The common conditions of war, where the enemy and its civilian population are strangers to
opposing armed forces, also facilitate depersonalization since “[s]trangers can be more easily
depersonalized than can acquaintances.”1120 The devaluation and detachment produced by
depersonalization render it a conducive stepping stone on the way to activating the disengaging
power of dehumanization. The moral disengagement mechanism of dehumanization directly
mirrors the technique of neutralization, denial of humanity, articulated by Alvarez. This
mechanism reinforces the importance of the theme of dehumanization identified across the
theories discussed in this chapter in the context of explaining combatant violence toward
civilians.
7.3.2.vii Attribution of Blame
Attribution of blame is the final mechanism of moral disengagement in which perpetrators casts
themselves as victims provoked into violence by the target of their violence.1121 Perpetrators
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selectively portray the circumstances as being instigated by their victims, and thus characterize
their own harmful acts as merely defensive. Furthermore, such a portrayal of events and
circumstances means that “[v]ictims then get blamed for bringing suffering upon
themselves.”1122 The attribution of blame to others or on circumstances means that “not only are
one’s own injurious actions excusable, but one can feel self-righteous in the process.”1123
Attribution of blame was used extensively by Adolf Hitler and his Nazi party in their persecution
of Jewish people during the Holocaust. They conveyed the message that “[t]he Jews are guilty of
everything”, including the economic crisis in Germany and Germany’s defeat in the First World
War.1124 Another example is the manner in which Osama bin Laden “characterized his terrorist
activities as ‘defensive jihad,’ compelled by ‘debauched infidels’ bent on enslaving the Muslim
world.”1125 Tactics such as these facilitated people’s participation in the commission of atrocities
in the forms of genocide and terrorist attacks by deactivating self-censoring capacities through
moral disengagement. Attribution of blame parallels the denial of victim technique of
neutralization articulated by Sykes and Matza. Both operate to render victims responsible for
their own victimization.
Albert Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement demonstrates mechanisms by which people are
able to deactivate moral control to permit the commission or participation in atrocities. People
have the capacity to selectively activate their internal control through the operation of selfregulation, self-censure, and self-sanctions. It is the failure to activate these processes of personal
control that permits destructive and harmful behaviour. The moral standards of the individual
have not been altered by the mechanism of moral disengagement nor have their personality
structures or aggressive drives been changed. It is simply that self-restraint is no longer activated
by the behaviour or act in question. The ability to activate and deactivate moral control
selectively means that both acts of kindness and extreme cruelty can be observed in the same
individual. Bandura actively makes the link between armed forces and the use of mechanisms of
moral disengagement, as demonstrated by Nazis during the Holocaust and American armed
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forces during the Vietnam War.1126 While not acknowledged by Bandura, there are significant
parallels between mechanisms of moral disengagement and the techniques of neutralization
identified by Sykes and Matza, and subsequently further developed by Klockars, Minor, and
Alvarez. Bandura has, however, provides greater detail on the specific psychological function of
the mechanisms of moral disengagement than there is on the function of the techniques of
neutralization. In particular, in addition to the mechanism of dehumanization, Bandura includes a
separate mechanism addressing the use of euphemistic language. The historical examples
provided above demonstrate that dehumanizing and euphemistic language are often used
together by combatants. Further, Bandura identifies two separate mechanisms expressly
addressing responsibility and how individuals can both displace or diffuse responsibility for their
actions. Moreover, Bandura makes explicit the link between armed forces, as well as
international crimes, and moral disengagement that was absent from the earliest articulations of
techniques of neutralization.
7.3.3 Deindividuation
The theories of techniques of neutralization and moral disengagement focus largely on wholly
internal processes – processes internal to the individual perpetrators – although diffusion and
displacement of responsibility are often linked to the existence of a group or authority figure.
However, the theory of deindividuation focuses primarily on the psychological effect
membership within a group has on an individual. Deindividuation has its earliest roots in
Gustave Le Bon’s 1895 book on crowd psychology.1127 It was not until a 1952 article by social
psychologists Leon Festinger, Albert Pepitone, and Theodore Newcomb that the term
“deindividuation” was applied in the manner in which I will refer to it here: describing the
behaviour exhibited by individuals when “submerged in a group.”1128 Individuals are
“submerged in the group” when they are no longer seen as, nor feel as, though they “stand out as
individuals” - that is, when focus is placed on the group and not the individuals that make up the
group.1129 Under such conditions of deindividuation, Festinger et al. explained,
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there is likely to occur for the [group] member a reduction of inner
restraints against doing various things. In other words, many of the
behaviors which the individual wants to perform but which are
otherwise impossible to do because of the existence, within
[themselves], of restraints, become possible under conditions of deindividuation in a group.1130
Consequently, deindividuation can lead to behaviour normally frowned upon by society (i.e.,
anti-normative behaviour) because it weakens an individual’s internal restraints. This includes
both negative behaviour, such as acts of violence, as well as positive behaviour, such as public
displays of extreme joy or sadness.1131 The influence of the group on the individual in
deindividuation theory has direct parallels to the influence of the groups discussed in the context
of acculturation by Goodman and Jinks. However, deindividuation theory provides a more
nuanced account of the function of social pressures on the individual than that provided in
Goodman and Jinks’ Socialization and International Law theory.
The theory of deindividuation was revisited in 1965 by Jerome E. Singer, Claudia A. Brush, and
Shirley C. Lublin.1132 They elaborated on the work of Festinger et al. and focused on the internal
characteristics of deindividuation. Deindividuation was defined by Singer at al. as a “subjective
state in which people lose their self-consciousness.”1133 A reduced sense of individuality and loss
of self-consciousness are essential components of deindividuation. It is now understood that this
can be more accurately described as a state of “reduced self-awareness” which “induce[s] a state
of psychological disinhibition”.1134 It operates on both public and private self-awareness.1135
Public self-awareness has an external focus that “involves attention to oneself as a social object”
and includes “[c]oncerns about one’s appearance and the impression made in social

1130

Ibid.
Ed Diener, “Deindividuation: The Absence of Self-Awareness and Self-Regulation in Group Members” in Paul
B Paulus, ed, Psychology of Group Influence (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, 1980) 209 at 231.
1132
JE Singer, CA Brush & SC Lublin, “Some aspects of deindividuation: Identification and conformity”” (1965)
1:4 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 356 at 356.
1133
Ibid.
1134
Richard Wortley, Psychological Criminology: An Integrative Approach (New York: Routledge, 2011) at 193.
See also Diener, supra note 1131; Philip G Zimbardo, “The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order
versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos” in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 1969 (Lincoln, NE: University
of Nebraska Press, 1970) 237.
1135
Steven Prentice-Dunn & Ronald W Rogers, “Effects of public and private self-awareness on deindividuation and
aggression” (1982) 43:3 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 503.
1131

207
situations”.1136 When public self-awareness is reduced, “people may be aware of what they are
doing but have a reduced expectation of suffering any negative consequences.”1137 By contrast,
private self-awareness has an internal focus on things such as personal “perceptions, thoughts,
and feelings.”1138 Prentice-Dunn and Rogers have argued that it is the reduction of private selfawareness in particular that activates the process of deindividuation.1139 This is because the
submergence of one’s identity in a group “decrease[s one’s] ability to self-monitor their
behaviour” and, consequently, “their capacity for self-regulation is fundamentally impaired.”1140
Psychologist Ed Diener has identified three fundamental premises of deindividuation. First, the
prevention of self-awareness as an individual is submerged in a group and that group becomes an
operating unit unto itself and the focus of all attention.1141 Second, the individual no longer pays
attention to their own behaviour and no longer sees themselves as an entity distinct from the
group.1142 Third, deindividuation triggers a “lack of self-regulation”.1143 Additionally, selfregulation is absent in states of deindividuation because “[individuals] have relinquished
decision-making to the group.”1144 The external or outward focus of such individuals inhibits
their ability to access their internal standards of behaviour from long-term memory.1145
Deindividuation, as demonstrated by Diener’s three premises, is therefore the result of an
interplay of “situational, internal and behavioral factors.”1146
Transgressive behaviour as a result of deindividuation is not reliant on the presence of deviant
norms within the group. While the presence of such norms in the group can lead to transgressive
behaviour, their absence does not inherently produce behaviour obedient to societal norms. This
is because “lowered self-awareness leads to lowered adherence to societal norms even in the
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absence of deviant group standards.”1147 There are several forces that have been identified by
scholars as contributing to the creation of a deindividuated state: (1) pressure to conform; (2) a
sense of anonymity; (3) and, a sense of responsibility.
7.3.3.i Pressure to Conform
Conformity is defined as “the tendency to behave in accordance with group norms or unspoken
rules about what one should or should not do.”1148 Individuals join and conform to groups to
fulfill their information needs.1149 Group members are a source of other “ideas, views,
perspectives, and knowledge that helps us to better navigate our world”.1150 Second, a desire to
belong to a group and be accepted by others fuels an individual’s normative needs: “other people
are more likely to accept us when we agree with them than when we disagree, so we yield to
their view of the world”.1151 As group conformity increases and group members become
progressively similar in behaviour, the ability to differentiate between members of the group
becomes difficult, thereby leading to the inhibition of individual self-awareness.1152 The pressure
to conform was the primary source of social pressures discussed by Goodman and Jinks in their
work on Socialization and International Law theory.
7.3.3.ii Sense of Anonymity
A sense of anonymity may contribute powerfully to a state of antisocial deindividuation.1153
Zimbardo argues that “anything that makes a person feel anonymous, as if no one knows who he
or she is, creates the potential for that person to act in evil ways – if the situation gives
permission for violence.”1154 Submergence in a group can create this sense of anonymity, but
groups may enhance anonymity and thus reduce a sense of personal accountability, through the
use of “uniforms, costumes, and masks, all disguises of one’s usual appearance”.1155 Many
studies support the finding that anonymity and deindividuation increase the likelihood of
antisocial behaviour. For example, Zimbardo demonstrated in a 1970 study that deindividuated
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and anonymous women were more inclined to inflict pain on victims than individuated
women.1156 Diener, however, stresses that anonymity and deindividuation are not
interchangeable terms because “an anonymous person (e.g., a bank robber in a ski mask) may be
highly individuated and self-conscious, and a deindividuated crowd member may not be
anonymous to a particular onlooker such as a policeman.”1157 For example, some studies have
suggested that anonymity in a group setting can actually lead to more reserved or controlled
behaviour.1158 In considering both studies that support a finding that anonymity increases
disinhibited behaviour and those which suggest it decreases such behaviour, Diener concludes
that “[a]nonymity will tend to disinhibit behavior if threats of punishment are a major source of
inhibition”; “[t]he symbolic function of anonymity-inducing costumes will create a pressure on
the individual to conform to the implicit message conveyed by the outfit”; and, that “[w]hen
people are anonymous by virtue of appearing outwardly similar, besides the anonymity effect per
se there will be group compliance pressures and a feeling of unity created by similar
appearance.”1159 By contrast, anonymity may serve to increase or decrease inhibition depending
on whether the “form of anonymity serves to heighten or lessen the individual’s selfawareness.1160 Anonymity from other members of the group, such as an individual in a group of
strangers participating in a protest, will reduce the pressure on individuals to conform to the
group and thus is likely to decrease the level of disinhibited behaviour.1161 Anonymity from
people who are not members of the group, such as a group of individuals in disguise holding a
public protest, however, may facilitate an individual’s dispersal or diffusion of responsibility
from themselves onto other members of the group.
7.3.3.iii Sense of Responsibility
Deindividuation can affect an individual’s sense of responsibility for actions committed as a
member of the group. The pressures to conform with a group and a sense of anonymity within
that group contribute to a deindividuated individual’s ability to displace or diffuse responsibility
onto the group and/or other members of the group. Zimbardo notes that the sense of
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responsibility “may be made insignificant by situations in which [responsibility] is shared by
others, by conditions which obscure the relationship between an action and its effects, or by a
leader’s willingness to assume all of it.”1162 Denial of responsibility as well as diffusion and
displacement of responsibility indicate that an individual may shift responsibility for their actions
onto a leader regardless of whether that leader is willing or not to assume responsibility for the
actions of the group, as suggested in the preceding quote from Zimbardo. Zimbardo’s article in
which these comments on responsibility were made predates Bandura’s articulation of the moral
disengagement mechanisms of diffusion and displacement of responsibility. There are definite
parallels between Zimbardo’s discussion of responsibility and Bandura’s discussion of
displacement and diffusion of responsibility as well as between Zimbardo’s work and the earlier
techniques of neutralization work done by Sykes and Matza. Zimbardo’s later work directly
draws on Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement to explain torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment of civilian detainees by of members of the United States Armed Forces in
Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq, in 2003.1163
7.3.3.iv Criticism of Deindividuation
Reicher, Spears, and Postmes have been extremely critical of deindividuation theory.1164 Postmes
and Spears conducted a meta-analysis of deindividuation literature and studies. According to
their findings, “group immersion, group size, anonymity, lack of self-awareness” - characteristic
factors of deindividuation - were “not associated with an increase in anti-normative
behaviour.”1165 Instead, they argue, the literature and studies suggest that these factors actually
“are associated with an increase in normative behaviour.”1166 In their view, in reality, any antinormative behaviour found in the studies was evidence of greater conformity with group
norms.1167 Based on these findings and the results of their own studies, they advanced a new
theory of social identity deindividuation effects (SIDE). This theory argues that anonymity and
submergence in a group “can give rise to, not a loss of identity, but, rather, a change of identity,
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with a particular emphasis on the group identities that may become salient in such situations.”1168
An individual transitions from “a personal to a social identity”.1169 Despite this strong criticism
of deindividuation, textbooks tend to not even reference the work of Postmes, Spears, and
Reicher; rather they define and describe deindividuation in line with the works of Diener,
Zimbardo, and Prentice-Dunn and Rogers.1170
The theory of deindividuation demonstrates a process by which membership in a group can
facilitate individual participation in anti-normative behaviour. This behaviour may be positive or
transgressive in nature. Through the process of deindividuation, individuals lose the ability to see
themselves as individuals and, instead, focus is increasingly placed on the group as a whole. The
effect is to inhibit individual self-awareness and thus the ability of individuals to self-regulate
their own behaviour according to personal standards and societal norms. Similar to techniques of
neutralization and moral disengagement, deindividuation operates on the individual. However,
deindividuation differs from these two theories in that it is a process that requires the presence of
a group in which the individual is submerged. The process does not operate if no group exists.
Factors which contribute to the process of deindividuation - pressure to conform, a sense of
responsibility, and a sense of anonymity –exist in many group contexts and have been expressly
linked to the military context in the works of Zimbardo.1171 Militaries and armed groups must be
cohesive units in order to carry out operations effectively and efficiently. Additionally, a uniform
has long been a requirement for parties to an international armed conflict.1172 Ideally, uniforms
should also be worn be parties to NIAC to facilitate combatants’ task of distinguishing between
non-targetable civilians and legally targetable combatants even though a uniform is not a
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requirement for an armed group to be considered a party to a NIAC.1173 The possibility for
deindividuation would therefore seem to be inherent within armed forces and armed groups.
7.3.4 Obedience to Authority
Whereas deindividuation focuses on the effect of being submerged in a group, obedience to
authority in the work of Stanley Milgram, Kelman and Hamilton focus on the effect of authority
figures on an individual. The effect of authority on obedience, even in situations where an
individual is harming another human being, originates in Milgram’s laboratory experiments in
the 1960s. His work has been widely cited and is relied upon by many of the scholars.1174 His
experiments demonstrated that ordinary people will obediently inflict pain on an innocent human
being when ordered to do so by an authority figure.1175 The results of Milgram’s obedience to
authority experiments play a significant role in the related theory of crimes of obedience from
social psychologists Kelman and Hamilton.1176 While Milgram drew parallels between his
findings and the participation of so many German citizens in the Holocaust, Kelman and
Hamilton examine their theory in the context of the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War.
Together, the work of Milgram, as well as that of Kelman and Hamilton, has been used in a great
number of theories which endeavour to explain how ordinary people commit international
crimes.1177
7.3.4.i Milgram’s Obedience Experiments
In Milgram’s original, and most widely cited, laboratory experiment, two volunteers were placed
in separate rooms. One volunteer, the “teacher,” was in a room with the authority figure (the
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experimenter) and the other, the “learner,” was hooked up to an electrode in another room. The
experimenter instructed the teacher to administer electric shocks each time the learner answered
a question incorrectly, beginning at 15-volts and increasing in 15-volt increments, upon each
wrong answer, up to a maximum of 450-volts.1178 While physically separated from the learner,
the teacher could hear the learner. The recipient of the shocks, unbeknownst to the teacher, was
an actor and did not actually receive any shock. At 75-volts, the learner began expressing
increasing discomfort and subsequently displayed increasing levels of distress, including asking
to be released from the study and emitting an “agonized scream.”1179 At 330-volts, the learner
would go silent and unresponsive.1180 If the volunteer administering shocks sought guidance
from the experimenter or hesitated to administer a shock, they were instructed to continue by the
experimenter.1181 They were told that the absence of a response should be considered as an
incorrect response and a shock should be administered.1182 The majority of teachers continued to
administer shocks up to the maximum level (450-volts), despite evidence that the learner had
been in extreme pain and was now, perhaps, unconscious.1183 Milgram concluded that “ordinary
people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can become
agents in a terrible destructive process.”1184
From his studies, Milgram identified certain “adjustments in the [teacher’s] thinking … that
undermine [their] resolve to break with the authority.”1185 First, individuals can become so
focused on the “narrow consequences of the task that [they] lose[] sight of its broader
consequences.”1186 Second, the teacher absolves themselves of responsibility for the
consequences of their actions and places the responsibility on “the experimenter, a legitimate
authority.”1187 The teacher’s moral priorities shift, from the morality of inflicting pain or harming
an individual, to “a consideration of how well [they are] living up to the expectations that the

1178

Milgram, supra note 23 at 3.
Ibid at 4.
1180
Ibid at 23.
1181
Ibid at 4.
1182
Ibid at 23.
1183
Ibid at 33.
1184
Ibid at 6.
1185
Ibid at 7.
1186
Ibid.
1187
Ibid at 8.
1179

214
authority has of him.”1188 Finally, many of the teachers saw their acts as part of a larger “noble
cause … the pursuit of scientific truth.”1189
Milgram’s work on obedience to authority demonstrates that individuals are capable of
committing extreme acts of violence when instructed to do so by an authority figure. As noted
above, one of the key processes that contributes to this ability to commit acts of violence is the
fact that the individual transfers responsibility for the consequences of his or her actions onto the
authority figure. Responsibility is again the continuing theme in all of the theories discussed in
this chapter.
7.3.4.ii Crimes of Obedience
Milgram’s findings play an important role in Kelman and Hamilton’s theory of crimes of
obedience. In addition to supporting Milgram’s theory of destructive obedience, they pick up on
the themes of responsibility and dehumanization seen in the theories of techniques of
neutralization, moral disengagement, and deindividuation. Their theory aims to answer how
“moral inhibitions against violence become weakened.”1190 Again, this is very similar to the
earlier theories presented in this chapter. All of these theories articulate explanations for
individual participation in violent acts as a result of the deactivation or diminution of one’s
ability to regulate their behaviour according to social norms. Kelman and Hamilton define a
crime of obedience as “an illegal or immoral act committed in response to orders or directives
from authority.”1191 This authority, in the context of a crime of obedience, is “unrestrained” and
“wrongful[ly] exercise[d]”.1192 Kelman and Hamilton’s theory describes the social processes
under which individuals may participate in sanctioned massacres, such as the Holocaust and the
My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War: authorization, routinization, and dehumanization.1193
These processes have been incorporated into criminologist Alette Smeulers’ work on the
perpetration of human rights violations.1194 These three processes also, in many ways, repackage
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the elements of responsibility and dehumanization seen in techniques of neutralization, moral
disengagement, and deindividuation. Each of these processes will be discussed in turn.
7.3.4.iii Authorization
The first social process identified by Kelman and Hamilton, authorization, is an inherent
component of sanctioned massacres.1195 In identifying this, Kelman and Hamilton rely most
heavily on the work of Milgram. A person is more likely “to commit or condone” violence when
it is either directly or indirectly authorized by a legitimate authority, whether in the form of
orders, encouragement, approval, or a generally permissive environment.1196 Authorization
eliminates the need to exercise individual judgment or make choices for oneself, effectively
inhibiting the application of personal moral standards.1197 A sense of obligation to obey orders
will generally supplant personal standards even when those standards are inconsistent with the
orders being given.1198 Individuals may, however, be willing to disobey orders which they
consider illegitimate, although there will be individual variance in the extent to which an
individual will be willing to challenge authority.1199 Usually, people will “obey without
question”.1200 Kelman and Hamilton note that, “[unquestioning] obedience is specifically
fostered in the course of military training and reinforced by the structure of the military authority
situation.”1201 When a person is authorized, whether explicitly or implicitly, to commit an act,
often they will “not see themselves as personally responsible for the consequences of their
act[].”1202Authorization, according to Kelman and Hamilton, includes the processes of diffusion
of responsibility and deindividuation.1203 Authorization, in the theory of crimes of obedience,
allows people to detach from personal accountability in a similar manner to Sykes and Matza’s
denial of responsibility, Bandura’s displacement of responsibility, or the attribution of
responsibility to the group in deindividuation.
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7.3.4.iv Routinization
Kelman and Hamilton’s second process of routinization focuses on the organization and
repetitiveness of acts of violence. While authorization provides the means of initial participation
in an action, continued participation is influenced by the regularization of the activity.1204 The
transformation of the activity “into routine, mechanical, highly programmed operations” serves
to significantly diminish “the likelihood of moral resistance”.1205 Similar to the process of
authorization, individual decisions become unnecessary when the action is routinized, and, as a
consequence, the “occasions in which moral questions may arise” are limited.1206 Routinization
requires people “to focus[] on the details of the job rather than on it meaning”, though this is
more easily accomplished by individuals who have some physical distance between themselves,
their actions, and their victims.1207 Within an organization, each person will often only be
responsible for one discrete component of the overall action. As a consequence, responsibility
for the overall action is diffused among the various actors as in Sykes and Matza’s denial of
responsibility and Bandura’s diffusion of responsibility.1208 The routinization of activity in the
context of sanctioned massacres “reinforce[s] […] the view that what is going on must be
perfectly normal, correct, and legitimate.”1209
7.3.4.v Dehumanization
While authorization and routinization operate to “override standard moral considerations” and
“reduce the likelihood that such considerations will arise”, Kelman and Hamilton feel that
authorization and routinization are generally not sufficient in themselves to induce individual
participation in sanctioned massacres.1210 The process of dehumanization will usually need to be
employed in addition to authorization and routinization in order to commit atrocities. Here,
Kelman and Hamilton differ slightly from Bandura’s moral disengagement mechanism of
dehumanization and, possibly, Alvarez’s denial of humanity technique of neutralization. In
addition to dehumanization, Kelman and Hamilton note that the “neutralization of the victim”
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can help to justify violence.1211 Kelman and Hamilton find that dehumanization will “generally”
have to be employed whereas in moral disengagement is merely a possible and not essential
element of facilitating participation in acts of violence. The technique of neutralization, denial of
humanity, on the other hand, was deemed an essential component of participation in the
Holocaust by Alvarez, though it was unclear whether he believed it to be an essential component
to the use of techniques of neutralization to facilitate participation in all forms of violence.
Kelman and Hamilton do define dehumanization in the same way as in these other theories. They
describe it as the process by which victims are “stripped of their human status”.1212 They note
that “[d]ehumanization of the enemy is a common phenomenon in any war situation” and that “a
more extreme degree of dehumanization” is needed for sanctioned massacres because “the
killing is not in direct response to the target’s threats or provocation.”1213 The process of
dehumanization is self-reinforcing because, in “observing [the] victimization” of victims,
participants “are reinforced in their perception of the victims as less than human.”1214 Thus,
dehumanization can contribute to initial acts of violence as well as ongoing perpetuation of
violence.
Authority can play a powerful role in the perpetration of international crimes. The works of
Milgram, Kelman and Hamilton demonstrate that human beings, despite their own misgivings,
will usually obey an order to inflict pain on an innocent person.1215 People are reticent to disobey
an order when they are unsure whether the order is or is not a legitimate order.1216 In the face of
an illegitimate order, some people may be willing to challenge authority, but, more frequently,
people will blindly obey.1217 Authorization from a legitimate authority allows individuals to
place accountability for the consequences of their actions on the authority figure who gave the
order. While the physical proximity of killing on the battlefield may provide encouragement to
challenge an illegitimate order to kill a civilian, a soldier’s fear of the significant punishment
attached to disobeying orders may counter the effects of physical proximity.1218 The additional
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factors of routinization and dehumanization operate in military contexts where international
crimes have been committed under explicit or implicit authorization from a superior officer. The
repetitive routinization of violence contributes to the diffusion of responsibility.1219 Finally,
dehumanization will usually be necessary in addition to authorization and routinization for an
individual to participate in a massacre. Obedience to authority and crimes of obedience represent
not only a powerful factor contributing to international crimes, but also reinforces the concepts
of diffusion of responsibility and dehumanization found in the techniques of neutralization and
moral disengagement.

7.4 Conclusion
A study of social psychology and criminology literature on how ordinary people come to commit
acts of violence against civilians reveals the prominence of the use of the theories of techniques
of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority in this body
of literature. The theories all seek to explain how individuals reconcile the commission of violent
acts that conflict with social, moral and legal norms while preserving their positive sense of self.
Two specific themes dominate within these four theories: dehumanization and responsibility.
Within techniques of neutralization, 10 forms of neutralizing criminal behaviour and avoiding
self-censure are identified. Denial of responsibility and denial of humanity speak directly to the
themes of dehumanization and responsibility. There are eight mechanisms of moral
disengagement, which similarly explain how people to disengage moral self-sanctions and
overcome moral standards in order to participate in international crimes. Diffusion or
displacement of responsibility along with dehumanization and the use of euphemistic language
and labelling focus on the themes of responsibility and dehumanization. The submergence of an
individual in a group can result in deindividuation, wherein one’s ability to self-monitor their
behaviour is inhibited. Factors such as conformity to the group and anonymity within the group
can lead to diffusion of responsibility. Obedience to authority demonstrates that individuals will
often obey orders to harm another human being, even if it contradicts their own morals. An
instruction or order from an authority figure allows an individual to displace responsibility for
acts of violence onto the person who issued the instruction or order.
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This thesis advances the claim that there is a gap between the regulation of behaviour for the
protection of individuals in peace and the regulations needed to protect civilians during war from
combatant violence. Social psychology and criminology theories help to fill this gap because
they explain how combatant deviance is adversely affected by psychological processes that
reframe combatants’ conceptions of right and wrong and, in doing so, fundamentally alter the
way in which combatants view the IHL rules intended to protect civilians. This chapter has
identified four theories from the disciplines of social psychology and criminology that address
the psychology of violence toward civilians during conflict. All of these four theories present
psychological processes which can prevent people from feeling responsible or accountable for
the consequences of their actions. Further, across the four theories discussed in this chapter,
dehumanization is shown to be another powerful contributing factor to violence against civilians.
These processes allow an individual to reframe their understanding of right and wrong.
As noted earlier in this chapter, “[t]here is a marked difference between scientific explanations of
how moral self-sanctions are disengaged from inhumane conduct and evaluative judgments of
that conduct.”1220 During armed conflict, IHL provides the evaluative judgments of what conduct
is legal and what conduct is illegal. This chapter has provided the scientific explanations for how
law-abiding citizens can become law-breaking combatants who commit acts of violence toward
civilians. These scientific explanations are a tool that can be employed to “prevent and
counteract the suspension of morality in the perpetration of inhumanities.”1221 The perpetration
of violence against civilians is not inevitable.1222 Consequently, if some, or all, of these
mechanisms of moral disengagement could be prevented, deterred or inhibited, it could result in
fewer IHL violations of protections for civilians.
The earlier chapters in the thesis demonstrated that existing IHL protections for civilians during
conflict are largely the same as protections afforded to individuals in peacetime. The next
chapter uses the scientific explanations for combatant violence toward civilians identified in the
current chapter, namely the processes of dehumanization and the displacement of responsibility,
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to examine combatant behaviour in Sierra Leone and the DRC. The next chapter will argue that
there are common behaviours used by combatants to dehumanize civilians and to abdicate their
sense of responsibility for their actions that are currently unregulated by IHL. In order to
adequately protect civilians, new rules are needed to regulate these behaviours during armed
conflict.
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Chapter 8
8 The Use of Social Psychology and Criminology to Identify and Address
Gaps in International Humanitarian Law
This thesis advances the claim that there is a gap between the regulation of behaviour for the
protection of individuals in peace and the regulations needed to protect civilians from combatant
violence during war. Social psychology and criminology theories can help to develop the
necessary conflict-specific behavioural regulations because they explain how combatant
deviance is adversely affected by psychological processes that reframe combatants’ conceptions
of right and wrong and, in so doing, fundamentally alter the way in which combatants view the
IHL rules intended to protect civilians. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this thesis provided the theoretical
foundations and practical realities of civilian protections under IHL. States made evaluative
judgments about what conduct needed to be prohibited for the protection of civilians during
armed conflicts and codified these judgments in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two
1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Civilian protections during armed conflict
are premised on the protections afforded to individuals in peacetime, despite the dramatically
different contexts of peace and war. In practice, NIACs, such as those in Sierra Leone and the
DRC, often see law-abiding citizens become law-breaking combatants who commit acts of
violence against civilians. These acts are unquestionably illegal under IHL; however, the fact
that these IHL violations occur provides little insight into why they are occurring: why have lawabiding citizens become law-breaking combatants?
In order to identify an explanation for this shift from legal compliance to legal deviance, this
thesis examined three legal theories which seek to explain human behaviour and legal
compliance or deviance. Chapter 6 demonstrated that existing explanations of individual
behaviour in Law and Economics, Behavioural Law and Economics, and Socialization and
International Law theories, fail to provide a sufficiently nuanced understanding of human
behaviour to explain the transition from law-abiding citizen to law-breaking combatant who
perpetrates acts of violence against civilians.
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Without an adequate explanation of combatant perpetration of violence toward civilians in legal
theory, Chapter 7 looked outside of the discipline of law for an explanation. Chapter 7
demonstrated that a deeper and more focused turn to social psychology, than that employed in
Socialization and International Law theory, as well as to criminology, can provide conflict
specific explanations of combatant violations of IHL protections for civilians. An examination of
the theories of techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and
obedience to authority demonstrated that behaviours that allow combatants to dehumanize
civilians or to abdicate responsibility for their own actions place civilians at a heightened risk for
suffering violence at the hands of combatants. These scientific explanations for combatant
violations of IHL protections for civilians allow for an assessment of whether there are
behaviours related to dehumanization and the displacement of responsibility that warrant
regulation in order to advance the humanitarian goals of IHL for the protection of civilians.
Through the use of research and field data gathered in Sierra Leone and the DRC, this chapter
identifies two common behaviours among members of armed groups that contribute to violence
toward civilians in violation of IHL during NIACs. First, the use of dehumanizing or degrading
language toward civilians by combatants was common in both the Sierra Leone civil war and the
conflicts in the DRC. Second, the widespread use of nicknames by combatants in Sierra Leone
and the DRC that contributes to producing a sense of anonymity in the combatant, which permits
the combatant displace their sense of responsibility for their actions.
This chapter will prove three key ideas proffered in this thesis. First, this chapter demonstrates
that existing IHL protections for civilians do not adequately regulate the use of demeaning,
degrading, and dehumanizing language directed at civilians and the use of anonymizing
nicknames by combatants. Second, this chapter argues that, in order to advance the humanitarian
goals of IHL discussed in chapter 4, new regulations should be introduced to inhibit the ability of
combatants to employ these behaviours as a means of facilitating the commission of IHL
violations against civilians. Third, this chapter demonstrates how scientific explanations of
combatant perpetration of violence offered by techniques of neutralization, moral
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disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority can be used to develop substantive
regulations to address these problematic behaviours.
This chapter is divided into three parts: (1) the underlying theory on the role of law; (2) the use
of dehumanization by combatants; and, (3) and the displacement of responsibility by combatants.
Section 8.1 of this chapter demonstrates that law is a common tool employed to regulate risky
behaviour and that it has the capacity to contribute to positive changes in those behaviours. The
chapter then turns to an examination of the two themes identified in the dominant theories of
social psychology and criminology in chapter 7: dehumanization and displacement of
responsibility.
Section 8.2 of the chapter focusses on the theme of dehumanization and is divided into 12
subsections. This discussion begins with a brief review of dehumanization and the manner in
which it explains combatant violence toward civilians. The use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language to speak to, or refer to, civilians is a manifestation of the mechanism of
dehumanization used by combatants in Sierra Leone and the DRC. The chapter examines
whether existing protections for civilians currently address the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language by combatants. It argues that, although it may appear possible for
existing IHL protections to capture these types of language, currently IHL does not clearly
protect against the use of such language nor is there evidence that existing IHL has ever been
interpreted in a manner that would capture demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language.
The focus of the chapter next shifts to an examination of international human rights law to
determine whether the prohibition on hate speech, as an exception to protection of free speech
and expression rights, would adequately capture demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing
language used by combatants when speaking to or referring to civilians. It contends that hate
speech, while able to capture some instances in which demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing
language is used, does not capture the full scope of the problematic use of these forms of
language. The final subsection of section 8.2 recommends a new substantive regulation to
prevent and inhibit the deleterious effects of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language
that can contribute to violations of IHL protections for civilians.
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Section 8.3 of this chapter focuses on deindividuation, depersonalization, and displacement of
combatant responsibility for violence towards civilians and is divided into six subsections. This
section examines the risky behaviour of combatant use of anonymizing nicknames. The first
subsection examines how the use of nicknames is a manifestation of deindividuation,
depersonalization, and displacement of responsibility and the consequent effect the use of
nicknames can have on combatant psychology. The second subsection considers whether
nicknames are currently regulated under IHL or international human rights law, concluding that
neither area of law currently regulates the use of nicknames by combatants. The final subsection
makes recommendations for the regulation under IHL of nickname use by combatants.
This chapter concludes by demonstrating how scientific explanations, provided by theories of
social psychology and criminology, for combatant violence toward civilians can positively
contribute to the humanitarian goals of IHL.

8.1 The Power of Law to Change Risky or Dangerous Behaviour
This chapter argues that IHL regulation is needed to prevent or inhibit two behaviours which
jeopardize civilian safety by increasing combatant violence toward civilians. This section
explains why law is the appropriate tool to address the threat to civilians posed by combatant use
of demeaning, degrading or dehumanizing language and combatant use of nicknames. This
section demonstrates that law has the power to affect behavioural change by shaping how
societies view particular actions.1223 This section further demonstrates that legal regulation is a
common means employed in both domestic and international law to regulate risky or dangerous
behaviours.
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Laws and regulations express messages about the conduct they govern.1224 Law functions as a
tool to coerce and/or deter certain behaviours, but this is not its sole function.1225 A law can also
be used to “reconstruct existing norms and to change the social meaning of action through a legal
expression or statement about appropriate behaviour.”1226 This is often a common aim or feature
of regulatory law1227 and, more specifically, the regulation of dangerous or risky behaviour.1228
Laws can impact not only people’s choices but the reputational effects of legal compliance and
deviance.1229 The theories of techniques of neutralization and moral disengagement in chapter 7
explained how people desire to maintain a positive self-image and often change their thinking
and/or behaviour to align with a conception of positive identity.1230 Law can contribute to this
process by shaping what an individual sees as a positive behaviour by indicating social approval
of certain behaviours and social disapproval of other behaviours.1231 Law can also shape people’s
“expectations about how others will behave” and how others will react to their own
behaviour.1232 In changing their behaviour to align with the social message conveyed by a law,
people contribute to changing social norms.1233 Behavioural change and/or reconstruction of
social norms through regulation of dangerous or risky behaviour can be further aided through
accompanying information and education about the risks of the behaviour or activity being
regulated.1234
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States also attempt to address risks through international law. For example, the risks of nuclear
weapons possession1235 or of the disposal of hazardous wastes1236 are both regulated through
international treaties. IHL seeks to regulate the risks that war poses to civilians through rules
governing the methods and means of warfare, including rules addressing combatant
behaviour.1237 For example, the principles of proportionality and precaution require military
actors to take account of risks to civilians during conflict and take actions to minimize in as
much as possible those risks.1238 The regulation of risk is both a common function of law and an
inherent characteristic of IHL.
Where clear laws exist to govern specific behaviours, ongoing violations may be the result of
multiple causes. As discussed in chapter 1,1239 IHL violations stem in part from compliance and
enforcement issues. However, as argued in this thesis and demonstrated by the theories discussed
in chapter 7, there are psychological factors that can contribute to IHL violations, some of which
are either not currently regulated at all, or not sufficiently or clearly regulated, under existing
IHL. This chapter posits that clear regulation of risky or dangerous behaviours, ideally
accompanied by education about the risks associated with the behaviour, is particularly
important where behaviours are considered innocuous or where the behaviours are socially
accepted or socially tolerated. This chapter argues that the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language towards civilians by combatants is, at the very least, socially tolerated
and the use of nicknames by combatants is generally considered to be innocuous.
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Socially tolerated practices can include behaviours that are illegal. For example, in North
America, speed limits or drunk driving limits are often violated and may go unpunished,1240 but
this does not mean that speeding or drunk driving is legal. However, societal awareness of the
risks sought to be minimized through the regulation of speeding and drunk driving (e.g., car
accidents, death or injury to motorists or pedestrians) are widely known, if not even intuitive.
However, there are times when criminal or regulatory measures are introduced to govern risky
behaviour that has previously been legal and widely practiced. Drunk driving laws have not
always been as restrictive as they are currently,1241 and drunk driving was once more socially
acceptable.1242
Another example of the power of law to effect social change can be seen in the introduction of
seatbelt laws. Prior to 1963-1964, seatbelts were not a standard feature in automobiles1243 and a
legal requirement to wear a seatbelt was introduced in different countries in the 1970s.1244
Indeed, many individuals in western societies vociferously opposed being required to wear a
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seatbelt on the grounds that such laws interfered with “individual freedom” and civil liberties.1245
Four decades after the first mandatory seatbelt laws, societal perceptions of seat belts and their
required use has dramatically changed, due in large part - or entirely - to the legal regulation of
their use. Whereas the use of seatbelts prior to legal regulation was quite rare, their use has
dramatically increased since the advent of seatbelt laws. In the province of Victoria, Australia,
only 15 per cent of people wore seatbelts the year prior to the introduction of mandatory seatbelt
laws in 1970; that number rose to 65 per cent in 1973 and 90 per cent by 1977.1246 In Canada,
mandatory seat belt laws have had similar success. In the province of Ontario, only 17.2 per cent
of people wore seat belts prior to the introduction of mandatory seat belt laws in 1976; by 2011
that number had risen to 92.8 per cent.1247 According to Wittlin, seatbelt laws in and of
themselves positively affected the use of seatbelts distinct from the added effects of enforcement
of seatbelt laws in the states she studied.1248
Legal regulation of risky behaviours is a common practice, both generally and in IHL
specifically, and has been demonstrated to have the capacity to effect positive change in the
prevalence of the risky behaviours being regulated. This suggests that, at a minimum, where a
risky behaviour is identified in armed conflict, it is worth considering whether it may be possible
to legally regulate the risky behaviour in question for the protection of civilians. As noted in
chapter 1,1249 there is an internal tension in the proposition that new laws are the solution to
combatant non-compliance with existing IHL protections for civilians. However, once employed
the psychological processes focused on in this chapter – dehumanization and deindividuation –
serve to alter combatant psyches and reframe how they view civilians and the current laws
intended to protect civilians. The laws recommended in this chapter represent an upstream
intervention that prevents the use of these psychological process and, in doing so, disrupts the
progression from ordinary individual to law-breaking combatant.

1245

See, e.g., Kenneth E Warner, “Bags, Buckles, and Belts: The Debate over Mandatory Passive Restraints in
Automobiles” (1983) 8:1 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 44; Howard Leichter, “Lives, Liberty, and Seat
Belts in Britain: Lessons for the United States” (1986) 16:2 International Journal of Health Services 213; Linda
Geller Dubinsky, “The Minnesota Mandatory Seat Belt Law: No Right to be Reckless” (1987) 10:1 Hamline Law
Review 229.
1246
McDermott & Hough, supra note 1244.
1247
Ontario Ministry of Transportation, supra note 1244.
1248
Wittlin, supra note 1224.
1249
See pages 18-19 in Chapter 1.

229

The next section will examine the first risky behaviour focused on in this chapter: the use of
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward civilians. It will also consider whether
this risky behaviour is currently regulated under IHL and will assess the potential of creating
explicit regulation to combat the ability of such problematic language to contribute to violations
of IHL protections for civilians during armed conflict.

8.2 Dehumanization
This section examines the failure of IHL to clearly address the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language to refer to, or address, civilians. It draws together the theories of social
psychology and criminology discussed in chapter 7, providing a brief review of the effects and
risks of dehumanizing civilians, using evidence of dehumanization collected through research
and field interviews in Sierra Leone and the DRC. It considers whether demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language could be sufficiently captured by existing IHL rules on nondiscrimination, humane treatment, and the prohibitions of violence to mental health, torture or
cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment. It then discusses whether existing international human rights law addressing the
regulation of hate speech as a permissible restriction on free speech and freedom of expression
could adequately address the concerns raised by the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language in the theories of techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement,
deindividuation, and obedience to authority. Finally, it proposes a new IHL regulation that
prohibits the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language to refer to or address
civilians.
8.2.1 The Effect of Demeaning, Degrading, or Dehumanizing Language in Armed Conflict
Dehumanization and/or the use of euphemistic language plays a significant role in violence
directed toward civilians during armed conflict.1250 While the use of dehumanizing language
toward civilians does not guarantee that an individual will perpetrate crimes against them,
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historical examples such as the Holocaust,1251 the Rwandan genocide,1252 the My Lai
Massacre,1253 and the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib,1254 support the link between the
existence of dehumanizing language and the perpetration of crimes against civilians.
Dehumanization is at its most extreme when combatants depict civilians and enemy combatants
as animals, demons or objects. Dehumanization is the portrayal of other humans as inferior
beings or objects. Dehumanization can also be achieved through the depiction of others as
“mindless ‘savages,’ ‘degenerates’ and other despicable wretches.”1255 The use of degrading
labels and ethnic slurs, such as American servicemen using the term “gook” during the Vietnam
War to describe the Vietnamese people or the terms “hajis” and “towel heads” to describe Iraqis
during the second Gulf War (2003-2011),1256 can also be a means of dehumanizing victims. In
the DRC, combatants are recorded as explicitly telling civilians: "You are not human beings”.1257
Euphemistic language can also be used to dehumanize civilians in the eyes of combatants. For
example, killing civilians or enemy combatants may be described as ‘cleaning’,1258 ‘taking out
the trash’,1259 or ‘pulling up weeds’.1260 In Sierra Leone, the RUF also used the euphemism
“washing” to refer to killing1261 and one witness before the Special Court for Sierra Leone
testified that a Kamajor had referred to killing Temne as “weed[ing]”.1262 Dehumanization can be
1251
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common in conditions of war by virtue of the fact that the enemy and its civilian population are
often strangers to opposing armed forces. This facilitates depersonalization of victims since
“[s]trangers can be more easily depersonalized than can acquaintances.”1263 Kelman and
Hamilton have suggested that “a more extreme degree of dehumanization” is needed for
sanctioned massacres in war because “the killing is not in direct response to the target’s threats
or provocation.”1264 This is not, however, necessarily borne out in laboratory experiments
examining the effects of dehumanization. Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that the
level of violence exhibited by a perpetrator is increased where the perpetrator’s sense of personal
responsibility is depersonalized and victims are depersonalized and dehumanized.1265 This will
be addressed further in the following sub-section.
Dehumanization serves to create a psychological distance between perpetrator and victim.1266 It
minimizes the empathy felt for people who are not part of the perpetrator’s group by severing the
perceived common bonds of humanity.1267 Dehumanization facilitates the exercise of harmful
behaviour without the consequence of self-censure. Dehumanization is also self-reinforcing: the
victimization of victims reinforces the perception of them as less than human, thereby facilitating
further violence towards them.1268 This is why it is important to capture dehumanization
upstream. Once direct acts of violence are occurring, dehumanization has long since altered
combatants’ psyches.
8.2.2 The Use of Demeaning, Degrading, or Dehumanizing Language toward Civilians in
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo
The previous section discussed the general effects of dehumanization on combatant psyches.
This section will provide more detailed examples of the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language by combatants in Sierra Leone and the DRC. Fieldwork interviews with
former combatants and data collection on combatants in Sierra Leone and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) did not reveal the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing
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language. This is unsurprising. As noted in chapter 7, the work of Bryant et al. demonstrated
that, in the context of the Rwandan genocide, the testimonies of defendants at the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda did not contain examples of the technique of neutralization denial
of humanity.1269 They noted that “denying the genocidal violence or the humanity of Tutsis
would be deleterious to both [the defendants’] cases and their public image”.1270 Despite the lack
of evidence of such language in the testimonies, there is ample evidence of the use of these forms
of language by génocidaires.1271 The absence of dangerous language and forms of speech in
testimonies from former combatants does not indicate an absence of such language in the
conflict. Rather, alternative sources must be considered to determine whether such language was
used by combatants.
In Sierra Leone, RUF combatants were portrayed by civilians as “beasts, animals, bush devils
and inhuman agents of terror” and the RUF referred to Sierra Leonean elites as an “‘indigenous
clique of unpatriotic exploiters and leeches’, [who] must be violently cleansed or destroyed along
with their ‘rotten system’”.1272 The RUF also used the euphemism “washing” to refer to
killing.1273 One victim testified before the Special Court for Sierra Leone that a CDF combatant
told her that “they would weed all the Temne from xxx xxx” as they killed a Temne man.1274
Some combatants in Sierra Leone are recorded as having referred to civilians as being “like
insects”.1275 Military songs were often sung by combatants in the DRC, such as combatants from
the predominantly Hema UPC, who sang “songs disparaging or threatening the Lendu”1276 and
their Lendu opponents who “s[ang] anti-Hema songs”.1277 In one case, demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing songs were recorded being sung “a few months before the actual beginning of the
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massacres.”1278 Other songs sung by combatants in the DRC dehumanized girls by comparing
them “to food for the leaders and communal cooking pots for the party”.1279 In Sierra Leone, the
degrading term “iron titty” was used by some combatants to refer to young girls they “took …
away to Liberia as their wives.”1280 Similarly, combatants in Sierra Leone used the term ‘wife’ to
“enslave[e] and psychologically manipulate[e] the women and with the purpose of treating them
like possessions.”1281 A witness at Bosco Ntaganda’s Confirmation of Charges Hearing at the
ICC testified that “UPC soldiers shouted at the Lendu that they were not human but animals from
the forest and that they were going to kill them.”1282 Another combatant told this witness, "You
are not human beings”.1283 A former combatant testified that civilian homes were designated as
“houses belonging to our enemies” and that combatants “were to destroy them.”1284 A direct
attack on civilian homes is a violation of existing IHL under the principle of distinction;
however, reference to civilians as the “enemy” is not currently illegal.
The examples from Sierra Leone and the DRC show that the use of dehumanizing language is a
problem that is present alongside IHL violations targeting civilians and is not unique to contexts
in which genocide, ethnic cleansing, or persecution as a crime against humanity is occurring,
although some examples targeted civilians based on ethnicity.1285 As noted in chapter 7, in the
context of armed conflict and with the exception of persecution as a crime against humanity,
there is often very little distinction between crimes against humanity and war crimes. These
examples demonstrate an ongoing problem, i.e. the dehumanization of civilians, that IHL must
address in order to provide adequate protection to civilians during armed conflict.
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8.2.3 International Humanitarian Law and the Use of Demeaning, Degrading or
Dehumanizing Language
The identification of the problematic use of demeaning, degrading or dehumanizing language
requires consideration of whether existing IHL addresses these forms of language when used to
address or refer to civilians. The link between dehumanization and the perpetration of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide is firmly established, yet it is not explicitly
addressed in IHL.1286
Civilians have special protected status during armed conflict.1287 This status flows from the fact
that “[t]he protection of civilians in times of armed conflict, whether international or internal, is
the bedrock of modern humanitarian law.”1288 However, as noted in chapter 4, people are equally
protected from murder, rape, and torture, among other crimes, in peacetime.1289 What renders
civilian protection particularly critical during armed conflict is that behaviour which is illegal
during peace (e.g., murder, assault) is, subject to IHL rules, permitted during armed conflict. In
particular, during armed conflict it is legal, and expected, that combatants directly target, injure,
and kill enemy combatants.1290 Due to this reality of armed conflict, there is a need to protect
civilians from (1) being treated as enemy combatants towards whom combatants can legally be
violent during conflict, and (2) being debased through the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language that will facilitate direct violence towards civilians in contravention of
existing IHL protections.
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IHL protects civilians from being directly targeted by parties to an armed conflict and prohibits
many forms of violence towards them;1291 however, it does not explicitly regulate or prohibit the
use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward civilians. That said, it may be
possible to argue that such use of language is at least partially covered by one or more of four
existing IHL rules: the requirement of humane treatment, the prohibition on violence to mental
well-being, the prohibition on torture or cruel treatment, the prohibition on outrages upon
personal dignity including humiliating and degrading treatment.
8.2.3.i Humane Treatment
IHL requires that civilians be treated humanely. As noted in chapter 4, the term “humane
treatment” is largely left open to interpretation; however, its scope is given definition through the
guidance provided by the types of acts designated as being inhumane in Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II 4(2).1292 The ICRC Customary IHL Study provides many examples of
state practice in the application of the rule of humane treatment.1293 Yet, the many state military
manuals referencing this rule provide little additional guidance on the interpretation of the rule.
For the most part, these manuals only repeat the language of “humane treatment”, “treated
humanely”, or “humanity” without defining the terms.1294
One exception to the standard approach to “humane treatment” in military manuals is the
Canadian 2001 Law of Armed Conflict Manual, which specifies that protected persons “must be
humanely treated and protected against all acts or threats of violence, and against insults and
public curiosity.”1295 Certainly, this would include dehumanizing or derogatory language
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directed at a protected person; however, this manual is not binding.1296 Thus, barring an IHL rule
prohibiting dehumanizing or derogatory speech, there would be no binding requirement on the
Canadian Armed Forces to punish the use of such language directed at protected persons.
However, a senior member of the Canadian Armed Forces interviewed for this thesis stated that,
while they would punish such language directed at civilians by a member of their unit, there was
no requirement across the Forces to do so.1297 Therefore, there is no consistent policy or practice
regarding the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward a civilian.
Since the enumerated examples of inhumane treatment in Common Article 3 and Article 4(2) of
Additional Protocol II are not exhaustive, it is possible that the use of demeaning, degrading or
dehumanizing language directed at a protected person is prohibited under the requirement of
humane treatment. However, the lack of available evidence to support the existence or
enforcement of such a rule would seem to suggest this is not the case. Three specifically
prohibited types of inhumane treatment may capture the prohibition of such language: (1) the
prohibition on violence to the mental well-being of persons; (2) the prohibition on torture and
cruel treatment; and, (3) the prohibition on outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment.
8.2.3.i.a Violence to Mental Well-Being
Violence to the mental well-being of persons is generally considered to include “the use of
threats” to commit any of the prohibited acts under Additional Protocol II Article 4(2).1298
Sivakumaran has indicated that where such threats are “not aimed at, or issued to, a particular
individual” they are “unlikely [to] amount to such violence.”1299 By contrast, techniques of
neutralization, moral disengagement, and obedience to authority demonstrate that it is the
adverse effect of the use of such language on combatants that contributes to violence toward
civilians regardless of statements are issued.1300 This suggests that it is also important to protect
combatants from the psychological harms that stem from the use of these forms of language and,
in protecting combatants from the deleterious psychological effects of this language to their own
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psyche, it will be possible to also better protect civilians. The prohibition on violence to mental
well-being has been linked to the use of “mental torture”.1301 However, since it is listed
separately from the prohibition on torture, acts that fall short of the very high threshold for
torture or the somewhat lower threshold for cruel treatment could still constitute violence to the
mental well-being of persons.
8.2.3.i.b Torture, Cruel and Inhuman Treatment
The second category of inhumane acts is torture, cruel and inhuman treatment. The prohibition
on torture requires that an act be intentionally committed to inflict “severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental”.1302 Further, the act must be committed for a specific purpose, such
as
obtaining from [the victim] or a third person information or a
confession, punishing [the victim] for an act he or a third person
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing [the victim] or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind.1303
It is under this final purpose – discrimination - that the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language might be captured if it caused severe mental pain or suffering. Where the
threshold of severity is not met, the use of these forms of language could not be considered to
amount to torture. In order to constitute cruel or inhuman treatment, a threshold of serious mental
pain of suffering, which is lower than the severity threshold for torture but still a high threshold,
must be met. Mental pain and suffering are most frequently identified in conjunction with
physical acts of torture or cruel or inhuman treatment.1304 There are, however, purely
psychological forms of torture that may target an individual’s phobias, such as solitary
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confinement and sleep deprivation, or the sexual taboos of a particular culture.1305 International
case law also indicates that credible threats to an individual’s life can also cause sufficient
mental pain or suffering.1306 Psychological torture may include “constant taunting; verbal abuse;
intimidations; [and] insulting the honour of a family member”.1307 While there is limited
literature on purely psychological forms of torture, it appears that, absent accompanying physical
abuse or threats to commit illegal acts of physical abuse, this form of torture does not breach IHL
protections against torture or cruel and inhuman treatment.1308 Consequently, it would seem
unlikely that demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language directed at civilians would be
captured by the prohibitions on torture or cruel or inhuman treatment absent accompanying
physical abuse or specific verbal threats.
8.2.3.i.c Outrages upon Personal Dignity, Humiliating and Degrading Treatment
The third form of inhumanity - the prohibition on outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment - may be able to capture the use of demeaning, degrading,
or dehumanizing language directed at protected persons. There is no firmly established threshold
for the severity of humiliation of degradation under the prohibition of outrages upon personal
dignity in IHL. The only indication of the appropriate threshold for violating the prohibition on
outrages upon personal dignity comes from international criminal law, where the war crime of
outrages upon personal dignity requires that an act be likely to cause “serious humiliation,
degradation or otherwise would be a serious attack on human dignity.”1309 Sivakumaran has
suggested that this “serious” threshold only applies to the prohibition under international
criminal law and that, while a threshold must still be met under IHL, it is likely to be lower than
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that found in international criminal law.1310 However, no alternative threshold for IHL has been
stipulated. Examples of outrages upon personal dignity in international criminal law include
“[I]nappropriate conditions of confinement,” “perform[ing] subservient acts,” being “forced to
relieve bodily functions in their clothing,” and “endur[ing] the constant fear of being subjected to
physical, mental, or sexual violence” in detention.1311 The plain and ordinary meaning of
‘humiliating’ and ‘degrading’ is “to make someone feel ashamed or lose respect for himself or
herself”1312 and “causing people to feel that they have no value”.1313 Certainly, based on these
two definitions, the use of dehumanizing or degrading language directed at civilians would likely
be captured. However, since the threshold for the IHL violation is unclear, it difficult to gauge
whether, for example, calling someone a “gook” or a “towel head” would constitute a violation
of the IHL protection. If the threshold under IHL is “serious humiliation, degradation or
otherwise … a serious attack on human dignity”, like in international criminal law, then it is
unlikely that the use of terms such as “gook” or “towel head” would be captured by the IHL
prohibition on outrages upon personal dignity because words alone of this nature are unlikely to
cause “humiliation … so intense that any reasonable person would be outraged.”
It is possible, even without an explicit prohibition on the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language, that such language could be captured by the IHL requirement to treat
civilians humanely. However, as noted, the absence of publicly available information on the use
of such language toward civilians being punished suggests that states either do not, or chose not,
to consider existing IHL protections for civilians to capture such language absent concurrent
perpetration of illegal physical acts of violence. Further, although dehumanization was noted by
the authors of the ICRC study Roots of Behaviour,1314 there was no mention or suggestion that
the use of language to dehumanize civilians is currently governed by IHL. Where the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the “guardian of international humanitarian law”1315
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and the “main driving force behind the development of international humanitarian law”,1316 is
silent on the existence of a particular protection for civilians during armed conflict, this is highly
suggestive that no such legal protection exists. A prohibition or regulation of the use of
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward civilians could develop into an act
captured by existing IHL. However, the power of law to shape behaviour and, in some cases,
change social norms, relies on actors being aware of the law that seeks to change the perception
of certain behaviours. This need to for clarity and awareness of a specific rule in order to alter
behaviour supports the creation of new, clear regulation of the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language directed toward civilians, accompanied by education of the risks of these
types of language and enforcement. Furthermore, new, explicit regulation of demeaning,
degrading, or dehumanizing language targeted at civilians would be consistent with the
underlying IHL goal of protecting civilians who do not take part in hostilities.1317
8.2.4 The Use of Demeaning, Degrading, or Dehumanizing Language in International
Human Rights Law
This section will examine the question of whether international human rights law prohibits the
use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language in armed conflict. The preceding
discussion indicates that, while it is possible that a prohibition on demeaning, degrading or
dehumanizing language to address or reference protected persons could be captured by certain
existing IHL prohibitions, it appears unlikely that they actually do, or are considered to, capture
such behaviour. Although existing IHL likely does not address this issue, it is relevant to
consider whether international human rights law applicable during armed conflict already
captures these forms of language. If the problem is already addressed by international human
rights law, then a new rule of IHL would be unnecessary.
Within international human rights law, the right which is most relevant to possible regulation of
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language is the right to free speech or freedom of
expression. The right to free speech is codified in many international and regional human rights
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treaties.1318 It is also widely protected under national laws.1319 Under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),1320 the right to freedom of expression is defined as
including the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
his choice.”1321 Free speech is an important protection for “the quest for truth, the promotion of
individual self-development or the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy where the
participation of all individuals is accepted and encouraged”.1322 Free speech is integral to
“historical research, the dissemination of news and information, the public accountability of
government authorities”.1323 Protection of freedom of expression is therefore a very important
task in a democratic society.
On its face, the right of free speech would appear to protect rather than prohibit the use of
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language; however, despite the fundamental nature of
the right of freedom of expression, some restrictions of this right are, if not required, certainly
permitted under international law.1324 Under international human rights law, the right to freedom
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of expression can be subjected to certain restrictions. Under the ICCPR, states may legally
restrict freedom of expression if a restriction is necessary “[f]or respect of the rights or
reputations of others” and/or “[f]or the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.”1325 The right to freedom of expression can also be
derogated from during public emergencies, such as armed conflicts.1326
The right to freedom of expression is qualified by a prohibition in the ICCPR on “[a]ny advocacy
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence”, which “shall be prohibited by law”.1327 The UN Human Rights Council has
considered this particular prohibition to be non-derogable, even though the ICCPR does not list
Article 20 as non-derogable.1328 Where explicit prohibitions like the prohibition on advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred in the ICCPR are not included, freedom of expression
provisions have often been interpreted to include a prohibition on advocacy of national, racial, or
religious hatred, which is commonly referred to as ‘hate speech’.1329 However, international
human rights law merely creates an obligation for states to prohibit hate speech and does not in
itself create a criminal offence. International human rights law relies on states to implement
legislation to address hate speech. However, not all states regulate hate speech. Notably, for the
purposes of this thesis, neither Sierra Leone nor the Democratic Republic of Congo have laws
regulating hate speech.1330 Therefore, there are countries where there would be no possible
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regulation of hate speech during armed conflict, unless the speech satisfied the elements of the
international crimes of incitement to genocide or persecution as a crime against humanity.1331 A
further general issue with relying on hate speech under international human rights law to address
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech toward civilians during armed conflict is that
international human rights law creates obligations only for some, but not all, armed groups.1332
This means that many armed groups will have no obligation under international human rights
law to address hate speech among their combatants during armed conflict.
Hate speech or incitement of hatred under IHRL has been criminalized in many domestic
jurisdictions.1333 These offences must, rightly so, balance individuals’ fundamental free speech
rights with the desire to prohibit forms of speech that incite hatred or violence against a
particular group on discriminatory grounds. As will be discussed below, there is a legal
distinction in many countries between the free speech rights of civilians and those of members of
armed forces. The protection of free speech has often necessitated national or regional courts to
review laws that regulate hate speech.1334 Extreme forms of hate speech have also been
criminalized under international criminal law as the crimes of incitement to genocide1335 and
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persecution as a crime against humanity.1336 However, hate speech is not prima facie
criminalized under international criminal law.1337 The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda Appeals Chamber clearly distinguished between “hate speech in general (or inciting
discrimination or violence) and direct and public incitement to commit genocide.”1338 Similarly,
the court stated that “not every act of discrimination will constitute the crime of persecution”.1339
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Appeals Chamber in Nahimana chose not to
rule on whether hate speech that is not accompanied by calls for violence could attain the
requisite threshold of gravity for persecution as a crime against humanity.1340
In domestic, regional, and international case law, four important considerations in assessing
speech have emerged: (1) context; (2) identity of the speaker and their audience; (3) intent; and
(4) causation. The first two, context and identity, do not inhibit the use of hate speech laws to
regulate demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech toward civilians during armed conflict.
In actuality, context and identity can help to explain why combatant speech merits its own
unique regulation during armed conflict. However, the intent and causation elements of hate
speech laws, while appropriately balancing free speech rights and society’s desire to denounce
the promotion of hatred and violence against identifiable groups, would inhibit the ability to fully
capture the forms of speech that pose a risk to combatants’ psyches and civilians’ safety during
armed conflict. The following sub-sections examine these issues.
8.2.4.i The Context of Statements and the Identity of Speaker and Audience
Consideration of context and the identity of speaker and audience do not inherently impede the
ability of domestic hate speech laws to address demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech
toward civilians during armed conflict. Words may take on a different meaning or have a
different impact depending on the context and the identity of speaker and audience. For example,
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the UN Human Rights Council accepted the restriction of hate speech disseminated by a teacher
of young children.1341 However, comments made by a journalist in the context of a program
devoted to exposing societal racism, were not legitimate hate speech.1342 Hate speech may take
on a particularly egregious nature where committed in a context of community violence
motivated by discrimination,1343 but be permissible where the connection between comment and
conflict is geographically remote.1344 In the context of the crime of incitement to genocide, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda stressed the importance of evaluating alleged
genocidal speech “in its proper context” because “a particular message may appear ambiguous
on its face or to a given audience, or not contain an explicit appeal to commit genocide, and
still… amount to direct incitement.”1345 Context here is extremely important because it means
that perpetrators cannot hide behind euphemistic language or other forms of coded messages.1346
This thesis agrees that context is highly important to evaluating speech among combatants;
however, it argues that the specific context of armed conflict necessitates regulation of forms of
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech toward civilians that, during peace, would
warrant protection due to free speech rights.
The “standing or influence” of the statement maker can also increase the level of influence their
statements have on their audience.1347 In particular, statements made by public officials,
politicians, or “persons with particular status in the society”1348 can have a high degree of
influence on others and may give the impression, correct or not, that the state itself condones or
promotes the discrimination and hatred.1349 International criminal case law on incitement to
genocide and persecution as a crime against humanity has considered the power dynamic
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between speaker and audience in the context of superior responsibility, with the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda extending the application of the traditionally military concept to
civilians.1350 The identity of the statement maker must also be considered in relation to the
identity of the audience. In some cases, the audience may be “characterized by excessive respect
for authority” which causes them to be more easily influenced by statements made by authority
figures.1351
The chain of command in armed groups and effects of authority mean that the use of such forms
of speech before subordinates could have a powerful and negative impact on the behaviour of
subordinates toward civilians.1352 The legitimacy of a commander’s authority over their
subordinates renders subordinates particularly susceptible to the influence of their commanding
officers.1353 Not only can the demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language contribute to
debasing the civilians in the eyes of the subordinate, but the impact of the position of authority of
the statement-maker can have the effect of suggesting that similar behaviour from subordinates is
condoned or even encouraged.1354 Even where there is no superior-subordinate relationship
between speaker and audience, there is potential for demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing
language about civilians to adversely affect how listeners view and treat civilians. Combatants
usually develop a “powerful sense of accountability to [their] comrades on the battlefield” which
is “the primary factor that motivates a soldier to … kill[] and [die]”.1355 Fidelity to one’s
comrades can be so strong that a combatant is willing to kill or die for them and a desire to
conform and fit in with the group gives combatants power over one another even where they are
equal in rank.1356 Therefore, the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward
a civilian can have a more powerful affect among members of an armed group than among other
people who do not have similar power and influence dynamics. Consequently, armed conflict
represents a context in which demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language has a greater
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power to influence how civilians are viewed than in a peacetime context and outside of the
power dynamics of armed groups.
8.2.4.ii Intent and Causation
Hate speech laws require that the speaker intends to incite hatred and/or violence toward a
specific group.1357 It has been advocated that that intent should be the decisive element when
evaluating these statements: the statement-maker must “intend[] not only to share his/her
opinions with others but also to compel others to commit certain actions based on those beliefs,
opinions or positions.”1358 Courts and other human rights bodies have repeatedly held that, in
order to legally restrict free speech, governments must link “liability to the intent of the
author”.1359 The crimes of incitement to genocide and persecution as a crime against humanity
carry the very high mens rea thresholds of “genocidal intent”1360 and “discriminatory intent”1361
respectively. The gravity of these two crimes necessitates a high threshold of mens rea due to of
the extreme level of moral and social stigma associated with these offences.1362
In addition to an intent to incite hatred and/or violence, hate speech laws require that the speech
in question actually does result in hatred or violence toward a specific group.1363 Based on the
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work of the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, ‘hatred’ “is a state of mind rather than a specific act.”1364 While “hatred,
as such, is simply an opinion and is thus absolutely protected under international law”, most
states accept this standard “because hatred will inevitably find some form of tangible
manifestation, and groups should not have to wait until concrete acts are perpetrated on them
before being able to claim some protection.”1365 Even if a definition of ‘hate’ can be agreed
upon, “it is almost impossible to prove whether hatred per se is or is not likely to result from the
dissemination of certain statements.”1366
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Appeals Chamber clearly distinguished between
“hate speech in general (or inciting discrimination or violence) and direct and public incitement
to genocide.”1367 Similarly, the court stated that “not every act of discrimination will constitute
the crime of persecution”.1368 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Appeals Chamber
in Nahimana chose not to rule on whether hate speech that is not accompanied by calls for
violence could attain the requisite threshold of gravity for persecution as a crime against
humanity.1369 It would appear, therefore, that under international criminal law, only the most
extreme forms of hate speech which meet the stringent threshold requirements for incitement to
genocide (e.g., direct and public; intent to destroy) or persecution as a crime against humanity
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(e.g., discriminatory intent to harm, interference with fundamental right, gravity threshold) are
criminalized.
The elements of existing domestic hate speech laws and the international crimes of incitement to
genocide and persecution as a crime against humanity fail to fully capture what is truly
problematic about the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language by combatants.
Social psychology and criminology theories of combatant perpetration of civilian abuses showed
that dehumanization can facilitate IHL violations regardless of whether there is a specific intent
to incite IHL violations.1370 The effects of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech on
both the combatant and their audience can contribute to IHL violations regardless of whether or
not the combatant intends to incite the emotion of hatred or to incite IHL violations. The problem
with demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language used by combatants is the language itself
and the depiction of civilians as inferior beings, rather than on any specific emotion motivating
the language. The problem with the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language by
civilians is the insidious effect that such language has psychologically on both speaker and
audience that can contribute to explicit violations of IHL protections, not whether the speaker
intends to incite hatred or violence against civilians. There is no evidence that reference to
civilians as ‘gooks’ in Vietnam or ‘sand niggers’ in Iraq were intended to incite the IHL
violations towards civilians that followed in My Lai in the case of Vietnam and Abu Ghraib in
the case of Iraq. Yet, these terms have been linked to IHL violations in both cases.1371 Therefore,
the specific intent to incite hatred or violence required under hate speech regulation would not
capture all forms of problematic demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech against civilians
identified by criminologists and social psychologists who have studied the link between
dehumanization and violence against dehumanized individuals. However, although the intent
requirement in hate speech offences may not capture all the forms of speech that can contribute
to violence against civilians, intent cannot be eliminated entirely from a new offence. Thus, the
new law proposed in section 8.2.5 will include an intent element, but one that differs from the
intent requirement in hate speech offences.
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If required as a necessary element of an IHL prohibition on the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing speech, the requirement that actual hatred and/or violence against a group be
incited or caused would limit, in some circumstances, the extent to which IHL might prevent
harm to civilians. Part of the harm of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language is that it
can build and escalate over time. The opportunity to deter and prevent violence against civilians
will be lost if IHL regulation of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech requires that
actual incitement of hatred result from a single utterance of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing speech.
Courts have relied upon social science evidence to demonstrate a link between speech and harm
and, consequently, justify restrictions to free speech.1372 For example, the Supreme Court of
Canada has repeatedly held social science evidence of a link between a form of speech and harm,
even where not fully conclusive, can be relied upon to support restriction of speech.1373 Bandura,
Underwood, and Fromson have demonstrated a link between the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language and an increased likelihood that individuals will harm other individuals
that have been dehumanized. Consequently, regulation is supported by this link between the use
of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language and harm.
The preceding discussion has examined how, under international human rights law, the right to
freedom of expression can and, in some cases, must be restricted to protect the rights of others
from violence, hostility, and discrimination.1374 In international human rights law and in the
implementation of human rights law, a balance is sought between fundamental rights of freedom
of expression and other rights such as equality and human dignity.1375 The discussion of hate
speech laws has illustrated that international human rights law is an inadequate vehicle for
regulating demeaning, degrading or dehumanizing speech toward civilians during armed conflict
for three key reasons. First, regulation of hate speech relies on national legislation and there are
states where no such legislation exists. Second, many armed groups do not reach the threshold to
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have legal obligations under international human rights law, thereby leaving a significant number
of armed groups unregulated if international human rights law is relied on as the sole means of
dealing with problematic forms of speech during conflict. Finally, the requirements of intent and
causation of hatred and violence mean that there are dangerous forms of demeaning, degrading,
or dehumanizing speech that would not be captured under hate speech laws.
The use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language by combatants is not fully captured
by existing hate speech laws. However, this does not mean that new regulation of the use of
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language by combatants is possible. Free speech
remains a fundamental right that cannot be arbitrarily infringed. This thesis argues that the
specific context of armed conflict and the identity of the speakers as combatants justifies
regulation of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech toward civilians that would
otherwise be an illegal restriction of free speech for civilians and during peace. The following
section will advance this argument through a discussion of the existing practice and case law in
Canada, Europe, and the United States that has distinguished the free speech protections afforded
to members of armed forces from that afforded to civilians.
8.2.4.iii Restriction of Free Speech in Military Contexts
The protection of free speech differs between peacetime and wartime contexts. For example, the
right to freedom of expression can be derogated from in public emergencies, such as armed
conflict.1376 This section demonstrates that combatants’ free speech is already regulated
differently from that of civilians in many jurisdictions. This section examines the differentiation
between civilian and combatant free speech and the legal grounds identified in national and
regional case law as justifying greater regulation of free speech among combatants. This
different treatment of civilian and combatant free speech provides the legal grounds to restrict
combatants’ use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech toward civilians during
armed conflict. While the focus of the thesis is on non-state armed groups, this section relies on
case law addressing domestic regulation of state armed forces. It cannot be definitively said that
armed groups with obligations under international human rights law would be able to exercise
and limit rights in the same manner that states exercise and limit rights. The binding quality of
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international human rights law on armed groups is, in many ways a theoretical or abstract
concept. Apart from academic analysis, pronouncements from bodies, such as the UN Security
Council, are usually phrased in general terms, for example, “[d]emand[ing] that parties to armed
conflicts comply strictly with the obligations applicable to them under … human rights law”.1377
Some academics have, however, suggested that armed groups should only be bound by
international human rights law to the extent that they have the capacity to protect and respect a
particular right.1378 In the absence of clear direction on the issue and given that IHL rules apply
in the same manner to both state armed forces and non-state armed groups, I consider it
appropriate to rely on the parameters attributed to states’ abilities to restrict the rights of
members of their national armed forces as a guide for the manner in which non-state armed
groups may be able to regulate the rights of their own combatants.
Free speech case law from Canada, the European Union, and United States notes that there is a
difference between the protection of free speech for ordinary civilians and the protection of free
speech for certain other members of society, in particular members of the armed forces.1379
Unquestionably, combatants are entitled to, and retain, free speech rights while in uniform;1380
however, those rights will not be identical to those of a civilian. For example, in the United
States, civilians may criticize or insult the President, but members of the armed forces can be
court martialed for the same behaviour1381 or receive a reprimand, be subjected to a fine, and/or
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be forced into early retirement.1382 Canadian and European courts have allowed for more
regulation of speech even among civilians because both the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and the European Convention on Human Rights allow for the restriction of rights
where the maintenance of a democratic society necessitates a particular restriction.1383
Deviation from the civilian standards of protection for free speech is based primarily on reasons
of national security,1384 maintenance of military discipline,1385 unit cohesion,1386 and troop
morale.1387 An assessment of whether a regulation violates the freedom of expression rights of
a member of the armed forces requires decision-makers “to take into account the special
conditions attaching to military life and the specific ‘duties’ and ‘responsibilities’ incumbent on
military personnel”.1388 Further, “in choosing to pursue a military career, members of the
armed forces have accepted of their own accord a system of military discipline and the
limitations of rights and freedoms implied by it”.1389 For example, military codes of justice often
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place limitations on combatants’ freedom of expression through the requirement of a uniform,
regulating hair styles and facial hair,1390 and even prohibiting soldiers in uniform from holding
hands in public.1391 These restrictions apply equally during peace and war.
Courts have required that certain standards must be met in order for a restriction on the free
speech of a military member to be legal. There must be a rational connection between the
purpose (e.g., “maintenance of discipline, efficiency and morale”) and the effects of rules
restricting free speech of members of the armed forces.1392 Canadian case law has found that
the “behaviour of members of the military relates to discipline, efficiency and morale even
when they are not on duty, in uniform, or on a military base.”1393 Actual harm to the military
mission or military environment is not always a required component of the offence.1394 Laws
restricting the free speech of military members must also “be formulated with sufficient
precision to enable the persons concerned – if need be with appropriate legal advice – to
foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given
action may entail.”1395 However, a law may still be “couched in very broad terms” and meet
these standards.1396
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Broadly worded regulations are common to military codes of discipline.1397 They have
repeatedly been deemed to satisfy requisite precision or clarity standards in American,
Canadian, and European case law.1398 For example, codes usually contain regulations
prohibiting “conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline”.1399 While broadly worded
offences still usually require a level of intent, courts have considered the language used and
surrounding circumstances to be demonstrative of an individual’s intent.1400 For example,
where language was deemed “disrespectful and abusive” under the circumstances of an
offence of insubordination, the court found this “prov[ed the accused’s] intention to
be insubordinate.”1401 Intent may also be irrelevant to the determination of innocence or guilt,
such as in the case of conduct that may discredit the armed forces.1402 However, case law
indicates that intent will still be relevant to sentencing or determining the appropriate
punishment for an offence regardless of the degree to which intent factors into determinations
of guilt.1403
Dehumanization has a demonstrated a link to violence towards civilians, even without any
specific level of hatred in either the statement-maker or the audience.1404 In peacetime, the
importance of free speech under international and domestic laws requires that government
ability to restrict speech be limited and that any legal restriction on the speech of ordinary
citizens be subject to high thresholds of intention.1405 The severity and extreme stigmatization
1397
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associated with international crimes of incitement to genocide and persecution as a crime
against humanity similarly justify exacting thresholds of mens rea. However, in the context of
armed conflict, the international community has demonstrated a desire to protect civilians
under IHL as much as possible without excessively inhibiting militarily necessary methods and
means of warfare.1406 The failure under IHL and international human rights law to address
forms of speech less extreme than hate speech, incitement to genocide, or persecution as a
crime against humanity creates a clear gap. This gap permits the use of demeaning, degrading,
or dehumanizing speech by combatants during armed conflict, which can facilitate the
commission of IHL violations against civilians – the very type of violations that the international
community clearly seeks to prevent.
The specific context of armed conflict is recognized under international law as a situation in
which state obligations to protect the right to free speech may be derogated from for all
citizens.1407 This means that speech that would be protected during peacetime may legally be
restricted during armed conflict.1408 Courts in Canada, the European Union, and United States
have recognized that, in both peace and war contexts, militaries are entitled to restrict the free
speech rights of their combatants to a greater degree than a state may restrict the speech of
civilians.1409 Further, the ability to legally restrict the free speech rights of combatants is
generally believed to be even greater during an active conflict than during peace.1410 The need
for discipline, cohesion, morale, and security among combatants is heightened during an armed
conflict. In addition to posing a threat to civilians, the use of racist language has the potential to
“corrode the morale and internal cohesion of a [military] unit.”1411 Strong internal discipline
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systems, as discussed in chapter 3,1412 are the primary indicator that an armed group possesses
a sufficient degree of organization to fulfill obligations under IHL and to be an official party to
an armed conflict. Internal disciplinary systems are therefore an important source of IHL
implementation within armed groups.1413 The erosion of fidelity to the laws of war through the
use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward civilians during armed conflict
is both inimical to the aims of IHL to protect and manage risk to civilians during conflict as well
as to the discipline essential for the functioning of armed forces and armed groups. This not
only establishes the need to regulate these forms of speech by combatants during armed
conflict, it also provides legal justification for these limitations.
Legal regulation has the power to shift and change existing norms among combatants that
currently contribute to the dehumanization and denigration of civilians during armed conflict.
However, this regulation must be clear and must be known to the members of the community
in which behaviours are sought to be changed. Existing IHL does not provide this clarity.
However, IHL could become a force for positive norm creation through the adoption of a rule
prohibiting the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language to describe, refer to, or
address protected persons.
8.2.5 A New International Humanitarian Law Rule to Regulate the Use of Demeaning,
Degrading, or Dehumanizing Language
Given that neither IHL nor international human rights law currently address all the forms of
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language that contribute to violence toward civilians
there is a need for a new IHL rule regulating these forms of speech. A new IHL rule regulating
the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language by combatants toward civilians
should include and/or address five key components: (1) an inclusive definition of ‘demeaning,
degrading, or dehumanizing language’; (2) the use of euphemistic language; (3) the use of the
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term ‘enemy’ to refer to civilians; (4) a level of intent; and, (5) no requirement for a specific
result or outcome. This section will discuss each of these components in turn.
The first necessary component for a new IHL rule regulating the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language is an inclusive definition of ‘demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing
language’. An inclusive definition will allow for possible broader interpretation and application
of the rule by parties to a conflict while not allowing for an interpretation of the rule that is
narrower than the specific elements included in the definition. This will protect the elements of
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language, the prohibition of which is currently
necessary for civilian protection, but leave room for substantive development of the rule in the
future. The term ‘demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language’ should capture many forms
of dangerous speech, including all the examples provided in subsections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 above,
such as discriminatory or racist speech, the use of negative stereotypes, and other language that
serves to cast civilians as a threat, as inferior, or as not worthy of respect or protection.
In addition to language provided in the preceding paragraph, a second component that should be
included in a new IHL rule regulating the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing
language is the inclusion of euphemistic language when it has the effect of demeaning,
degrading, or dehumanizing civilians. The use of euphemistic language can have an equally
powerful effect on people as explicit language demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing
civilians.1414 Although phrases such as “taking out the trash”1415 or “pulling up weeds”1416 may
have innocuous meanings in certain contexts, where used to refer euphemistically to civilians,
phrases such as these must be captured by an IHL rule regulating the use of demeaning,
degrading, or dehumanizing language in order to prevent or inhibit the use of dehumanization of
civilians by combatants to reframe their conceptions of right and wrong and the contribution to
violence toward civilians that stems from this reframing.
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The third necessary component of a new IHL rule regulating demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language is the inclusion of a prohibition on using the term ‘enemy’ to refer to a
civilian or the civilian population. This is important because combatants are trained to kill the
enemy and IHL permits combatants to kill enemy combatants. Reference to civilians as the
‘enemy’ debases the protected status of civilian life and physical integrity by placing the civilian
in the category of permissible target of violence permitted under IHL. The new rule should,
however, include a defence of honest and reasonable mistake as to the identity or status of a
specific civilian. In a NIAC, combatants are not always easily distinguished from civilians and a
combatant should not be disciplined where there is no intent to place a protected civilian in the
category of permissible target. An ‘honest mistake’ is a commonly accepted defence to
regulatory offences and some criminal offences in certain countries.1417 It is a well-accepted
principle of criminal law that a person should not be punished without some amount of moral
blameworthiness.1418 Further, there is no necessity for the use of the label ‘enemy’ with regards
to protected persons in armed conflict: violence is meant to be kept between parties to the
conflict and civilians, provided they are not actively or directly participating in hostilities, may
never legally be directly targeted.1419 Consequently, there is no legitimate reason to allow such
behaviour among combatants.
The fourth necessary component of an IHL rule regulating the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language by combatants should address the level of intent for the offence. The
IHL offence should require an intent to demean, degrade, or dehumanize a protected civilian or
the civilian population on the part of the combatant accused of violating the prohibition. This
level of intent differs from domestic hate speech laws which require that the speaker intend to
promote, advocate, or incite hatred. This must be done in order to capture the forms of speech
that can manipulate the psyche of combatants and debase civilians in a manner that facilitates
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acts of violence towards them. An intent to demean, degrade, or dehumanize a civilian or the
civilian population directly links the level of intent to the harm the regulation seeks to prevent.
The specific harm that needs to be prevented in armed conflict is the debasement of civilians in
the minds of combatants that facilitates violence toward civilians. In armed conflict it is the
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language itself that that contributes to harm against
civilians, not the animating emotion behind the speech.1420 Racism, discrimination, and
otherization of groups that leads to the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language
can be motivated by many different things including fear, the need to belong, projection of one’s
own negative feelings onto others, and emotional incompetence, that is, a failure to “understand[]
the origins of the negative emotions which, like all of [one’s] emotions, deserve respect and care
as they are important to [one’s] sense of self.”1421 An intent requirement which rests on an
intention to provoke a single specific emotion, i.e. hatred, such as in domestic hate speech laws,
is inadequate to capture many instances of dangerous speech during armed conflict. The unique
context of armed conflict and combatants has been recognized as one in which greater restriction
of speech rights is legally permitted and accepted.1422 However, combatants nonetheless retain
free speech rights.1423 Consequently, intent must remain a component of the IHL offence in order
to balance the protection of civilians with the protection of combatants’ speech rights. The
standard of intent to demean, degrade, or dehumanize a protected civilian or the civilian
population is consistent with other existing military offences that restrict speech, such as
insubordination where it must be established that the combatant “inten[ded] to
be insubordinate.”1424 Since racist language could and has been punished in national armed
forces as conduct to the “prejudice of good order and discipline”,1425 which is often, if not
1420
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always, a strict liability offence,1426 requiring an intent to demean, degrade, or dehumanize a
civilian during an armed conflict would, in practice, provide a higher level of intent requirement
for the regulation proposed in this thesis.
The fifth component necessary for an IHL rule regulating the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language by combatants is that the offence should require that the demeaning,
degrading, or dehumanizing language used by a combatant have the effect of debasing a civilian
or the civilian population in the eyes of the audience. This is another important difference
between the necessary components of the IHL offence and the common requirements of
domestic hate speech laws. Domestic hate speech laws seek to prevent discriminatory violence
and, therefore, in order to contravene hate speech laws, the speech must result in hatred or
violence toward the target of the hate speech. By contrast, the harm sought to be prevented with
an IHL rule regulating the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech by combatants
is the debasement of civilians in the minds of combatants. The debasement of civilians can
produce increasing levels of dehumanization in the minds of combatants over time,1427 making it
difficult to alter patterns of violence that begin downstream. This is why it is the debasement of
civilians that is the harm which must be prevented and why it must be prevented early on. The
assessment of whether speech has the effect of debasing a civilian or the civilian population in
the eyes of the audience should be based on a reasonable person standard: would a reasonable
person consider the speech to demean, degrade, or dehumanize a civilian or the civilian
population. One reason a reasonable person standard should be used is due to the difficulty of
determining whether debasement has occurred in the mind of a specific audience member prior
to the escalation of the effects of such language which results in physical violence toward a
civilian. The use of a reasonableness standard to evaluate the conduct of combatants is common
accepted practice among many national armed forces.1428
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Armed conflict is meant to be between parties to the conflict and while civilians and other
protected persons may indirectly suffer from the conflict, there is no legitimate reason to allow
for the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language to describe, refer to, or address
such persons. This section has proposed a new IHL rule to regulate the use of demeaning,
degrading, or dehumanizing speech by combatants. In order to effectively inhibit the effects of
dehumanization on combatants which contribute to violence toward civilians, this new IHL rules
must include five components. First, the definition of ‘demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing
language’ should be inclusive, but not exhaustive. Second, the rule should include a prohibition
on the use of euphemistic language where it has the effect of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing a civilian or the civilian population. Third, the rule should include a prohibition on
referring to a civilian or the civilian population as the ‘enemy’; however, this component should
include a defense of reasonable mistake. Fourth, the offence should require an intent on the part
of the speaker to demean, degrade, or dehumanize a civilian or the civilian population. Finally,
the rule should require, based on a reasonableness standard, that the speech have the effect of
debasing a civilian or the civilian population in the mind of the audience. Together, these five
components will provide an IHL rule that balances the protection of civilians with the speech
rights of combatants, while still having the capacity to inhibit the ability of dehumanization to
contribute to violence toward civilians during armed conflict.

8.3 Deindividuation, Depersonalization, and Displacement of Responsibility
This section will examine the need for a new IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames by
combatants. It will provide a brief review of the effects and risks of deindividuation,
depersonalization, and the displacement of responsibility. It will provide evidence of the use of
nicknames by combatants in Sierra Leone and the DRC, which can serve to create a sense of
anonymity among combatants as well as be a means of creating a separate identity that assumes
responsibility for acts of violence committed by combatants. This section will examine whether
the use of nicknames is already addressed by existing rules of IHL. It will also discuss whether
existing international human rights law, specifically the right to free speech already discussed in
the context of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech, may actually protect the use of
nicknames in armed conflict, thereby preventing its regulation. Finally, this section will propose
a new IHL rule regulating the use nicknames by combatants in armed conflict.
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8.3.1 The Effect of Nicknames in Armed Conflict
The theory of deindividuation demonstrates that the submergence of an individual in a group
can decrease private self-awareness leading to an impairment of that individual’s ability to selfregulate their behaviour.1429 In a state of deindividuation, “people may be aware of what they
are doing but have a reduced expectation of suffering any negative consequences.”1430 This is
accompanied by a reduced ability to consider long-term consequences and an increased
susceptibility to the influences of immediate stimuli, emotions, and motivations.1431 The desire
to conform to and be accepted by a group also influence an individual submerged in a
group.1432 Anonymity can contribute to diffusion of responsibility.1433 Zimbardo has stated that
“anything that makes a person feel anonymous … creates the potential for that person to act in
evil ways – if the situation gives permission for violence.”1434 A link between anonymity and
antisocial behaviour has been found in social psychology experiments.1435 Contexts in which
“threats of punishment are a major source of inhibition” for individuals, contexts in which
individuals sport a costume that conveys an implicit message, and contexts in which group
members are similar in appearance can all enhance an individual’s sense of anonymity and tend
to increase disinhibited behaviour.1436 All three of these contexts exist within an armed group.
First, internal disciplinary systems seek to enforce compliance through coercion and
punishment. Second, the uniform of a combatant or soldier implicitly conveys power and
violence.1437 Third, a group in which combatant or soldier wears the same uniform contributes
to an outwardly similar appearance. Thus, all three contexts that can increase disinhibited
behaviour are often present among armed groups.
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In addition to the effects of a state of deindividuation, the core theories of techniques of
neutralization, moral disengagement, and obedience to authority demonstrate that factors which
serve to decrease an individual’s sense of responsibility, or that allow an individual to attribute
responsibility for their own actions to another actor, will facilitate their ability to participate in
crimes.1438 Indeed, these theorists have shown that “[p]eople behave more cruelly under group
responsibility than when they hold themselves personally accountable for their actions.”1439
Further, where a diffused sense of responsibility is combined with the use of dehumanization,
this has been shown to significantly increase the degree of punitiveness expressed by
individuals.1440 Thus, factors which contribute to individuals’ ability to distance themselves from
feeling personally responsible for their actions, including acts that cause another person to suffer,
can facilitate their participation in atrocity crimes.
There are two factors inherent in the organization and function of armed groups that contribute to
deindividuation and an individual’s ability to separate themselves from a sense of responsibility.
First and foremost, an armed group is a group, therefore the potential for deindividuation is
inherent in the existence of an armed group. Since the existence of these groups is an accepted
reality of non-international armed conflict, a certain amount of deindividuation is both likely and
unavoidable. Second, armed groups will often, where possible, wear uniforms or some sort of
other identifying feature.1441 They may do this for reasons similar to those as regular armed
forces: “[i]dentification, obedience, comradeship and a display of strength” or as a means to
“gain respectability”.1442 Even where members of an armed group do not have the resources to
afford or acquire uniforms, they will often attempt to have a common identifying feature among
the group.1443 For example, a witness in the Bosco Ntaganda case at the International Criminal
Court (ICC) stated,
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They did wear something to identify them. Some put on
leaves around their arms, others around their necks. It was a
something, a sign to identify them so people would know that
they were defending the village in the case of war, to help. So
they did wear something to identify themselves. They had
leaves around their arm or their necks, or sometimes they had
fabric of a -- of a particular colour. They did have ways of
identifying themselves.1444
Similarly, in Sierra Leone, a former RUF combatant recalled
Our group was called Born Naked because of our hardness,
and when we fought we took off our shirts and tied them
around our waists or wore them inside out. We also did this
to recognize each other because at that time both rebels and
soldiers could be wearing combat uniforms.1445
Sometimes armed groups will choose not to wear uniforms, trying to disguise themselves as
civilians, or wear the stolen uniforms of enemy combatants, trying to have their violent acts
attributed to the enemy.1446 A uniform has long been the primary means for parties to an
international armed conflict to fulfill the IHL requirement to wear a “fixed, distinctive sign
visible at a distance”.1447 From a civilian protection perspective, uniforms or another form of
“fixed, distinctive sign visible at a distance” should also be worn by parties to NIACs to facilitate
combatants’ task of distinguishing between non-targetable civilians and legally targetable
combatants.1448 This is so even though a uniform is not a requirement for an armed group to be
considered a party to a NIAC.1449 The use of uniforms or other common identifying mark serves
two very important functions during armed conflict. First, as a matter of military utility, uniforms
allow combatants to distinguish between members of their own armed group and enemy
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combatants, thereby fulfilling a tactical or strategic function.1450 Second, uniforms are extremely
important for reducing accidental civilian casualties, as a uniform can serve to distinguish
combatants from civilians.1451 Although uniforms are not explicitly required under the law of
NIACs, some distinguishing feature, such as a uniform, is an implicit legal requirement in
NIACs by virtue of the principle of distinction that, as a rule of customary IHL, binds all parties
to an armed conflict.1452 Consequently, even though they may contribute to deindividuation,
uniforms are an essential feature of civilian protection during armed conflict. Unless an
alternative means of fulfilling the legal requirement of distinction can be found, a prohibition or
restriction on the use of uniforms would be counter to the aim of civilian protection during
conflict.
The use of nicknames can contribute to deindividuation, in particular through the creation of a
sense of anonymity, depersonalization, and distancing the individual from a sense of
responsibility for their actions. This is because the use of the nickname can allow individuals to
separate their identity, facilitating depersonalization and disassociation from their actions
committed under the second identity. This is best described through the concept of doubling.1453
This is a form of disassociation by which an individual develops a “second self”.1454 The
individual and their second self “operate autonomously, allowing the participant to function in
the two irreconcilable worlds of the ‘normal’ and the genocidal.”1455 Doubling has been used to
explain apartheid era violence in South Africa.1456 Smeulers has referenced doubling more
generally to explain the type of process perpetrators use to “try to cope with their own roles [in
violence]”.1457 Preston has made a connection between doubling and the experiences of some
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Ugandan child soldiers trying to reconcile their civilian and their rebel identities.1458 Doubling
was first used to explain how Nazi doctors participated in the killing of patients:
Doubling involved the formation of an Auschwitz self, by
which one internalized many of the patterns and assumptions
of the Auschwitz environment: the reversals of healing and
killing, the operative Nazi biomedical vision, the extreme
numbing that rendered killing no longer killing, struggles
with omnipotence (deciding who would live or die) and
impotence (being a cog in a powerful machine), maintaining
a medical identity while killing, and somehow finding
meaning in the environment.1459
The use of nicknames by combatants can fulfill a similar function. This makes the choice of
nicknames particularly meaningful, as often combatant nicknames represent an idealized vision
of the self as a hero or allude to particularly violent identities or characters. A heroic identity
could give a combatant a sense of righteous purpose that justifies all of their acts, while a violent
identity can help propel a combatant to acts of violence. Zimbardo notes that CIA officers
operating at Abu Ghraib prison, which became notorious when reports revealed egregious
violations of IHL toward detainees,1460 only used aliases and never their true names.1461
Therefore, it is not merely physical appearances changes, such as the use of a uniform or war
paint,1462 that contribute to a separate ‘combatant identity’, but also the use of nicknames.
8.3.2 Examples of the Use of Nicknames by Combatants in Sierra Leone and the DRC
The previous section discussed the general effects of deindividuation, depersonalization, and
displacement of diffusion of responsibility on combatant psyches and how nicknames in
particular can affect the psychology of combatants. This section will provide more detailed
examples of the use of nicknames by combatants in Sierra Leone and the DRC.

1458

Justin M Preston, “‘If They Abduct You, You Don’t Come Back’: Understanding Ugandan Former Child
Soldiers in the Context of Their Life” (2015) 21:3 Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 432 at 438, 441.
1459
Lifton & Markusen, supra note 1453 at 106. See also; Lifton, supra note 22.
1460
Seymour M Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib”, (30 April 2004), online: The New Yorker
<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib>. See also; David P Forsythe, “The
United States and International Humanitarian Law” (2008) 7:1 Journal of Human Rights 25 at 30–32; CNN, “Iraq
Prison Abuse Scandal Fast Facts - CNN”, (4 March 2019), online: CNN
<https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scandal-fast-facts/index.html>.
1461
Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 394.
1462
See, e.g., ibid at 303–305; RJ Watson, “Investigation into Deindividuation Using a Cross-Cultural Survey
Technique” (1973) 25 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 342.

268
One element that appeared repeatedly in the research and fieldwork interviews and data
collection conducted for this thesis: the use of nicknames by combatants in both the Sierra Leone
and DRC case studies. Many of the victim, witness, and perpetrator statements collected from
the archives of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission contained reference to
nicknames.1463 However, in-person interviewees in Sierra Leone and the DRC did not reference
nicknames during our conversations, with one exception. One interviewee in the DRC revealed
his nickname had been ‘Jack Bauer’, after the lead character on the television series ‘24’, when
he showed me his demobilization card that had been issued under the name ‘Jack Bauer’ rather
than his actual name.1464 Indeed, ‘Jack Bauer’ was an extremely common nickname among
combatants in Eastern Congo.1465 The use of nicknames in both Sierra Leone and Eastern Congo
has been documented in case law,1466 the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Report,1467 UN Reports,1468 and academic literature.1469
As noted in the preceding section, the use of nicknames by combatants can be particularly
problematic where they evoke heroic or violent separate identities. The widespread use of the
nickname ‘Jack Bauer’ in the DRC created an identity that was able to righteously protect the
country.1470 Violent nicknames in the DRC and Sierra Leone have included ‘First Blood’,1471
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‘Kill man no blood’,1472 ‘Rambo’,1473 and ‘Terminator’.1474 One Sierra Leonean woman is
recorded as saying
When we were with the rebels we saw them capture and kill a
lot of people. We also saw women raped in front of us. I saw
everything. I don’t know the real names of any of the rebels,
only their nicknames. One was called The Killer and another
was Cobra.1475
This quote demonstrates not only the prevalent use of nicknames in conjunction with IHL
violations, but also the extent to which these nicknames could allow combatants to be
anonymous: to the point where possibly no one knows their real name.
Other examples of heroic or aspirational nicknames include the common use of “Superman” in
Sierra Leone or names of sports heroes such as “Gullit” used by senior AFRC commander Alex
Tamba Brima, subsequently convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Special
Court for Sierra Leone.1476 Other extremely violent nicknames include “Hitler”,1477 “‘Blood
Never Dry,’ ‘Laughing and Killing,’ [and] ‘The Castrator’”.1478 Another common nickname in
the DRC has been “Bruce Lee”, a name which, like other names drawn by combatants from
American wrestling programs or action films, evoke images and identities of people who are
“virile men, who are self-confident, in control of everything, energetic and dynamic. They
control their health and are able to confront any physical danger; in a word, they are
invincible.”1479 Vermeij has noted that “nicknames dissociate[] [people] from the violence they
carry out and makes it possible for them to function as killing machines without remorse”.1480
One Jack Bauer in Eastern Congo stated, “‘When this ideology of Jack Bauer comes to me it’s
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like taking drugs…I have no fear.’”1481 Thus, the use of nicknames allows combatants to create a
separate identity under which they can participate in acts of violence without jeopardizing, or at
least minimizing negative effects on, their sense of self.
8.3.3 The Use of Nicknames under Existing International Humanitarian Law
Existing IHL does not explicitly address the use of nicknames by combatants nor is it addressed
implicitly under existing rules. In fact, the use of nicknames is a widespread, common historical
and contemporary practice among armed groups and national armed forces in various areas of
the world.1482 There are two likely explanations for why nicknames are not addressed by IHL.
First, IHL prohibitions in NIACs are generally aimed at the protection of persons outside the
armed group, that is, civilians, other protected persons, and, to a more limited extent, enemy
combatants. Thus, as discussed in the preceding section, IHL is more likely to regulate language
directed at civilians and other protected persons rather than focus on how combatants within an
armed group treat each other. Second, the use of nicknames is likely not addressed in IHL
because nicknames generally appear innocuous, unless they are deemed to constitute verbal
abuse or bullying.1483 Finally, as a form of speech, any regulation or restriction of the use of
nicknames must be evaluated in light of the protections for free speech discussed earlier in this
chapter. Existing IHL is aimed at addressing acts against civilians that are likely to cause
physical or mental pain or suffering.1484 Most IHL prohibitions and regulations for civilian
protection address acts that have a close proximal relationship to the pain or suffering of a
civilian, such as direct acts of torture and cruel treatment or the physical conditions in which
detainees are kept.1485 However, there are IHL provisions that seek to protect civilians indirectly.
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For example, rules requiring particular care to be taken with installations, such as dams or
nuclear electrical facilities,1486 and prohibiting attacks on “objects indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population” are rules for the protection for civilians that prohibit acts that do not
have the same physical proximity to civilian harm as acts such as torture.1487 The effects of
nicknames on combatants that contribute to IHL violations against civilians, such as the
production of a sense of anonymity1488 and doubling,1489 are less obvious because they are
psychological as opposed to physical. Without an understanding of the possible psychological
effects of nicknames on combatants, the common use of nicknames can seem innocuous.
Decision makers may focus on the more immediately apparent positive effects of the use of
nicknames. The use of nicknames may not only be viewed as innocuous but can be considered to
sometimes be a positive tool for “social cohesion”,1490 or for “solidarity, friendship and
affection”,1491 or may be viewed as merely being humorous.1492 Nicknames may facilitate or
enhance camaraderie and team esprit de corps within military units.1493 Group cohesiveness is
extremely important in armed groups and contributes to fostering the feeling of accountability
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among fellow combatants.1494 Group cohesiveness and morale can have a positive effect on a
unit’s operational effectiveness.1495 However, while group cohesiveness is important for the
successful execution of military operations, there is nothing to suggest that the use of nicknames
to aid in fostering this cohesiveness is necessary to produce group cohesion.1496 Further, there are
many effective alternatives for building team cohesion such as team sports.1497
8.3.4 The Use of Nicknames under International Human Rights Law
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the use of nicknames by combatants is not captured
by existing IHL rules and prohibitions. In actuality, the use of nicknames is generally seen by
members of armed forces as playing a positive role in fostering camaraderie and cohesiveness
within military units.1498 However, social psychology and criminology theories indicate that
underneath this seemingly innocuous and useful façade, the use of nicknames can contribute to
an individual’s commission of violent acts towards civilians.1499 IHL seeks to minimize the
adverse effects of war on civilians,1500 therefore, regulation of behaviour that contributes to
violence against civilians would be consistent with this objective. Although existing IHL does
not address the subject of nickname use by combatants, it is relevant to consider whether
international human rights law applicable during armed conflict already captures the use of
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nicknames or whether it prohibits restriction on the use of nicknames. If the issue is already
covered by international human rights law, then a new rule of IHL would likely be unnecessary.
If a restriction on the use of nicknames is prohibited under international human rights law this
may affect how a new IHL rule is structured. This section will examine whether international
human rights law regulates or protects the use of nicknames during armed conflict.
The use of nicknames is not explicitly addressed under international human rights law. If
anything, rather than restrict their use, international human rights law may protect their use under
the right to freedom of expression. As discussed earlier in this chapter, freedom of expression is
intended to protect an individual’s right to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds…either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of a
person’s choice”.1501 Freedom of expression has been deemed to include less obvious forms of
expression such as one’s manner of dress.1502 A nickname can be used to communicate
something about the person who goes by that nickname. For example, a combatant nicknamed
“Cobra” may be someone who is stealthy and lethal like a snake.1503 However, not all behaviour
is protected by freedom of expression: free speech rights are not absolute and may be lawfully
regulated by governments in particular during armed conflict,1504 and militaries may place
greater restrictions on the free speech rights of members of the armed forces than they would
otherwise legally be able to place on the free speech rights of civilians.1505
The use of a nickname may be punished where it breaches other laws, for example, nicknames
dealing with hate speech, defamation, discrimination in the United Kingdom1506 or nicknames or
alias used to commit a crime in Canadian criminal law.1507 This means that, even if nicknames
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are protected, their use may still be legally restricted for other necessary purposes such as the
protection of others from discriminatory hatred and violence or to impede crimes of fraud. Many
states also regulate names by restricting the names parents may give their child, or the names to
which adults may voluntarily change. For example, parents in Denmark may choose their child’s
name from a list of 7,000 names or apply for special permission to use a name not listed.1508 The
Danish law also requires that the “name must show the gender of the child and not be
unusual.”1509 Meanwhile adults in the United States may not legally change their name to one
that is considered obscene, a racial slur, or which contains symbols or numerals.1510 Informal
name changes such as going by a nickname, as opposed to official legal changes, are less strictly
regulated. In many common law jurisdictions, individuals may easily choose to informally be
known by a different name. In these jurisdictions “people have a right under common law to be
officially recognized by whatever name they ordinarily use”;1511 it is simply a matter of choosing
a name and using it.1512 Name changes in this manner are often a common occurrence. For
example, someone legally named Edward may go by Ed, Eddie, Ted, or Ned.
Nicknames are therefore neither fully protected nor truly prohibited under international human
rights law and many domestic legal systems. Certainly, it is clear that they may legally be subject
to restrictions and regulations. Existing restrictions focus on the protection of other rights and the
promotion of other social goods, such as the protection of best interest of the child, the
prevention of hate speech or racial discrimination, and to avoid their use to escape accountability
for the commission of crimes. However, no existing rules would appear to address their common
colloquial usage among colleagues in the armed forces or in armed groups. Consequently, the

Canadian Criminal Code, supra note 1333 at Section 362 (false pretense), Section 380 (fraud), Section 402.2
(identity theft).
1508
“The Strict Name Laws of Denmark - WorldAtlas.com”, (20 November 2017), online: World Atlas
<https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-strict-name-laws-of-denmark.html>.
1509
Ibid.
1510
“Are There Legal Name Change Restrictions?”, online: <http://www.lawprofessor.com/are-there-legal-namechange-restrictions/>.
1511
Eric Andrew-Gee, “Why and how Ontarians change their names in the 21st century”, (12 November 2017),
online: The Globe and Mail <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/why-and-how-ontarians-changetheir-names-in-the-21stcentury/article31799805/>.
1512
Ibid; “Change of Name”, online: Women and the Law in Alberta <https://www.lawforalbertawomen.ca/womenand-marital-status/change-of-name/>; “Common-Law Name Change”, (2010), online:
<http://myfamilylaw.com/library/common-law-name-change/?more=yes>; Israel Merolevitz & others, petitioners, ;
Lindon v First National Bank, ; Christianson v King County, .

275
application of international human rights law in armed conflicts does not currently address the
problem of the use of nicknames contributing to deindividuation, depersonalization, and the
displacement of responsibility, which in turn can facilitate the commission of and participation in
crimes against civilians. International human rights law does, however, protect free speech and
expression, which includes the use of nicknames. The next section will advocate for a new
regulation on the use of nicknames within armed groups that could limit these deleterious
outcomes and will consider whether the restriction proposed would be a legal limit on free
speech.
8.3.5 Regulation of Nicknames in a Military Context
A new IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames by combatants during armed conflict is needed
to prevent the psychological effects of nickname use that can contribute to the perpetration of
violence toward civilians. Section 8.1 demonstrated the power of law to change behaviour by
shaping what an individual sees as a positive behaviour by indicating social approval of certain
behaviours and social disapproval of other behaviours.1513 Further, law is commonly used to
regulate risky or dangerous behaviours.1514 Behaviours that are socially acceptable, such as not
wearing a seatbelt, have been dramatically changed through the use of legal regulation.1515 The
regulation of risk regulation is inherent to IHL, which seeks to limit the risks to civilians during
armed conflict.1516 Consequently, the regulation of the risk posed to civilians through combatant
use of nicknames is logical and consistent with IHL efforts to limit risks to civilians during
conflict. Further, a law is needed to clearly express disapproval of the adverse effects of
nickname use in conflict in an effort to alter combatant behaviour by inhibiting the reframing of
combatant decision-making.
Section 8.3.1 demonstrated the effects deindividuation, including anonymity, depersonalization,
diffusion of responsibility, and doubling can have on combatants which contribute to combatant
violence toward civilians. The effects of these psychological processes have been linked to

1513

See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 871 at 2034–35; Nadler, supra note 977 at 63; Cooter, supra note 1229 at 7–8.
See, e.g., Nadler, supra note 977 at 67–68; Geisinger, supra note 1224 at 41, 63; Sunstein, supra note 871 at
2024, 2052.
1515
See, e.g., McDermott & Hough, supra note 1244; Ontario Ministry of Transportation, supra note 1244.
1516
See, e.g., ICTY Kupreskic Trial Judgment, supra note 125 at para 521.
1514

276
increased aggression generally1517 as well as specifically to the perpetration of violence toward
civilians during conflict.1518 The effects of deindividuation and the use of diffusion of
responsibility and doubling result in a reframing of the manner in which combatants evaluate
right and wrong and make decisions about courses of action.1519 When a combatant is operating
under the effects of these psychological processes, they no longer view their behaviour in the
same manner they did in peacetime when they followed the law.1520 The effects of these
processes must be inhibited in order to prevent their contribution to the perpetration of violence
against civilians. The inhibition of these processes will also render the work of organizations
which engage with armed groups, such as the ICRC, easier because, assuming compliance with
the new law, they will not have to undo this harmful reframing before being able to effectively
engage armed actors.
The enhanced risk produced by the use of nicknames, in particular heroic or violent nicknames,
is captured by the earlier quote from one Congolese combatant: “‘When this ideology of Jack
Bauer comes to me it’s like taking drugs…I have no fear.’”1521 An absence of fear or remorse, as
well as a sense of invincibility,1522 eliminates considerations of responsibility for one’s actions
during conflict and renders the combatant a threat to civilians and a threat to the internal
discipline of the armed group or armed forces due to the potential for illegal violence toward
civilians. When the power of nicknames to contribute to violence against civilians is understood,
it becomes unsurprising that all new members of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, known for
targeting civilians, assume a new name upon joining the organization.1523 This thesis
recommends that a new IHL rule be adopted and implemented to regulate the use of
anonymizing nicknames that help combatants eliminate feelings of fear and remorse and produce
a feeling of invincibility among combatants in armed conflict. This new rule would decrease the
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risk of crimes against civilians during armed conflict by inhibiting a source of deindividuation,
doubling, and displacement of responsibility that contribute to increased violence. This is
because it would impede a combatant’s ability to create a separate or alternative identity under
which they could commit these crimes anonymously without facing the same self-sanction they
would otherwise be likely to feel. In addition, much like the effects of dehumanization, the
effects of deindividuation, disassociation, and doubling can intensify over time,1524 which makes
it important to capture and prevent the use of nicknames at the earliest point possible. The
capture of nicknames upstream is important to prevent the reframing of combatant psyches
before this leads to direct violence against civilians.
In addition to decreasing the risk of violence toward civilians, the reasonable restriction of
behaviour contributing to violence towards civilians can protect combatants from the significant
post-conflict psychological costs associated with harm to civilians and/or prisoners during armed
conflict.1525 This provides additional support for the regulation of the use of nicknames that
provide a sense of invincibility and absence of responsibility for both the maintenance of
discipline critical for military operations during an armed conflict and for the protection of
civilians that is integral to IHL.
Section 8.3.3 demonstrated that nicknames are not currently regulated by IHL. Furthermore, the
use of nicknames does not serve an essential military purpose. While nicknames may contribute
to the development of unit cohesion and morale,1526 there are other ways of producing cohesion
and morale, such as through team building exercises and team sports.1527 Additionally, basic
military training in itself is considered one of the primary tools for fostering cohesion and
bonding among recruits.1528 Unit cohesion may be an important source of operational
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effectiveness,1529 but nicknames are not a necessary component of the production of group
cohesion.
Section 8.3.4 demonstrated that international human rights law does not regulate the use of
nicknames during armed conflict. That section also demonstrated that the use of names and
nicknames can and is legally regulated under different domestic legal systems.1530 Therefore,
although international human rights law does not provide helpful regulation of the use of
nicknames during conflict, it also does not inhibit the regulation of nicknames based on the
protection of human rights, such as freedom of expression.
In addition to providing protection for civilians under IHL, a new rule regulating the use of
nicknames could help improve accountability both at the military justice or internal disciplinary
level as well as under international and domestic criminal law and other accountability
mechanisms, such as truth commissions. The regulation of nicknames could inherently do this by
eliminating, in as much as possible, the likelihood that a combatant’s true identity could be
unknown to others in an armed group. Nicknames can pose practical difficulties for seeking
accountability for IHL violations under various mechanisms.1531 The use of nicknames can
complicate or impede the ability of investigators and prosecutors to identify those responsible for
violations and bring them to account for their actions. This is because a combatant’s true identity
- their legal name - may be well masked by the use of a nickname. This is demonstrated by a
victim in the Sierra Leone Civil War, who stated, “I don’t know the real names of any of the
rebels, only their nicknames.”1532 Also, when many individuals use the same nickname, such as
‘’Jack Bauer’, it may be difficult to link a specific Jack Bauer to the specific violations being
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investigated. This difficulty can be addressed in some cases by issuing arrest warrants and
indictments listing all known names and aliases of a suspect. This was frequently done at the
Special Court for Sierra Leone.1533 In spite of this, identity was an issue in some of this cases,
such as that of Alex Tamba Brima, who denied having the nickname ‘Gullit’.1534 It will often be
possible to link nicknames to specific individuals when they are well-known, high-level
perpetrators and officers; however, it is difficult to do so for lower ranking combatants. This was
noted by the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which mentioned on more than
one occasion the inability to identify an individual’s real name due to the use of nicknames.1535
Thus, addressing the use of nicknames in IHL could have additional benefits for criminal law
and other forms of accountability for perpetrators of crimes against civilians.
8.3.5.i A New Rule of International Humanitarian Law to Address the Use of
Nicknames by Combatants
A new IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames by combatants needs three components: (1) a
requirement that combatants be known by their first name or surname; (2) an exception for
diminutive and derivative nicknames; and, (3) a recordkeeping requirement. This section will
discuss each of these components in turn.
The first necessary component to the regulation of nicknames under IHL is that the rule should
require combatants to be known by either their first name or surname. This would prevent
combatants from using nicknames to create a sense of anonymity, doubling, or to diffuse their
sense of responsibility for their actions. Consequently, this would prevent combatants from using
these psychological mechanisms to reframe their decision-making during conflict.
The second necessary component of an IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames is the inclusion
of an exception to the strict requirement of using only first and last names that would allow
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combatants to be known by a derivative or diminutive form of either their first name or surname.
A rule regulating the use of nicknames must be balanced against the free speech rights of
combatants outlined in Section 8.2.4.iii above. Therefore, if a rule were to be developed to
regulate the use of nicknames by combatants, it must not be a blanket prohibition and any such
rule would need to allow for certain legitimate uses of nicknames. For example, a combatant
named Edward Jones could go by Ed, Ted, Eddie, or Jonesy. The preservation of the use of
derivative and diminutive nicknames among combatants would maintain a contribution to group
cohesion and the fostering of camaraderie. While there is nothing to suggest that a derivative or
diminutive nickname does not carry the risk of permitting a combatant to form a separate identity
under which they commit violent acts against civilians, the chances of doubling and diffusion of
responsibility is lessened due to the link between the combatant’s real identity and nickname. In
order to balance free speech protections with the IHL’s goal of protecting civilians,1536 only
nicknames that can anonymize the combatant or provide for a separate identity unrelated to their
real self should be regulated during armed conflict. Non-derivative or non-diminutive nicknames
fall into this category, in particular aspirational nicknames that portray the individual as a hero,
and violent nicknames that allow a combatant to create a particularly violent separate identity.
This was evident in the nicknames used by combatants carrying out severe IHL and IHRL
violations in the wars in Sierra Leone and the DRC, as outlined above.
The third component necessary for an IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames by combatants is
the requirement that records be kept of all combatants by both first and last name and, if
necessary, other identifiers. This would diminish the capacity of combatants to create a separate
identity for themselves as well as diminish the likelihood that a combatant’s true identity could
be unknown to others in an armed group. Ideally this requirement would be fulfilled through the
maintenance of a full roster of combatants, but the rule should allow this requirement to be
fulfilled through the use of full names in reports recording the activities of the unit.1537 This
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requirement to record the first and last names of combatants would not include a requirement to
be able to produce such records in any and all circumstances. Not all armed groups have the
resources to record and store this information in a manner that would protect them from damage
or destruction during armed conflict.1538 Nonetheless, the requirement to record the first and last
names of combatants would assist military commanders as well as other individuals such as
investigators, prosecutors, and truth commissioners, to conduct necessary work to ensure
accountability for IHL violations during armed conflicts.1539
In sum, this section has identified three key components that a new IHL rule regulating
anonymizing combatant nickname use should possess: (1) the requirement that combatants be
known by either their first or last name; (2) an exception to the rule that allows for the use of
derivative or diminutive forms of first or last names; and (3) the requirement to record the first
and last names of combatants. A new regulation on the use of non-derivative and non-diminutive
nicknames would balance free speech with the risk of harm posed to civilians by combatants
who use such nicknames to free themselves of the moral constraints that normally inhibit their
capacity to commit violent acts toward civilians.

8.4 Conclusion
This chapter has drawn on the insights gleaned from theories of techniques of neutralization,
moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority, in particular it has focused on
dehumanization, euphemistic language, deindividuation, anonymity, doubling, and the diffusion
of responsibility. These psychological processes have the power to debase civilians in the eyes of
combatants1540 and to alleviate combatants of a sense of responsibility for their violent actions
toward civilians.1541 As a result, processes such as dehumanization and diffusion of responsibility
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have been linked to violence committed against civilians in World War II,1542 the Vietnam
war,1543 the Rwandan genocide,1544 and the Iraq war in 2003.1545 This chapter further identified
dehumanization and displacement of responsibility in the contexts of the Sierra Leone civil war
and series of conflicts in the DRC. This chapter has discussed the manifestation of
dehumanization and displacement of responsibility – as demonstrated in Sierra Leone and the
DRC - through two forms of speech commonly used by combatants: (1) demeaning, degrading,
or dehumanizing language toward civilians, and (2) non-derivative or non-diminutive nicknames
used by combatants. The use of these forms of speech by combatants during armed conflict
drives the neutralization of, and disengagement from, social norms that would otherwise inhibit
violence toward civilians.1546 The effects of these forms of speech are particularly insidious and
dangerous to civilians and combatants during armed conflict because their effects generally build
over time until they result in extreme forms of violence that constitute IHL violations during
armed conflict.1547 The cumulative effect of these acts are extreme violations of IHL protections
for civilians such as assault, murder, torture, and outrages upon personal dignity.1548 This chapter
argues that there is a need to address demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward
civilians and non-derivative or non-diminutive nicknames, in particular heroic or violent
nicknames, used by combatants before they result in the reframing of combatant conceptions of
right and wrong and violent acts toward civilians. In addition to the established link between
dehumanization and diffusion of responsibility with respect to violence toward civilians,1549 this
chapter has grounded its argument in (1) the power of law to change behaviours; (2) civilian
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protection as the foundational concept of IHL; (3) the common use of law to regulate risk,
including the centrality of risk regulation for the protection of civilians in existing IHL; and (4)
the difference between free speech protection in peace and for civilians as compared to free
speech protection in war and for combatants.
Law plays an important role in altering human behaviour.1550 Behaviours that were once seen as
socially acceptable, such as the non-use of seatbelts,1551 can be drastically changed over time
through legal regulation. Education about the reasons for new regulation of previously accepted
behaviours or activities can enhance the effectiveness of behavioural change through law.1552
While some militaries regulate the use of offensive or racist speech,1553 it remains prevalent in
other militaries.1554 Furthermore, regulation of armed forces under domestic military law not
only varies between countries but also its application does not extend to armed groups or any
entity outside the national armed forces.1555 The use of nicknames, on the other hand, is not
currently subject to regulation and their harmful effects during armed conflict do not appear to be
common knowledge. Clear legal regulation of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language
toward civilians during armed conflict as well as nicknames could have a positive effect on
preventing or reducing the use of these practices to commit violent acts toward civilians during
conflict. Both the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language and the use of
nicknames must be captured upstream in order to ultimately prevent these behaviours from
allowing combatants to alter their psyches in a way that leads to direct violence toward civilians.
The prevention of direct violence toward civilians requires that behaviours which make a critical
1550

See section 8.1 in this chapter.
See, e.g., McDermott & Hough, supra note 1244; Ontario Ministry of Transportation, supra note 1244; Wittlin,
supra note 1224.
1552
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 871 at 2034–35; Nadler, supra note 977 at 64.
1553
See, e.g., R c Camiré JJN (Caporal-chef), supra note 1425; R v Rainville JCB (Master Warrant Officer), supra
note 1385; R v Dryngiewicz ZA (Corporal), supra note 1411; R v Booth BR (Private), supra note 1379.
1554
See, e.g., Shannon E French & Anthony I Jack, “Dehumanizing the Enemy: The Intersection of Neuroethics and
Military Ethic” in David Whetham & Bradley J Strawser, eds, Responsibilities to Protect Perspectives in Theory
and Practice (Leiden, NLD: Brill Nijhoff, 2015) at 188–90; Sebastian Junger, “We’re all guilty of dehumanizing the
enemy”, (13 January 2012), online: The Washington Post <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/were-allguilty-of-dehumanizing-theenemy/2012/01/13/gIQAtRduwP_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6699dad88171>; Lt Col Peter Fromm, Lt
Col Douglas Pryer & Ly Col Kevin Cutright, “The Myths We Soldiers Tell Ourselves (and the Harm These Myths
Do)” (2013) Military Review 57.
1555
See, e.g., Georg Nolte & Heike Krieger, “Comparison of European Military Law Systems” in Georg Nolte, ed,
European Military Law Systems (Berlin: De Gruyter Recht, 2003) at 130–75; Eugene R Fidell, “A World-Wide
Perspective on Change in Military Justice” (2000) 48 Armed Forces Law Review 195.
1551

284
alteration to combatant decision-making are inhibited before they can begin to change
combatants from ordinary individuals into law-breaking combatants.
As well, the argument for IHL regulation of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language
directed toward civilians and of non-derivative or non-diminutive nicknames used during
conflict finds support in the foundational aims of IHL. Civilian protection during war is the
“bedrock of modern humanitarian law.”1556 Protection of civilians from harm and the adverse
consequences and impacts of armed conflict not only undergirds existing IHL, it drives the
ongoing development of this body of law.1557 Consequently, civilian protection provides a strong
impetus for further IHL regulations of behaviours that endanger civilians during armed conflict.
Admittedly, the forms of speech discussed in this chapter – demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language and nicknames – do not directly inflict physical harm on civilians.
Rather, these forms of speech create an increased risk of violence directed toward civilians
during an armed conflict. The regulation of risk through law is not uncommon; in fact, it is often
an important function of governments, both in practice and in the public perception of the duty of
governments to manage certain risks in society.1558 While there is no global government, the
international community of states creates law through treaties and through their practice and
opinio juris.1559 States also frequently use international law to regulate risk.1560 The management
of risk is a central component of IHL, which seeks to limit the risks of war to civilians, including
military operations and combatant actions. Risk regulation is a common function of law
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generally and an integral component of IHL. Thus, I argued that the use of IHL to regulate the
increased risk of violence posed to civilians by combatant use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language and nicknames during armed conflict is not only consistent with the
aims of IHL, but it is also consistent with the manner in which law is used to protect civilians
through risk management.
There is a recognized difference between protections afforded to the free speech rights of
civilians and during peace as compared to those of combatants and during war. This chapter
demonstrated how both national and regional courts of countries with very strong protections for
free speech recognize that free speech restrictions which exceed those legally permissible for
civilians in peace are often legal within armed forces.1561 Combatants retain some free speech
rights, but they differ from those accorded to civilians.1562 One of the primary legal justifications
for limitations on the free speech of combatants is the need to maintain discipline within armed
forces and armed groups.1563 Internal discipline is one of the primary mechanisms for ensuring
internal compliance with IHL. The erosion of fidelity to the laws of war through the use of
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language directed toward civilians and non-derivative or
non-diminutive nicknames by combatants is both inimical to the aims of IHL to protect and
manage risk to civilians during conflict as well as to the discipline essential for the functioning of
armed forces and armed groups.
There is a need for new IHL rules to inhibit the use of dehumanization, euphemistic language,
anonymity, doubling, and diffusion of responsibility by combatants that allows them to reframe
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their conceptions of right and wrong, which can lead to violence toward civilians during conflict.
Section 8.2 of this chapter argued for a new rule to address the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language by combatants. Dehumanizing and euphemistic language could be
captured, in theory, by existing IHL rules prohibiting inhumane treatment, in particular the
prohibition on humiliating and degrading treatment. However, the lack of evidence that these
forms of speech toward civilians during armed conflict is considered prohibited,1564 in particular
from the International Committee of the Red Cross, is highly suggestive that no such legal
protection currently exists under IHL. Existing national laws governing hate speech are
insufficient in the specific context of armed conflict and with regard to the specific harm posed
to civilians by the combatant use of dehumanizing and euphemistic language. Further, because
the limitations on the restriction of free speech in peacetime do not apply in the same way during
war or to combatants,1565 speech regulation that is more restrictive than that permitted in the
peacetime context of hate speech is possible during armed conflict.
A new IHL rule to regulate the use of demeaning degrading, or dehumanizing language by
combatants requires five components. First, the rule should have an inclusive definition of
‘demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language’ that includes forms of speech that serve to
debase civilians, such as language which casts civilians as a threat, as inferior, or as not worthy
of respect or protection. Second, the rule should include the use of euphemistic language that has
the effect of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing civilians. Third, the rule should extend to
prohibit the use of the term ‘enemy’ to refer to a civilian or the civilian population. Fourth, the
level of intent for the new offence of using demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language
should be an intent to demean, degrade or dehumanize a civilian or the civilian population.
Finally, the new rule should require that the demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language
used by a combatant have the effect of debasing a civilian or the civilian population in the eyes
of the audience based on a standard of reasonableness. Together, these five components provide
a rule that will inhibit demeaning, degrading, and dehumanizing speech from serving to reframe
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conceptions of right and wrong in the minds of both speaker and audience. This will inhibit the
ability of dehumanization and euphemistic language to contribute to the perpetration of violence
toward civilians.
Section 8.3 of the chapter argued that a new IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames by
combatants is needed. A new rule regulating the use of nicknames is required in order to impede
the ability of nicknames to produce a sense of anonymity, a separate combatant identity, and the
diffusion of responsibility in a combatant that can contribute to the perpetration of violence
toward civilians. In particular, heroic or violent nicknames have been linked to combatants’
losing their fear, remorse, and a sense of accountability. Civilian protection warrants regulation
of the risk of combatant violence posed by nicknames. Nicknames are not regulated under
existing IHL, nor do they serve an essential military function. The human right to freedom of
expression does not prevent the regulation of names and nicknames during peace and greater
regulation of forms of expression is permitted during armed conflict and with regards to
combatants. Therefore, international human rights law does not bar the regulation of nicknames.
Further, regulation of risk is a key aspect of IHL and the power of law to change common or
socially accepted behaviours, such as seatbelt use, militate in favour of the regulation of
nickname use by combatants to alter current practices and minimize existing risks.
A new IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames requires three components. First, the rule should
require combatants to be known by either their first or last name. Second, the rule should provide
an exception for the use of derivative or diminutive nicknames based on a combatant’s first or
last name. This exception is intended to balance the risk of harm that stems from anonymity
and/or the creation of a separate combatant identity with the free speech rights of combatants.
The risk of anonymity or the creation of a separate combatant identity is less likely to occur
when a combatant uses a derivative or diminutive form of their own name as compared to a nonderivative or non-diminutive nickname, particularly heroic or violent nicknames. Third, the rule
should require a record to be kept of combatants’ first and last names, such as recording this
information in unit reports, in order to decrease likelihood of combatant anonymity and increase
the likelihood of combatant accountability. Together, these components of a new rule regulating

288
the use of nicknames would inhibit the ability for nicknames to produce anonymity, doubling,
and diffusion of responsibility that can contribute to the perpetration of violence toward civilians.
Together, the two recommendations in this chapter demonstrate how theories that examine
factors that can contribute to violence toward civilians can be applied to NIACs in order to
identify behaviours that pose a risk to civilians but are not regulated under existing IHL. These
recommendations demonstrate how behaviours that may be harmless, relatively harmless, or
subject to limited regulation in peacetime, may pose an increased risk of harm to civilians during
armed conflict and, consequently, warrant IHL regulation. Law may be used to limit the risks to
civilians posed by behaviours such as the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing
language and the use of non-derivative and non-diminutive nicknames. These laws can serve to
inhibit psychological processes contributing to violence toward civilians.
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Chapter 9
9 Conclusion
This thesis has discussed the protection of civilians during NIACs with an emphasis on
violations of IHL by members of non-state armed groups directed against civilians. In the many
NIACs over the last three decades, civilians have been subjected to widespread violence at the
hands of combatants in direct contravention of IHL.1566 Studies have demonstrated that the
perpetration of this violence cannot be attributed to psychological deficiencies on the part of the
perpetrators: “the perpetrators are ordinary people within extraordinary circumstances.”1567
I began my research wondering how law-abiding citizens during peace become law-breaking
combatants during armed conflict. This question was only reinforced in my mind by
conversations I had with many kind and friendly people I met in Sierra Leone and the DRC and
who I came to learn had been members of armed groups that violently attacked civilians during
conflicts in both of these countries. I, as well as this thesis, have been driven by the premise that
in order to prevent crime it is necessary to understand crime. Through this thesis, I have begun
the process of considering how combatant psychology can help to develop conflict-specific ways
of improving civilian protection, rather than relying on the same regulation of specific
behaviours for civilian protection in conflict as are used to protect individuals in peacetime.
This closing chapter restates the research problem and summarizes the approach, findings, and
recommendations advanced in the thesis. It will also address some limitations of the work and
propose areas for further research.
This thesis advanced the claim that there is gap between the regulation of behaviour for the
protection of individuals in peace and the regulations needed to protect civilians from combatant
1566

Examples of NIACs in which civilians have been victims of widespread IHL abuses include the Democratic
Republic of Congo (1996-ongoing), Rwanda (1990-1994), Sierra Leone (1991-2002), South Sudan (2013-ongoing),
Sudan (2003-2013), Syria (2011-ongoing), Yemen (2015-ongoing), and the Former Yugoslavia (1991-1999).
1567
Smeulers, supra note 22 at 234.

290
violence during war. Social psychology and criminology theories can help to develop the
necessary conflict-specific behavioural regulations because they explain how combatant
deviance is adversely affected by psychological processes that reframe combatants’ conceptions
of right and wrong and, in so doing, fundamentally alter the way in which combatants view the
IHL rules intended to protect civilians.
War is an exceptional context with different legal demands than peace. In war, there is no
blanket prohibition against killing and no blanket prohibition that protects individuals from being
killed. Frequent incidences of violence toward civilians committed by members of armed groups
exist. Efforts to improve civilian protection in NIACs requires addressing the IHL violations
committed by these combatants. The binding obligations of IHL on armed groups and their
members exist regardless of whether an armed group consents to be bound by these rules. Armed
groups and their members are bound by current IHL by virtue of both the ability of states to
assume legal obligations on behalf of their citizens and by the limited international legal
personality bestowed on armed groups based on Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.
Consequently, armed groups would likely be affected by the new IHL regulations proposed in
this thesis. Although international human rights law applies during armed conflict, only a limited
number of armed groups that act as de facto authorities on a territory will have legal international
human rights obligations. IHL protections for civilians are very important tools for governing
combatant behaviour, but the specific prohibited acts for civilian protection (e.g., murder,
violence to physical integrity, torture and rape) are acts that are equally prohibited in most
countries during peace. Similarly, while the existence of widespread IHL violations directed
toward civilians in Sierra Leone and the DRC - the case studies employed in this thesis indicates ongoing threats to civilian protection in spite of existing IHL protections, knowledge of
these violations alone does not necessarily provide any insight into the combatant psychology
leading to violence toward civilians.
There are three attempts in legal theory to draw on human behaviour to explain compliance or
deviance: Law and Economics theory, Behavioural Law and Economics theory, and
Socialization and International Law theory. These three theories fall short of providing the depth
and nuance necessary to understand and explain combatant violence toward civilians during
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armed conflict. I turned to theories of social psychology and criminology not because I believe
legal theory to be an inferior discipline but because I believe it is unrealistic to expect one
discipline to possess all of the answers to all of the problems in a complex and multi-dimensional
world. Specific theories to explain how ordinary individuals come to commit violations of IHL
exist in the disciplines of social psychology and criminology. Further, social psychologists and
criminologists have scientifically demonstrated a link between specific behaviours, such as
dehumanization or anonymity, and the expression of aggression and violence. Within this body
of literature, I identified four dominant theories that were repeatedly relied on by different
scholars: techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to
authority. Within these four theories, I identified two dominant themes: (1) the dehumanization
of civilians through the use of dehumanizing or euphemistic language and (2) the diffusion of
responsibility through deindividuation, anonymity, and doubling. Dehumanization poses a risk to
civilians because it debases civilians in the eyes of the speaker and their audience and the
assumption that that the dehumanized civilian does not need to be accorded the same humane
treatment as other humans. Diffusion responsibility produced through deindividuation,
anonymity, and doubling poses a risk to civilians because it allows combatants to
psychologically abdicate personal responsibility for their violent actions.
I have argued that, guided by criminological and social psychological insights, specifically the
effects of dehumanization and diffusion or displacement of responsibility, there are behaviours
which, although legal during peace, should be regulated during war due to the risk they pose to
civilians. I argued that the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech, although
necessarily protected for civilians and during peace due to the fundamental human right to free
speech and expression, should be regulated during armed conflict when used by combatants
toward a civilian or the civilian population. While existing IHL could potentially capture these
forms of speech as inhumane treatment, the absence of evidence that demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing speech directed toward civilians is currently considered illegal indicates that a
clear regulation of these forms of speech may be necessary in order to change how these forms
of speech are currently viewed and treated. I have argued that hate speech as criminalized in
some national jurisdictions fails to fully capture the harms that stem from the demeaning,
degrading, or dehumanizing language itself and an intent to demean, degrade, or dehumanize
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rather than from a feeling of hatred and a desire to provoke violence. Consequently, I have
proposed IHL regulation of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech by combatants
directed toward civilians during armed conflicts where the speaker intended to demean, degrade,
or dehumanize and where a reasonable person would view the speech as debasing a civilian or
the civilian population. Such a regulation would inhibit the ability of dehumanization to
contribute to violence toward civilians.
The second recommendation I have made is for the IHL regulation of the use of heroic or violent
nicknames, as these nicknames provide combatants with a sense of anonymity and a separate
identity on which to place responsibility for harms committed against civilians. While uniforms
also contribute to deindividuation, they are necessary during armed conflict in order to facilitate
the application of the principle of distinction, which protects civilians by requiring combatants to
distinguish between enemy combatants and civilians. The use of nicknames is also a form of free
speech or expression that receives significant protection under human rights law during
peacetime in many national jurisdictions. However, I argued that the risk posed by the use of
nicknames, particularly heroic or violent nicknames, during armed conflict warrants regulation
for the protection of civilians. Ultimately, through the examples of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language and heroic or violent nicknames as seen in both historic contexts of
violence toward civilians (e.g., World War II, Vietnam, Rwanda and Iraq) and in the case study
conflicts of Sierra Leone and the DRC, I have demonstrated that there are specific behaviours
which, in an armed conflict situation, pose a risk to civilians and, consequently, require
regulation under IHL.
Although there may seem to be a problematic internal tension in the advocacy of new IHL laws
as a means of addressing non-compliance with existing laws, I have demonstrated that there is a
critical difference between the way individuals think, act, and make decisions before the use of
psychological processes, such as dehumanization or displacement of responsibility, and after. In
order to prevent direct acts of violence against civilians downstream, new IHL rules addressing
the psychological processes that contribute to these acts of violence must be enacted upstream as
a preventative measure. Failure to intervene prior to the perpetration of direct acts of violence
against civilians allows a psychological obstacle to compliance to develop in the psyches of
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combatants. This is why it is important to capture both the use of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing language and the use of nicknames at the earliest point possible in order to prevent
the alterations to combatant psyches that lead to direct violence. Enforcement will only be
optimally effective when the right laws exist. I have argued that the right laws for civilian
protection must address the psychology of combatant violence toward civilians and, in particular,
the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language and the use of nicknames. It is in
removing these obstacles to compliance that meaningful progress may be made in the prevention
of direct harm toward civilians in armed conflict.
Chapter 1 introduced key constructs and concepts central to the thesis as well as established the
scope of the thesis. First, the primary focus of this thesis has been IHL, drawing where necessary
or relevant from international criminal law, international human rights law, and domestic
military justice systems. The chapter distinguished between IHL and international criminal law,
bodies of law which, due to many areas of overlap, are often conflated. Within the field of IHL,
the focus was identified as non-state armed groups in the context of NIACs. The research was
situated within the existing literature which has largely focused on engagement with armed
groups on issues of compliance and education based on existing IHL. This thesis contributes to
existing IHL literature in four important ways: (1) by introducing an in-depth examination of
combatant psychology into the IHL literature; (2) by identifying a gap within current IHL
regulation and literature on the protection of civilians; (3) by demonstrating that there are ways
that IHL protection for civilians can and should be substantively developed; and, (4) by
developing and recommending new IHL regulations to address the use of demeaning, degrading,
or dehumanizing language by combatants during conflict as well as the use of non-diminutive
and non-derivative nicknames by combatants during war.
Other scholars have begun to apply social psychology and socio-legal approaches to international
criminal law.1568 For example, Smeulers has recently used social psychology, including cognitive
dissonance and crimes of obedience, to discuss the defence of superior orders codified in Article
33(1) of the Statute of the International Criminal and the reasons why this defence, currently
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only available with regards to war crimes, should possibly be extended to crimes against
humanity and genocide.1569 Other scholars have applied socio-legal approaches and social
psychology to examine international criminal law issues of individual responsibility,1570 to
discuss the role of the Malabo Protocol to make changes to the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights,1571 and to explore the differences in the application of international and national
criminal law.1572 These scholars are demonstrating the value of using social psychology and
criminology to think about law, specifically international criminal law. This thesis is the first
work to demonstrate how an approach based on social psychology and criminology can be used
in the substantive development of IHL.
Chapter 2 set out the methodological approach of this thesis. This thesis uses primarily legal
doctrinal methodology, which relies on the authoritative texts of international law – treaties,
custom, general principles, case law, and scholarly literature – to develop normatively persuasive
arguments that are grounded in the realities of the international legal system. This thesis has
relied heavily on interpretation; however, in doing so it drew on research from the social sciences
as supporting evidence. The thesis also used qualitative case study analysis based on conflicts in
Sierra Leone and the DRC to demonstrate the current status quo of IHL in practice and to find
evidence in practice of the behaviours identified within the social psychological and
criminological theories and studies employed in the thesis. Chapter 2 provided details on the
research and data collection conducted for both of these case studies. Though this thesis drew on
work from the social sciences and included the use of case studies, it remained motivated by the
“normative perspective of ‘the law’.”1573
Chapter 3 focused on identifying the legal actors whose behaviour was the subject of focus in the
thesis: armed groups and their members. This chapter clarified the legal concept of ‘armed
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group’ and demonstrated that both armed groups and their members are bound by existing IHL.
It argued that the binding obligations of IHL on armed groups and their members exist regardless
of whether an armed group consents to be bound by these rules and questions of compliance
should not be conflated with questions of the binding quality of law. Armed groups and their
members are bound by current IHL by virtue of both the ability of states to assume legal
obligations on behalf of their citizens and by the limited international legal personality bestowed
on armed groups based on Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. Consequently, armed
groups would likely be affected by the new IHL regulations proposed in this thesis. However,
although IHL applies to all armed groups, this chapter argued that international human rights law
only creates binding obligations for a limited number of armed groups that act as de facto
authorities on a territory will have legal international human rights obligations. The chapter
concluded that, because armed groups are bound by IHL, and in some cases by international
human rights law, this means that the application of new IHL regulations, such as those
developed in chapter 8, would be likely to affect armed groups.
Chapter 4 discussed the rules and principles to which organized armed groups are subject in
NIACs for the protection of civilians. First, it discussed the concept of humanity that is the
driving force undergirding much of IHL, in particular its core treaties: the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols in 1977. It argued that the humanitarian
goals of IHL warrant ongoing consideration of civilian protection and ways civilians might be
better protected during armed conflict. It then turned to more specific rules of IHL for the
protection of civilians, such as the principles of distinction proportionality, and precaution.
Combatants are required to distinguish between combatants and civilians as well as military
objectives and civilian objects and it is prohibited to directly target civilians or civilian objects.
However, they may be indirectly injured or killed in an attack on a legitimate target if that
attack’s anticipated military advantage is proportional to the incidental civilian damage that will
be caused by it. Further, IHL protects civilians from inhuman treatment in all circumstances.
Inhuman treatment is not exhaustively defined in IHL, but examples of acts that are inhuman
treatment as explicitly prohibited are provided: for example, violence to life, torture and cruel
treatment, humiliating and degrading treatment, and pillage. However, this chapter observed that
there is little to no difference between these specific prohibited acts for the protection of civilians

296
during armed conflict and peacetime legal protections for individuals. It suggested that the
unique context of armed conflict in which some people may legally kill and be killed may
demand regulation of behaviours that, in peace, would be legal but in war pose a threat to the
safety of civilians.
Chapter 5 demonstrated the prevalence of IHL violations of civilian protections in practice
through the case studies of Sierra Leone and the DRC. The chapter provided some brief
background information on the case study conflicts: Sierra Leone’s civil war and the many
conflicts in the DRC since the mid 1990s. This chapter focused on the types of IHL violations
committed against civilians in both Sierra Leone and the DRC. The existence of ongoing
violations demonstrates the possible need for greater regulation of combatants during armed
conflict. This chapter argued that, while the existence of widespread IHL violations toward
civilians in Sierra Leone and the DRC demonstrate the persistence of threats to civilian
protection in spite of existing IHL rules, knowledge of these violations alone does not
necessarily provide any insight into the combatant psychology leading to violence toward
civilians. Consequently, it is necessary to look beyond mere awareness of the existence of IHL
violations to understand how law-abiding civilians become law-breaking combatants who
commit acts of violence against civilians.
Chapter 6 examined whether behavioural models developed in the legal theories of Law and
Economics, Behavioural Law and Economics, and Socialization and International Law provide
an adequate understanding of human behaviour to explain the perpetration of violence by
combatants during armed conflict. It argued that Law and Economics theory provides an
inadequate behavioural model due to its flawed assumptions about human rationality, selfinterest, preferences and goals. Behavioural Law and Economics theory has advanced a
behavioural model that addresses many of Law and Economics’ flawed assumptions; however,
this chapter argued that Behavioural Law and Economics also falls short of providing an
adequately nuanced model of human behaviour because as it aims for the broadest application
possible it focuses solely on a limited number of aspects of human psychology in ordinary, dayto-day life. Consequently, it fails to appreciate that unique context of war and how this context
affects combatant psychology. Finally, this chapter examined Socialization and International
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Law theory, which draws upon some theories from the social and behavioural sciences to
understand how law influences states. It argued that Socialization and International Law theory is
inadequate for understanding combatant perpetration of violence for one important reason: the
theory provides a very limited look at one psychological process affecting compliance,
acculturation, and leaving open whether there are other theories of explanations that might be
useful to explain individual behaviour.
Chapter 7 turned to theories of social psychology and criminology and highlighted the fact that
the perpetration of violence toward civilians cannot be dismissed as psychological deficiencies.
These perpetrators were law-abiding civilians in peacetime who become law-breaking
combatants during armed conflict. The chapter identified four theories that have been repeatedly
used by scholars to explain how ordinary individuals come to commit violent acts against
civilians during conflict: (1) techniques of neutralization; (2) moral disengagement; (3)
deindividuation; and, (4) obedience to authority. These theories demonstrate that individuals are
not inherently disposed to commit violent acts against civilians. Rather, certain patterns of
thought can inhibit self-regulation and allow individuals to neutralize or disengage their so-called
moral compass, thereby facilitating their participation in IHL violations. These patterns of
thought may take the form of justifications, denial or displacement of responsibility, or blaming
the victim. The theory of deindividuation demonstrates that submergence in a group and
anonymity can produce disinhibited behaviour, in part because it also provides a means of
displacing individual responsibility onto the group. Finally, obedience to authority demonstrates
that individuals are more inclined to commit violent acts under orders or authorization from a
legitimate authority, even where the orders themselves may not be legitimate. Through
discussion of these four theories, this chapter identified two dominant processes contributing to
violence toward civilians: (1) dehumanization and (2) diffusion of responsibility.
Chapter 8 identified the use of the psychological processes of dehumanization and diffusion of
responsibility in combatant behaviour in Sierra Leone and the DRC: the use of demeaning,
degrading, or dehumanizing language and the use of nicknames. Both of these behaviours serve
to alter the minds of combatants and create an obstacle to compliance with IHL rules prohibiting
direct violence against civilians. Further, the effects of both of these behaviours which lead to
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direct violence against civilians intensify over time. It is necessary to capture these behaviours
upstream at the earliest point possible in order to prevent the creation of this obstacle to
compliance. This chapter recommended two new IHL rules to regulate the use of these
behaviours by combatants. The chapter began by positing that law has the power to change risky
or dangerous behaviours, such as those examined in chapter 8, even where these behaviours were
previously socially acceptable or tolerated. Furthermore, risk regulation is an inherent
component of IHL, which seeks to regulate and limit risks to civilians during armed conflict. It
argued that, at minimum, where a risky behaviour is identified during armed conflict, it is worth
considering whether it may be possible to legally regulate that risky behaviour for the protection
of civilians. Part two of the chapter argued the need for IHL regulation of the use of demeaning,
degrading, or dehumanizing language by combatants. It reiterated the risks associated with the
dehumanization of civilians, in particular, the reframing of combatant perceptions of right and
wrong contributing to violence toward civilians. It provided examples from Sierra Leone and the
DRC of combatant use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language. It argued that the
use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech, although necessarily protected for
civilians and during peace due to the fundamental human right to free speech and expression,
should be regulated during armed conflict when used by combatants toward a civilian or the
civilian population. While existing IHL could potentially capture these forms of speech as
inhumane treatment, the absence of evidence that demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing
speech toward civilians is currently considered illegal indicates that a clear regulation of these
forms of speech may be necessary in order to change how these forms of speech are currently
viewed and treated. Limitations placed on the ability of states to regulate free speech in
peacetime do not apply in the same manner during war or to combatants. Consequently,
international human rights law does not prevent the regulation of demeaning, degrading, or
dehumanizing speech during conflict. It argued that a new IHL rule regulating the use of these
forms of speech should include five components: (1) an inclusive definition of ‘demeaning,
degrading, or dehumanizing language’; (2) a restriction on the use of euphemistic language that
demeans, degrades, or dehumanizes; (3) a restriction on the use of the term ‘enemy’ to refer to a
civilian or the civilian population; (4) a requirement of an intent to demean, degrade, or
dehumanize on the part of the speaker; and, (5) a requirement that the speech have the effect,
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based on a standard of reasonableness, of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing a civilian or
the civilian population in the mind of the listener.
The third part of chapter 8 examined the deindividuation of combatants and the production of a
sense of anonymity, doubling, and diffusion of responsibility among combatants. It argued that,
while the use of uniforms can contribute to deindividuation, uniforms are an inherent necessity
during armed conflict in order to facilitate the application of the principle of distinction which
protects civilians by requiring combatants to distinguish between enemy combatants and
civilians. The chapter focused on the widespread use of nicknames by combatants which can
contribute to a sense of anonymity, facilitate the diffusion of responsibility and permit
combatants to create a separate identity under which they commit violent acts. It argued that the
use of nicknames is appropriate for regulation as their use is neither a military necessity nor an
existing means of aiding in the protection of civilians. Further, due largely to the seemingly
innocuous nature of nicknames, neither IHL nor international human rights law currently
regulate the use of nicknames. The use of nicknames is, however, a form of free speech or
expression that receives near absolute protection under human rights law in many national
jurisdictions. The unique risk anonymizing heroic or violent nicknames pose to civilians during
armed conflict warrants regulation of these forms of nicknames, since they provide combatants
with a feeling of invincibility contributing to increased violence and aggression. Finally, this
chapter recommended that a new rule regulating the use of nicknames by combatants should
include three components: (1) the requirement that combatants be known by their first or last
name; (2) an exception this requirement for the use of derivative or diminutive nicknames based
on a combatant’s first or last name; and, (3) a requirement to record the full name of combatants.
Ultimately, through the examples of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language and
heroic or violent nicknames as seen in both historic contexts of violence toward civilians (e.g.,
World War II, Vietnam, Rwanda and Iraq) and in the case study conflicts of Sierra Leone and the
DRC, this chapter demonstrated the potential to use combatant psychology in the ongoing
development of IHL. Combatant psychology provides not only a means of identifying combatant
behaviours that pose a particular risk to civilians during armed conflict, it also offers a guide for
developing new substantive rules to inhibit behaviours contributing to violence toward civilians
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during armed conflicts. The regulation of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language
toward civilians and the use of non-derivative or non-diminutive nicknames by combatants
provides a means of contributing to IHL’s aim of civilian protection. Further research and
fieldwork may identify additional combatant behaviours that could be addressed to manage risks
to civilians during armed conflict. Combatant psychology can help people to understand some of
the causes of violence directed toward civilians during armed conflict and, through this
understanding, it is possible to begin to imagine new ways to prevent harm to civilians during
war.
As noted at the outset of this chapter, this thesis was driven by the premise that, in order to
prevent crime, it is necessary to understand crime. I have argued that the theories of techniques
of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority can provide
a significantly deepened understanding of the context of IHL abuses directed against civilians
during armed conflict. In turn, the understanding of how dehumanization and displacement of
responsibility contribute to violence against civilians has led me to identify the problematic
usage of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language as well as non-derivative or nondiminutive nicknames in the case studies of Sierra Leone and the DRC. I have used this
knowledge to propose two new IHL regulations to prevent the ability of these behaviours to lead
to IHL violations of civilian protections. The inhibition of the dehumanization of civilians
through a prohibition on demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech will reduce risks of
violence directed toward civilians during conflict by inhibiting the reframing of combatant
perceptions of right and wrong that contributes to this violence. The inhibition of
deindividuation, doubling, and the abdication of personal accountability for one’s actions
through the regulation of non-derivative or non-diminutive nicknames will similarly reduce risks
of violence directed toward civilians during conflict by inhibiting the reframing of combatant
perceptions of right and wrong that contributes to this violence. Unfortunately, the inhibition of
these behaviours will not eradicate the problem of IHL abuses of civilians entirely because the
complex realities of armed conflict make it impossible to reduce all IHL violations to two
psychological causes. However, I intend for the two regulations I have proposed to serve as a
starting point from which combatant psychology can be used to develop further ways to diminish
violence directed toward civilians during armed conflicts. Further, the inhibition of the
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dehumanization of civilians and the production of anonymity and doubling will allow the work
of organizations, such as the ICRC, which engage with armed groups to be more effective.
Looking forward, there is room to expand data collection within Sierra Leone and the DRC as
well as extend data collection to other conflicts. While I identified the two themes of
dehumanization and displacement of responsibility and addressed two manifestations of these
themes in the context of Sierra Leone and the DRC, there were other behaviours identified in the
criminological and social psychological theories used in this thesis that could be utilized to
evaluate existing IHL protections for civilians.1574 Further, there will likely be more ways that
displacement of responsibility manifests itself in combatant behaviour and possibly other acts
that serve to debase civilians in the eyes of combatants. Understanding combatant psychology
can provide insights not just for those seeking to develop new regulations to improve civilian
protection during conflict, it can also help commanders better understand and manage the
behaviour of their subordinates in a way that promotes the high levels of discipline necessary for
IHL compliance more broadly. The utility of combatant psychology is not limited to the
regulation of armed groups. The proposed regulations in this thesis may also be of utility for
state armed forces where my, albeit limited, anecdotal evidence suggests that dehumanization by
combatants during armed conflict exists within Western militaries.1575 The regulations I have
proposed could help to prevent some of the types of civilian abuses committed, for example, by
U.S. forces in Iraq.1576
1574

For example, the theories discussed in chapter 7 emphasize the power of authorization and routinization, which
allow combatants to displace and diffuse responsibility for their own actions onto superior officers and/or their
fellow combatants. Although the chain of command plays an important role in the functioning of armed groups as
well as state militaries, it might be possible to develop ways of mediating the effects of the chain of command on the
sense of responsibility combatants feel for their own actions. There may also be additional manners in which
dehumanization, anonymization, or the abdication of personal responsibility is manifested in combatant behaviour
during armed conflict that could be identified through further fieldwork and/or the extension of fieldwork to
different case study conflicts.
1575
For example, the torture and murder of a Somali teenager by Canadian soldiers in 1993. The official report
explicitly records racism within the ranks and among the Canadian Armed Forces members responsible:
Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of
the Somalia Affair (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997); See also, e.g., JL
Granatstein & Dean F Oliver, “The Somalia Affair The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History” (2013)
22:4 Canadian Military History 59; Richard Foot, “Somalia Affair”, (5 November 2018), online: The Canadian
Encyclopedia <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/somalia-affair>; Alexander John McKinnon,
Torture of the Other - Racism as an Element of Torture in Contemporary Military Operations Carleton University,
2006) [unpublished].
1576
The most well known example is the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison: see, e.g., Hersh, supra note 1460;
However, Abu Ghraib is not the only recorded incident of IHL violations committed by US troops: see, e.g. Raffi
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This thesis has sought to contribute to a better understanding of combatant psychology and to
identify a way this understanding can be put to practical use within IHL. Dehumanization and
displacement of responsibility provide paths to civilian suffering and I have argued that legal
regulation can block combatants’ path to IHL violations.

9.1 Limitations
This thesis establishes a strong case for the substantive development of IHL based on insights
into combatant psychology. However, like all works it is not without limitations. First, as
addressed in chapter 2, the case study fieldwork was limited by the size and scope of the
fieldwork data collection as well as by practical, security and logistical limitations on interviews
in the field. Another limitation of this thesis is that it provides limited discussion on the
enforcement of IHL. Its primary focus is on developing a new approach to thinking about the
development of IHL and the types of behaviours that are regulated by this body of law. Thus, it
addressed the utility of a new approach that considers how combatant psychology contributes to
IHL violations and identified theories that provide this information. It then applies the theory of
combatant psychology to existing IHL based on the recent and ongoing armed conflicts in Sierra
Leone and the DRC. It demonstrated the utility and applicability of a combatant psychology
approach in the development of IHL and took this as a logical end point. Enforcement is a
natural correlate of law-making and issues of compliance and deviace but approaches the
problem of IHL violations from a different direction than that which was the focus in this thesis.
Consequently, the thesis leaves for future research questions of enforcement. The premise of
these thesis is that IHL must have new rules in place to prevent the psychological reframing of
conceptions of right and wrong before any remaining issues regarding compliance and
enforcement are examined.

9.2 Future Research
Over the next five years, I intend to focus on two projects stemming from the research and
fieldwork conducted for this thesis. First, I will build on the links I began to develop between the
military justice systems and the regulation of armed groups. This project would conduct a study
of state military justice systems as well as a study of the internal disciplinary systems of armed
Khatchadourian, “The Kill Company”, (2 June 2009), online: The New Yorker
<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/07/06/the-kill-company>.
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groups. The aim of the project will be to identify practices within state military justice systems
that might be adopted and adapted for the internal regulation of non-state armed groups. The goal
would be to produce different models of disciplinary best practices targeting different sizes of
armed groups with different levels of organization. These models would provide a useful tool for
armed groups as well as for international organizations engaging with armed groups. The second
research project will examine topics raised by field interviews, but which fell outside the scope
of this thesis. In particular, the issue of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration was very
important to former combatants I spoke to in Eastern DRC. My discussion with these excombatants highlighted for me the effect disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
programs can have on both incentivizing current combatants to disarm and demobilize, but also,
where programs leave ex-combatants dissatisfied or in precarious living conditions, this can
contribute to re-enlistment and the disincentivization of participation in these programs to
combatants. This problem arises in contexts like the DRC where disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration programs operate alongside ongoing conflict. Consequently, there is an
interesting overlap between IHL and post-conflict regulation, sometimes referred to as jus post
bellum (or law after war), that requires further study.

9.3 Conclusion
In sum, the protection of civilians during conflicts requires rules targeting the particular risks
posed to civilians during war. The use of social psychology and criminology theories help to
identify what these conflict-specific risks to civilians are by providing insight into the
psychological processes that lead law-abiding citizens to become law-breaking combatants who
perpetrate acts of violence against civilians. My hope is that this improved understanding of
violence toward civilians can continue to be used to develop new ways to protect civilians during
conflict and to advance IHL’s humanitarian objectives.
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